# SAFETY-001 evidence pack — invoked product-path safety

> **Status: repository-complete / closed.** The invoked Hathor dialogue, Metis
> tutoring/agent/tool, V8 multimodal, and V7 Forge/Moremi paths enforce their
> safety decisions before the governed action and fail closed when required
> evidence or authority is unavailable. This status does not claim live
> third-party moderation, production deployment, population-level calibration, a
> general learned safety classifier, arbitrary-JavaScript sandboxing, or human
> approval.

## Work-package charter

- **Task ID:** `SAFETY-001`
- **Owner:** V2 Hathor, V9 Metis, V8 Ariadne/Yemaya, and V7 Moremi/Forge
  maintainers; implementation owner: Elikem Agudogo
- **Accountable products:** V2 Hathor NPC dialogue, V9 Metis tutoring and agent
  runtime, V8 Ariadne/Yemaya case production, and V7 Forge Assist/Moremi realm
  execution
- **Priority:** P0
- **Target milestone:** 2026-07-15 SOTA gap-closure program
- **Risk tier:** Critical generated-content, learner-safety, agent-tool,
  multimodal-media, and realm-capability authority risk
- **Audit finding:** safety configuration, confidence, memory attribution,
  policy screening, media moderation, and capability inspection could exist as
  disconnected metadata or static proxies without governing the invoked product
  action
- **Dependencies:** `PROMPT-001` through `PROMPT-003`, V2 dialogue/memory
  contracts, V9 agent-runtime safety records, V8 G6/Sekhmet, V7 Moremi/Ixchel,
  `AUTH-001`, and product-specific safety policy
- **Affected schemas and content slots:** Hathor dialogue confidence,
  abstention, memory attribution, and adapter output; Metis safety screening,
  classifier, trust-zone, agent-plan, tool receipt, and tutor metadata; V8
  scanner evidence and Loom dependencies; Forge capability authority and Moremi
  admission receipt. No rendered UI or database migration changed.
- **Linked task IDs:** `SAFETY-001`, `PROMPT-001`, `PROMPT-002`, `PROMPT-003`,
  `AUTH-001`, `AUTH-003`, `PROOF-001`, `V2-003`, `V7-001`, `V8-005`, and
  `V9-003`
- **Rollout strategy:** fail-closed library/service boundaries with versioned,
  additive records; semantic media and live provider edges remain explicitly
  configured
- **Rollback strategy:** revert each product boundary with its fixtures and
  downstream contract changes. Do not partially restore permissive fallback,
  fabricated confidence, unbound memory IDs, static-only sandbox admission, or
  caller-asserted safety state.
- **Evidence-pack location:** this file

## Closure matrix

| Ledger requirement                                           | Invoked product path                                     | Current closure proof                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Invoke Hathor safety and fail closed                         | `DialogueGenerator.generateResponse`                     | Input is filtered before provider dispatch; output is validated before delivery; required evaluation throws or abstains when its filter/evidence is unavailable.                                                              |
| Calibrated Hathor confidence and abstention                  | dialogue result and V2 adapter                           | Provider, safety, constraints, and memory evidence feed versioned monotonic regression calibration; a score below `0.62` returns an explicit named abstention.                                                                |
| Real Hathor memory attribution                               | `MemorySystem.recall` → prompt → marker validation       | Only retrieved IDs can be attributed; invented IDs and required-but-unused memories abstain; `memoriesTriggered` contains validated used IDs only.                                                                            |
| Successful V9 safety record before planning/generation/tools | tutoring, plan creation/run, and DAG tool execution      | Each path requires the current tenant/input/policy-bound record; missing, stale, drifted, unevaluated, review, blocked, or approval-required state denies the governed action.                                                |
| V9 policy classifier plus adversarial evaluation             | Metis agent safety screening                             | Versioned intent classification and deterministic hard tripwires both run; the seven-case adversarial gate must pass completely, while classifier exceptions fail closed.                                                     |
| V8 real multimodal providers and honest offline floor        | Ariadne G6 through Loom production dependencies          | Actual text/image/audio/video/3D refs are coverage checked; local binary and remote Sekhmet providers are wired; the text-keyword floor cannot claim media semantics or silently satisfy production.                          |
| V7 computed capability calls in a real sandbox               | Forge → AUTH-001 authority → Moremi admission → Wasmtime | Constant expressions compile to exact Wasmtime imports; unsupported/dynamic syntax, invalid payloads, missing or widened authority, source drift, and host-call/authority-use trace drift all deny before an allowed receipt. |

## V2 Hathor dialogue boundary

`DialogueGenerator` owns the complete safety sequence around the invoked
provider:

1. evaluate the current user utterance with configured `filterContent`;
2. retrieve bounded memories from the injected Hathor `MemorySystem`;
3. fence persona, world, constraints, memories, and user text as untrusted
   prompt data;
4. invoke the configured provider;
5. parse only `[[memory:<retrieved-id>]]` markers and strip them from surfaced
   text;
6. evaluate generated text with `validateNPCResponse`;
7. validate dialogue constraints and memory attribution;
8. calculate versioned evidence and either answer or return a named abstention.

