Status: repository-complete / closed. The invoked Hathor dialogue, Metis tutoring/agent/tool, V8 multimodal, and V7 Forge/Moremi paths enforce their safety decisions before the governed action and fail closed when required evidence or authority is unavailable. This status does not claim live third-party moderation, production deployment, population-level calibration, a general learned safety classifier, arbitrary-JavaScript sandboxing, or human approval.
Work-package charter#
- Task ID:
SAFETY-001 - Owner: V2 Hathor, V9 Metis, V8 Ariadne/Yemaya, and V7 Moremi/Forge maintainers; implementation owner: Elikem Agudogo
- Accountable products: V2 Hathor NPC dialogue, V9 Metis tutoring and agent runtime, V8 Ariadne/Yemaya case production, and V7 Forge Assist/Moremi realm execution
- Priority: P0
- Target milestone: 2026-07-15 SOTA gap-closure program
- Risk tier: Critical generated-content, learner-safety, agent-tool, multimodal-media, and realm-capability authority risk
- Audit finding: safety configuration, confidence, memory attribution, policy screening, media moderation, and capability inspection could exist as disconnected metadata or static proxies without governing the invoked product action
- Dependencies:
PROMPT-001throughPROMPT-003, V2 dialogue/memory contracts, V9 agent-runtime safety records, V8 G6/Sekhmet, V7 Moremi/Ixchel,AUTH-001, and product-specific safety policy - Affected schemas and content slots: Hathor dialogue confidence, abstention, memory attribution, and adapter output; Metis safety screening, classifier, trust-zone, agent-plan, tool receipt, and tutor metadata; V8 scanner evidence and Loom dependencies; Forge capability authority and Moremi admission receipt. No rendered UI or database migration changed.
- Linked task IDs:
SAFETY-001,PROMPT-001,PROMPT-002,PROMPT-003,AUTH-001,AUTH-003,PROOF-001,V2-003,V7-001,V8-005, andV9-003 - Rollout strategy: fail-closed library/service boundaries with versioned, additive records; semantic media and live provider edges remain explicitly configured
- Rollback strategy: revert each product boundary with its fixtures and downstream contract changes. Do not partially restore permissive fallback, fabricated confidence, unbound memory IDs, static-only sandbox admission, or caller-asserted safety state.
- Evidence-pack location: this file
Closure matrix#
| Ledger requirement | Invoked product path | Current closure proof |
|---|---|---|
| Invoke Hathor safety and fail closed | DialogueGenerator.generateResponse |
Input is filtered before provider dispatch; output is validated before delivery; required evaluation throws or abstains when its filter/evidence is unavailable. |
| Calibrated Hathor confidence and abstention | dialogue result and V2 adapter | Provider, safety, constraints, and memory evidence feed versioned monotonic regression calibration; a score below 0.62 returns an explicit named abstention. |
| Real Hathor memory attribution | MemorySystem.recall → prompt → marker validation |
Only retrieved IDs can be attributed; invented IDs and required-but-unused memories abstain; memoriesTriggered contains validated used IDs only. |
| Successful V9 safety record before planning/generation/tools | tutoring, plan creation/run, and DAG tool execution | Each path requires the current tenant/input/policy-bound record; missing, stale, drifted, unevaluated, review, blocked, or approval-required state denies the governed action. |
| V9 policy classifier plus adversarial evaluation | Metis agent safety screening | Versioned intent classification and deterministic hard tripwires both run; the seven-case adversarial gate must pass completely, while classifier exceptions fail closed. |
| V8 real multimodal providers and honest offline floor | Ariadne G6 through Loom production dependencies | Actual text/image/audio/video/3D refs are coverage checked; local binary and remote Sekhmet providers are wired; the text-keyword floor cannot claim media semantics or silently satisfy production. |
| V7 computed capability calls in a real sandbox | Forge → AUTH-001 authority → Moremi admission → Wasmtime | Constant expressions compile to exact Wasmtime imports; unsupported/dynamic syntax, invalid payloads, missing or widened authority, source drift, and host-call/authority-use trace drift all deny before an allowed receipt. |
V2 Hathor dialogue boundary#
DialogueGenerator owns the complete safety sequence around the invoked
provider:
- evaluate the current user utterance with configured
filterContent; - retrieve bounded memories from the injected Hathor
MemorySystem; - fence persona, world, constraints, memories, and user text as untrusted prompt data;
- invoke the configured provider;
- parse only
[[memory:<retrieved-id>]]markers and strip them from surfaced text; - evaluate generated text with
validateNPCResponse; - validate dialogue constraints and memory attribution;
- calculate versioned evidence and either answer or return a named abstention.