The default is a local `SafetyFilter`. Passing `null` is permitted only when the
request explicitly makes evaluation optional. Required missing evaluation or
filter exceptions fail closed. Unsafe input never reaches the provider; unsafe
output never reaches the player.

The response exposes `hathor.dialogue-confidence.2026-07-16.v1`, its raw
evidence, calibrated score, threshold, and components. This is bounded monotonic
regression calibration over repository evidence, not provider certainty or
population calibration. Explicit states are `answered` and `abstained`, with
named reasons for safety, constraints, memory attribution, and low confidence.
The V2 adapter subsequently validates the surfaced safety output rather than
trusting a bridge-shaped object.

## V9 Metis governed execution boundary

Metis safety screenings are service-owned records, not booleans supplied by a
request. An admitted record binds:

- screening and tenant identities;
- canonical request-input hash;
- `metis.agent-runtime.safety` policy identity and version `2.0.0`;
- successful classifier evaluation and adversarial-gate result;
- `clear`/`allow` decision;
- a trust zone without outstanding human approval.

Plan creation screens first and embeds an immutable projection. Run execution
reloads the service record and rejects missing state, tenant/hash mismatch,
policy or classifier drift, failed evaluation, review/blocked state, binding
drift, or required approval. The DAG executor independently screens immediately
before each tool call and records the screening ID in its receipt. Tutoring
performs the same governed screen before provider generation and returns
learner-visible safe degradation when admission fails.

The policy has two independent surfaces: exact hard tripwires for control
tokens, private-key material, destructive commands, and unsafe network targets;
and a versioned deterministic intent classifier for prompt override, secret
disclosure, cross-tenant access, destructive mutation, unsafe network access,
assessment compromise, and policy bypass. Every screen evaluates seven
paraphrased, obfuscated, and benign cases. All must match their expected
blocked/review/clear result. Classifier exceptions and adversarial regression
produce separate critical findings and fail closed.

## V8 Ariadne multimodal G6 boundary

G6 scans actual asset-manifest inputs rather than using transcript text as proof
for media. Results name provider, version, mode, covered refs/kinds, flags, and
limitations. `requireSafetyClear` rejects absent scanners, malformed evidence,
missing refs/kinds, or any flag.

The providers intentionally make different claims:

- `KeywordSafetyScanner` is a text-only offline floor and refuses image, audio,
  video, and 3D coverage.
- `ContentAnalyzerSafetyScanner` invokes the local `@yemaya/safety` binary
  analyzer on fetched bytes. Its claim is integrity, metadata, steganography,
  and known-hash analysis, not semantic vision or 3D understanding.
- `SekhmetHttpSafetyScanner` sends actual text or base64 media bytes to the
  configured governed semantic provider and validates provider identity,
  coverage, refs, flags, and verdict consistency.
- `CompositeSafetyScanner` unions independent provider coverage and flags.

Production Loom construction requires Sekhmet configuration and an explicit
media-origin allowlist. Fetches constrain protocol, initial and redirect origin,
per-asset and batch bytes, streamed response size, and timeout. Production
cannot silently fall back to the keyword floor.

The committed 12-case offline benchmark deliberately retains semantic misses and
benign-context false positives:

| Metric                       |    Result |
| ---------------------------- | --------: |
| True positives               |         4 |
| False negatives              |         2 |
| False positives              |         2 |
| True negatives               |         4 |
| Precision                    |    0.6667 |
| Recall                       |    0.6667 |
| False-positive rate          |    0.3333 |
| Semantic/multimodal coverage | **false** |

This measures the keyword floor honestly; it is not evidence that media was
semantically moderated.

## V7 Moremi/Forge capability boundary

Forge Assist does not treat static scanning as execution authority. Every
static-clean candidate first earns source- and capability-bound AUTH-001
bindings, then submits source, declarations, authority, and hashes to Moremi's
authenticated admission endpoint. Missing configuration, transport failure,
malformed or foreign receipts, missing component hashes, and trace mismatch fail
closed.