The default is a local SafetyFilter. Passing null is permitted only when the
request explicitly makes evaluation optional. Required missing evaluation or
filter exceptions fail closed. Unsafe input never reaches the provider; unsafe
output never reaches the player.
The response exposes hathor.dialogue-confidence.2026-07-16.v1, its raw
evidence, calibrated score, threshold, and components. This is bounded monotonic
regression calibration over repository evidence, not provider certainty or
population calibration. Explicit states are answered and abstained, with
named reasons for safety, constraints, memory attribution, and low confidence.
The V2 adapter subsequently validates the surfaced safety output rather than
trusting a bridge-shaped object.
V9 Metis governed execution boundary#
Metis safety screenings are service-owned records, not booleans supplied by a request. An admitted record binds:
- screening and tenant identities;
- canonical request-input hash;
metis.agent-runtime.safetypolicy identity and version2.0.0;- successful classifier evaluation and adversarial-gate result;
clear/allowdecision;- a trust zone without outstanding human approval.
Plan creation screens first and embeds an immutable projection. Run execution reloads the service record and rejects missing state, tenant/hash mismatch, policy or classifier drift, failed evaluation, review/blocked state, binding drift, or required approval. The DAG executor independently screens immediately before each tool call and records the screening ID in its receipt. Tutoring performs the same governed screen before provider generation and returns learner-visible safe degradation when admission fails.
The policy has two independent surfaces: exact hard tripwires for control tokens, private-key material, destructive commands, and unsafe network targets; and a versioned deterministic intent classifier for prompt override, secret disclosure, cross-tenant access, destructive mutation, unsafe network access, assessment compromise, and policy bypass. Every screen evaluates seven paraphrased, obfuscated, and benign cases. All must match their expected blocked/review/clear result. Classifier exceptions and adversarial regression produce separate critical findings and fail closed.
V8 Ariadne multimodal G6 boundary#
G6 scans actual asset-manifest inputs rather than using transcript text as proof
for media. Results name provider, version, mode, covered refs/kinds, flags, and
limitations. requireSafetyClear rejects absent scanners, malformed evidence,
missing refs/kinds, or any flag.
The providers intentionally make different claims:
KeywordSafetyScanneris a text-only offline floor and refuses image, audio, video, and 3D coverage.ContentAnalyzerSafetyScannerinvokes the local@yemaya/safetybinary analyzer on fetched bytes. Its claim is integrity, metadata, steganography, and known-hash analysis, not semantic vision or 3D understanding.SekhmetHttpSafetyScannersends actual text or base64 media bytes to the configured governed semantic provider and validates provider identity, coverage, refs, flags, and verdict consistency.CompositeSafetyScannerunions independent provider coverage and flags.
Production Loom construction requires Sekhmet configuration and an explicit media-origin allowlist. Fetches constrain protocol, initial and redirect origin, per-asset and batch bytes, streamed response size, and timeout. Production cannot silently fall back to the keyword floor.
The committed 12-case offline benchmark deliberately retains semantic misses and benign-context false positives:
| Metric | Result |
|---|---|
| True positives | 4 |
| False negatives | 2 |
| False positives | 2 |
| True negatives | 4 |
| Precision | 0.6667 |
| Recall | 0.6667 |
| False-positive rate | 0.3333 |
| Semantic/multimodal coverage | false |
This measures the keyword floor honestly; it is not evidence that media was semantically moderated.
V7 Moremi/Forge capability boundary#
Forge Assist does not treat static scanning as execution authority. Every static-clean candidate first earns source- and capability-bound AUTH-001 bindings, then submits source, declarations, authority, and hashes to Moremi's authenticated admission endpoint. Missing configuration, transport failure, malformed or foreign receipts, missing component hashes, and trace mismatch fail closed.
Moremi accepts a deliberately restricted Forge program:
- constant string bindings;
- direct
oshun.invokecalls; - string literals, parenthesized constants, concatenations, and constant template interpolation for capability names;
- strict JSON payloads without secret-bearing keys.