Moremi accepts a deliberately restricted Forge program:

- constant string bindings;
- direct `oshun.invoke` calls;
- string literals, parenthesized constants, concatenations, and constant
  template interpolation for capability names;
- strict JSON payloads without secret-bearing keys.

Runtime-dependent capability expressions return `DYNAMIC_CAPABILITY_UNRESOLVED`;
aliased, optional-chain, computed Oshun syntax, uncompiled statements, and
unsupported control flow return fail-closed parser violations. Missing, expired,
payload-mismatched, or widened AUTH-001 bindings never reach Wasmtime.

For admitted source, Moremi creates a Wasmtime component whose imports derive
from exact resolved capabilities. The linker exposes only declared realm
capabilities, applies authority resource limits, then instantiates and runs the
program. Every host call consumes the exact authority-use identity and records
its payload hash. The receipt binds source/component hashes, compiled and
observed call sequence, authority-use sequence, payload hashes, runtime/version,
verdict, and violations. A TCP test crosses authentication, HTTP parsing,
component instantiation, and host execution.

## Adversarial fixture matrix

| Fixture                                                    | Result                                                               |
| ---------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Required Hathor filter is absent or throws                 | Provider action is denied or explicit abstention is returned         |
| Provider invents a memory marker                           | Attribution fails; invented ID is never surfaced as triggered memory |
| Required memory is retrieved but unused                    | Explicit `memory_required` abstention                                |
| Metis record tenant/input/policy drifts                    | Planning, tutoring, or tool execution is rejected                    |
| Metis classifier throws or adversarial set regresses       | Critical finding; governed action fails closed                       |
| V8 scanner omits an asset ref/kind                         | G6 admission rejects incomplete coverage                             |
| Keyword floor receives non-text media                      | Coverage is refused, not guessed                                     |
| Media redirects outside the allowlist                      | Byte fetch fails before scanner admission                            |
| Forge source hash or authority payload binding changes     | Moremi denies before Wasmtime                                        |
| Forge capability is aliased, unresolved, or undeclared     | Parser or missing Wasmtime import rejects                            |
| Extra invocation argument or secret-bearing payload        | `INVALID_INVOCATION_PAYLOAD` before Wasmtime                         |
| Executed host-call, authority-use, or payload trace drifts | Admission receipt is denied                                          |

## Automated verification

### Current admitted value ledger

The owning suites were run sequentially. The Forge and prompt rows precede the
source-remediation commit, but neither surface changed in that commit; Hathor
and Moremi were rerun after their exact changes.

| UTC interval                                      | Files/targets |              Result | Surface                                                       |
| ------------------------------------------------- | ------------: | ------------------: | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2026-07-29T15:27:10.483Z–2026-07-29T15:27:13.314Z |            10 |         **110/110** | full Hathor `llm-npc` package                                 |
| 2026-07-29T15:31:11.747Z–2026-07-29T15:31:15.887Z |             5 |           **38/38** | Metis safety/runtime/learning slice                           |
| 2026-07-29T15:32:10.210Z–2026-07-29T15:32:12.159Z |             3 |           **38/38** | Yemaya case pipeline                                          |
| 2026-07-29T15:32:17.476Z–2026-07-29T15:32:34.513Z |            10 | **41/41 + 3 skips** | V8 Loom service                                               |
| 2026-07-29T15:32:40.623Z–2026-07-29T15:32:41.552Z |             1 |           **18/18** | Yemaya case contracts                                         |
| 2026-07-29T15:27:35.615Z–2026-07-29T15:27:44.924Z |             1 |           **82/82** | full Moremi Rust library target; binary/doc targets contain 0 |
| 2026-07-29T15:19:47.476Z–2026-07-29T15:20:06.735Z |             3 |           **25/25** | full Forge Assist package                                     |
| 2026-07-29T15:20:12.464Z–2026-07-29T15:20:23.587Z |             1 |           **67/67** | exact V6/V7 prompt-boundary regression                        |
| **Unique total**                                  |        **34** |         **419/419** | plus three explicit Loom skips; no assertion is counted twice |

The former **378/378** total was accurate for the smaller historical suite set.
The `@yemaya/safety` package currently has no local test files; its configured
`--passWithNoTests` gate exited zero and is not counted as passing assertions.

Representative commands:

```text
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir libs/hathor/llm-npc exec vitest run
PYTHONPATH=apps/metis/service/src /tmp/metis-safety-venv/bin/python -m pytest -q <five Metis files>
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir libs/yemaya/case-pipeline exec vitest run
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir apps/v8/loom-service exec vitest run
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm --dir libs/yemaya/case-contracts exec vitest run
cargo test --locked --manifest-path apps/v7/Cargo.toml -p moremi-realm-server -- --nocapture
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/maya/forge-assist/vitest.config.ts
VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1 pnpm exec vitest run --config testing/prompt-injection/vitest.config.ts testing/prompt-injection/src/v6-v7-boundaries.spec.ts
```

### Type, lint, build, and contract gates

- Hathor, Forge Assist, and prompt-boundary TypeScript configurations passed;
  the commit hook also passed Hathor, V2 adapter, prompt, and BFF affected
  typechecks, with BFF reporting 0 known and 0 new app-owned errors.
- Seven current V8 configurations passed: case-pipeline library/spec, Loom,
  case-contract library/spec, Yemaya safety, and Daedalus.
- Hathor, Forge, prompt, and the core V8 scanner/Loom/contract/compiler surfaces
  have zero ESLint errors and warnings. The broader `@yemaya/safety` package
  lint exits zero with 12 pre-existing warnings in ethics/content-filter
  managers; this refresh does not relabel them clean.
- Hathor Prettier and `tsup` build passed. Yemaya safety `tsup` and V8 docs
  drift passed.
- Metis Ruff check/format passed on 11 safety source/test files; strict Mypy
  passed on six source modules. OpenAPI JSON and generated TypeScript drift
  checks passed with the compatible dependency set named below.
- Moremi Rust format, locked Cargo check, strict all-target Clippy, complete
  library tests, and zero-test binary/doc targets passed.
- `git diff --check` passed at the source checkpoint.

### Refresh-discovered red evidence and remediation

The refresh retains setup and gate failures rather than converting them into
passes:

1. System Python collected zero Metis tests because `fastapi` and
   `pydantic_settings` were absent. An isolated environment installed the
   declared `apps/metis/service[dev]` extra; the exact five-file suite then
   passed 38/38.
2. A fresh unconstrained install resolved FastAPI `0.141.0` with Pydantic
   `2.13.4`. Tests passed, but OpenAPI drift correctly failed because that
   Pydantic version collapses two previously separate input/output schema pairs.
   FastAPI `0.141.0`, Pydantic `2.11.7`, pydantic-settings `2.10.1`, and
   Starlette `0.47.3` reproduce the checked-in JSON and generated TypeScript
   exactly. The service's broad lower-bound-only dependency ranges remain a
   reproducibility caveat; no application-schema drift is hidden.
3. Hathor's first package-wide Prettier check found ten files. Commit
   `6299a9fc53213fcd0dd02ebd2a6596ea3021f50a` mechanically formatted them; full
   tests, typecheck, lint, formatter, build, and downstream hook typechecks then
   passed.
4. Rust `1.95.0` strict Clippy found one collapsible parser branch and two
   manual checked divisions. The same commit split duplicate-comma handling into
   explicit fail-closed match arms and used checked division with the existing
   zero-denominator fallbacks. Moremi 82/82 and all Rust static gates then
   passed.

Loom's green run emitted missing-source-map warnings for checked-in shared
database JavaScript. Its 41 assertions passed and three integration cases were
explicitly skipped. The Yemaya no-test gate also reported a ten-second close
timeout before exiting zero; neither message is represented as a test pass.

## Artifact identity

Hashes were recomputed from published implementation tip
`6299a9fc53213fcd0dd02ebd2a6596ea3021f50a`.