Runtime-dependent capability expressions return DYNAMIC_CAPABILITY_UNRESOLVED;
aliased, optional-chain, computed Oshun syntax, uncompiled statements, and
unsupported control flow return fail-closed parser violations. Missing, expired,
payload-mismatched, or widened AUTH-001 bindings never reach Wasmtime.
For admitted source, Moremi creates a Wasmtime component whose imports derive from exact resolved capabilities. The linker exposes only declared realm capabilities, applies authority resource limits, then instantiates and runs the program. Every host call consumes the exact authority-use identity and records its payload hash. The receipt binds source/component hashes, compiled and observed call sequence, authority-use sequence, payload hashes, runtime/version, verdict, and violations. A TCP test crosses authentication, HTTP parsing, component instantiation, and host execution.
Adversarial fixture matrix#
| Fixture | Result |
|---|---|
| Required Hathor filter is absent or throws | Provider action is denied or explicit abstention is returned |
| Provider invents a memory marker | Attribution fails; invented ID is never surfaced as triggered memory |
| Required memory is retrieved but unused | Explicit memory_required abstention |
| Metis record tenant/input/policy drifts | Planning, tutoring, or tool execution is rejected |
| Metis classifier throws or adversarial set regresses | Critical finding; governed action fails closed |
| V8 scanner omits an asset ref/kind | G6 admission rejects incomplete coverage |
| Keyword floor receives non-text media | Coverage is refused, not guessed |
| Media redirects outside the allowlist | Byte fetch fails before scanner admission |
| Forge source hash or authority payload binding changes | Moremi denies before Wasmtime |
| Forge capability is aliased, unresolved, or undeclared | Parser or missing Wasmtime import rejects |
| Extra invocation argument or secret-bearing payload | INVALID_INVOCATION_PAYLOAD before Wasmtime |
| Executed host-call, authority-use, or payload trace drifts | Admission receipt is denied |
Automated verification#
Current admitted value ledger#
The owning suites were run sequentially. The Forge and prompt rows precede the source-remediation commit, but neither surface changed in that commit; Hathor and Moremi were rerun after their exact changes.
| UTC interval | Files/targets | Result | Surface |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-29T15:27:10.483Z–2026-07-29T15:27:13.314Z | 10 | 110/110 | full Hathor llm-npc package |
| 2026-07-29T15:31:11.747Z–2026-07-29T15:31:15.887Z | 5 | 38/38 | Metis safety/runtime/learning slice |
| 2026-07-29T15:32:10.210Z–2026-07-29T15:32:12.159Z | 3 | 38/38 | Yemaya case pipeline |
| 2026-07-29T15:32:17.476Z–2026-07-29T15:32:34.513Z | 10 | 41/41 + 3 skips | V8 Loom service |
| 2026-07-29T15:32:40.623Z–2026-07-29T15:32:41.552Z | 1 | 18/18 | Yemaya case contracts |
| 2026-07-29T15:27:35.615Z–2026-07-29T15:27:44.924Z | 1 | 82/82 | full Moremi Rust library target; binary/doc targets contain 0 |
| 2026-07-29T15:19:47.476Z–2026-07-29T15:20:06.735Z | 3 | 25/25 | full Forge Assist package |
| 2026-07-29T15:20:12.464Z–2026-07-29T15:20:23.587Z | 1 | 67/67 | exact V6/V7 prompt-boundary regression |
| Unique total | 34 | 419/419 | plus three explicit Loom skips; no assertion is counted twice |
The former 378/378 total was accurate for the smaller historical suite set.
The @yemaya/safety package currently has no local test files; its configured
--passWithNoTests gate exited zero and is not counted as passing assertions.
Representative commands:
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir libs/hathor/llm-npc exec vitest run
PYTHONPATH=apps/metis/service/src /tmp/metis-safety-venv/bin/python -m pytest -q <five Metis files>
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir libs/yemaya/case-pipeline exec vitest run
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir apps/v8/loom-service exec vitest run
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir libs/yemaya/case-contracts exec vitest run
cargo test --locked --manifest-path apps/v7/Cargo.toml -p moremi-realm-server -- --nocapture
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/maya/forge-assist/vitest.config.ts
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm exec vitest run --config testing/prompt-injection/vitest.config.ts testing/prompt-injection/src/v6-v7-boundaries.spec.ts
Type, lint, build, and contract gates#
- Hathor, Forge Assist, and prompt-boundary TypeScript configurations passed; the commit hook also passed Hathor, V2 adapter, prompt, and BFF affected typechecks, with BFF reporting 0 known and 0 new app-owned errors.
- Seven current V8 configurations passed: case-pipeline library/spec, Loom, case-contract library/spec, Yemaya safety, and Daedalus.
- Hathor, Forge, prompt, and the core V8 scanner/Loom/contract/compiler surfaces
have zero ESLint errors and warnings. The broader
@yemaya/safetypackage lint exits zero with 12 pre-existing warnings in ethics/content-filter managers; this refresh does not relabel them clean. - Hathor Prettier and
tsupbuild passed. Yemaya safetytsupand V8 docs drift passed. - Metis Ruff check/format passed on 11 safety source/test files; strict Mypy passed on six source modules. OpenAPI JSON and generated TypeScript drift checks passed with the compatible dependency set named below.
- Moremi Rust format, locked Cargo check, strict all-target Clippy, complete library tests, and zero-test binary/doc targets passed.
git diff --checkpassed at the source checkpoint.
Refresh-discovered red evidence and remediation#
The refresh retains setup and gate failures rather than converting them into passes:
- System Python collected zero Metis tests because
fastapiandpydantic_settingswere absent. An isolated environment installed the declaredapps/metis/service[dev]extra; the exact five-file suite then passed 38/38. - A fresh unconstrained install resolved FastAPI
0.141.0with Pydantic2.13.4. Tests passed, but OpenAPI drift correctly failed because that Pydantic version collapses two previously separate input/output schema pairs. FastAPI0.141.0, Pydantic2.11.7, pydantic-settings2.10.1, and Starlette0.47.3reproduce the checked-in JSON and generated TypeScript exactly. The service's broad lower-bound-only dependency ranges remain a reproducibility caveat; no application-schema drift is hidden. - Hathor's first package-wide Prettier check found ten files. Commit
6299a9fc53213fcd0dd02ebd2a6596ea3021f50amechanically formatted them; full tests, typecheck, lint, formatter, build, and downstream hook typechecks then passed. - Rust
1.95.0strict Clippy found one collapsible parser branch and two manual checked divisions. The same commit split duplicate-comma handling into explicit fail-closed match arms and used checked division with the existing zero-denominator fallbacks. Moremi 82/82 and all Rust static gates then passed.
Loom's green run emitted missing-source-map warnings for checked-in shared database JavaScript. Its 41 assertions passed and three integration cases were explicitly skipped. The Yemaya no-test gate also reported a ten-second close timeout before exiting zero; neither message is represented as a test pass.
Artifact identity#
Hashes were recomputed from published implementation tip
6299a9fc53213fcd0dd02ebd2a6596ea3021f50a.
| Artifact / path | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
Hathor dialogue boundary — dialogue-generator.ts |
6e8a7896ac6c814726b56280b522470ab4e9240b451b0183a1b47380fdcb18f9 |
Hathor dialogue fixtures — dialogue-generator.spec.ts |
b0b23cff1ca57ed73961dbcd196199357b9b9d654b717ee2408ee226c877598b |
Metis policy classifier — agent_safety_helpers.py |
2a4e08b136b76e2c403c70c1f1e7f75adb965ee1801767e5724417566b65196e |
Metis runtime record gate — agent_runtime_service.py |
c420873700d7fda575b3cb2f5396a69572d017dc8845d8a4b6253a3fd1fa91f1 |
Metis tool gate — agent_dag_executor.py |
e85cc9236273d89efb77080c2a39080255c8ae9f785d3b3f4a5fcd663864633f |
Metis tutor gate — tutoring_service.py |
a413391549a5e36f8457ab6deefa920704413135a31ef1978ec74c81238a310f |
V8 scanner/providers — case-pipeline/src/safety.ts |
ae980a44bf6fb8a83f1f4c59783033e358ed14b2a284566aeee0c5d122c0c68c |
V8 keyword benchmark — keyword-safety-benchmark.ts |
77f946298d6b78f7c93a48565f72a8cefca8a64df5cbed66898c0445fcf8c8ab |
V8 production wiring — loom-service/src/deps.ts |
ab5c76c6581c28ea42438a43b90ad33e4ba10b6dc79da5345bac0db317fd8c5e |
Moremi Wasmtime admission — forge_assist_sandbox.rs |
02e54e26fae90e17ba80d03000192f30a78a7ffc0d11f0272022a6c4124283e6 |
Forge admission client — sandbox-admission.ts |
97dfdc5bd86b4779f4d4f539fbb05488c7da2b31b5af41b16fb49042a34557d0 |
Forge invoked boundary — forge-assist.ts |
ea5c5a893be8a686d525c37a2038196f484c877aaf5550cc3b1ba3b1483b70a4 |
Forge authority boundary — invocation-authority.ts |
dfcc21c131973a5fadcb9a8af65f6af2b5bf370ede737395829899e17276e11c |
| Metis OpenAPI artifact | 7a0aca2325ddd0c102aa0463ffd29ab103df0f38b7aded4dff6adbd8c4c7a925 |
| Metis generated TypeScript contract | 1966aea9128c5f6e715eb5e192414c805ef1dff9e18604e25f71656a71afbd4f |
| V7 Cargo lock | 4d7d0181cda4c0f1ef947d1d326bfcd1a1bcb8bd7ce8b6220754bd6e291eb94d |
| Workspace dependency lock | 08b055786e9b8a6104d5313601d7eef3205dedcf395066fd9a8264c9859d690f |
Human authority and external deployment boundary#
Repository publication of deterministic policies and fixtures requires no fabricated human signoff, and none is claimed.
- Hathor calibration is regression calibration over explicit product evidence, not population calibration, licensed human-gold validation, or a live-provider reliability estimate.
- Metis uses a deterministic versioned policy-intent classifier and bounded seven-case gate. It is not represented as a general learned semantic model; live-model red teaming remains a release activity.
- V8's local analyzer covers byte/media integrity, not semantic multimodal understanding. Semantic production coverage depends on configured Sekhmet; no live moderation response is claimed.
- Moremi executes the admitted restricted Forge program, not arbitrary JavaScript. Unsupported or runtime-dependent syntax is denied rather than guessed.
- AUTH-001 records and local TCP fixtures prove repository authority behavior, not a signed remote attestation, production realm deployment, or human approval.
- No production provider call, customer outcome, operator decision, or deployment is claimed.
Resource-safe verification and UI scope#
The refresh host was app-dev-server, Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, Linux
6.8.0-134-generic x86_64, with 15 GiB RAM, 31 GiB swap, and 16 GiB free disk.
The toolchains were Node.js v24.15.0, pnpm 10.25.0, TypeScript 6.0.3,
Vitest 4.1.7, Python 3.12.3, pytest 9.1.1, Rust/Cargo 1.95.0.
An unrelated checkout's long-running Vitest worker and this checkout's Nx daemon were active. Verification remained targeted and sequential except for the bounded repository hook. No full-workspace Nx sweep, production web build, Expo export, Tauri packaging, Unreal build, Playwright run, or mobile automation was started.
This refresh changes backend/runtime formatting, Rust gate compatibility, and evidence only. It does not change customer/admin/PWA/mobile/Unreal UI, so the frontend skill, Playwright, mobile automation, screenshots, and Unreal verification are inapplicable.
Publication identity#
- Original Hathor source commit:
fee5bba3101af670798333cf71844f7fda779d74 - Original Metis source commit:
c06014ca70aa4e296689770d634827b281071e16 - Original V8 source identity:
bbc441f42a04b7518f832a2b4d903a8c7dde680e - V8 source identity on the current graph (identical tree):
7c5d061745168fe759b6c72bfb68e51801992dff - Original V7 source commit:
39c039a5713606982ca1b2f3b4c1e6f783fe82f6 - Historical evidence-pack commit on the current graph:
0073cf4feee86df22f575ac05de3507e9a2d1a01 - Historical equivalent evidence identity (identical tree):
9453041294efd6888274ca640666276879527427 - Historical ledger closure commit:
b3dce86f52fcde33ed7b913a77e2b2588d7b40e3 - V2 surfaced-output hardening:
4436396cc24e26b19abe5a3ba4d898ae97df5146 - V7 invocation-authority hardening:
b8f637a8d7817b0e58635fea8e47c19239cbb93d - V7 complete restricted-program hardening:
16d3588f7824d44cd31dbe6b9a54cf1722bd4f4d - V8 exact eight-gate admission hardening:
b0d07ff5a8a7d1ddaa08e5fd297e7354b1667013 - Current static-gate remediation and admitted source tip:
6299a9fc53213fcd0dd02ebd2a6596ea3021f50a - Current evidence-refresh commit: recorded by the task-scoped commit that contains this file.