| Artifact / path                                         | SHA-256                                                            |
| ------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Hathor dialogue boundary — `dialogue-generator.ts`      | `6e8a7896ac6c814726b56280b522470ab4e9240b451b0183a1b47380fdcb18f9` |
| Hathor dialogue fixtures — `dialogue-generator.spec.ts` | `b0b23cff1ca57ed73961dbcd196199357b9b9d654b717ee2408ee226c877598b` |
| Metis policy classifier — `agent_safety_helpers.py`     | `2a4e08b136b76e2c403c70c1f1e7f75adb965ee1801767e5724417566b65196e` |
| Metis runtime record gate — `agent_runtime_service.py`  | `c420873700d7fda575b3cb2f5396a69572d017dc8845d8a4b6253a3fd1fa91f1` |
| Metis tool gate — `agent_dag_executor.py`               | `e85cc9236273d89efb77080c2a39080255c8ae9f785d3b3f4a5fcd663864633f` |
| Metis tutor gate — `tutoring_service.py`                | `a413391549a5e36f8457ab6deefa920704413135a31ef1978ec74c81238a310f` |
| V8 scanner/providers — `case-pipeline/src/safety.ts`    | `ae980a44bf6fb8a83f1f4c59783033e358ed14b2a284566aeee0c5d122c0c68c` |
| V8 keyword benchmark — `keyword-safety-benchmark.ts`    | `77f946298d6b78f7c93a48565f72a8cefca8a64df5cbed66898c0445fcf8c8ab` |
| V8 production wiring — `loom-service/src/deps.ts`       | `ab5c76c6581c28ea42438a43b90ad33e4ba10b6dc79da5345bac0db317fd8c5e` |
| Moremi Wasmtime admission — `forge_assist_sandbox.rs`   | `02e54e26fae90e17ba80d03000192f30a78a7ffc0d11f0272022a6c4124283e6` |
| Forge admission client — `sandbox-admission.ts`         | `97dfdc5bd86b4779f4d4f539fbb05488c7da2b31b5af41b16fb49042a34557d0` |
| Forge invoked boundary — `forge-assist.ts`              | `ea5c5a893be8a686d525c37a2038196f484c877aaf5550cc3b1ba3b1483b70a4` |
| Forge authority boundary — `invocation-authority.ts`    | `dfcc21c131973a5fadcb9a8af65f6af2b5bf370ede737395829899e17276e11c` |
| Metis OpenAPI artifact                                  | `7a0aca2325ddd0c102aa0463ffd29ab103df0f38b7aded4dff6adbd8c4c7a925` |
| Metis generated TypeScript contract                     | `1966aea9128c5f6e715eb5e192414c805ef1dff9e18604e25f71656a71afbd4f` |
| V7 Cargo lock                                           | `4d7d0181cda4c0f1ef947d1d326bfcd1a1bcb8bd7ce8b6220754bd6e291eb94d` |
| Workspace dependency lock                               | `08b055786e9b8a6104d5313601d7eef3205dedcf395066fd9a8264c9859d690f` |

## Human authority and external deployment boundary

Repository publication of deterministic policies and fixtures requires no
fabricated human signoff, and none is claimed.

- Hathor calibration is regression calibration over explicit product evidence,
  not population calibration, licensed human-gold validation, or a live-provider
  reliability estimate.
- Metis uses a deterministic versioned policy-intent classifier and bounded
  seven-case gate. It is not represented as a general learned semantic model;
  live-model red teaming remains a release activity.
- V8's local analyzer covers byte/media integrity, not semantic multimodal
  understanding. Semantic production coverage depends on configured Sekhmet; no
  live moderation response is claimed.
- Moremi executes the admitted restricted Forge program, not arbitrary
  JavaScript. Unsupported or runtime-dependent syntax is denied rather than
  guessed.
- AUTH-001 records and local TCP fixtures prove repository authority behavior,
  not a signed remote attestation, production realm deployment, or human
  approval.
- No production provider call, customer outcome, operator decision, or
  deployment is claimed.

## Resource-safe verification and UI scope

The refresh host was `app-dev-server`, Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, Linux
`6.8.0-134-generic` x86_64, with 15 GiB RAM, 31 GiB swap, and 16 GiB free disk.
The toolchains were Node.js `v24.15.0`, pnpm `10.25.0`, TypeScript `6.0.3`,
Vitest `4.1.7`, Python `3.12.3`, pytest `9.1.1`, Rust/Cargo `1.95.0`.

An unrelated checkout's long-running Vitest worker and this checkout's Nx daemon
were active. Verification remained targeted and sequential except for the
bounded repository hook. No full-workspace Nx sweep, production web build, Expo
export, Tauri packaging, Unreal build, Playwright run, or mobile automation was
started.

This refresh changes backend/runtime formatting, Rust gate compatibility, and
evidence only. It does not change customer/admin/PWA/mobile/Unreal UI, so the
frontend skill, Playwright, mobile automation, screenshots, and Unreal
verification are inapplicable.

## Publication identity

- **Original Hathor source commit:** `fee5bba3101af670798333cf71844f7fda779d74`
- **Original Metis source commit:** `c06014ca70aa4e296689770d634827b281071e16`
- **Original V8 source identity:** `bbc441f42a04b7518f832a2b4d903a8c7dde680e`
- **V8 source identity on the current graph (identical tree):**
  `7c5d061745168fe759b6c72bfb68e51801992dff`
- **Original V7 source commit:** `39c039a5713606982ca1b2f3b4c1e6f783fe82f6`
- **Historical evidence-pack commit on the current graph:**
  `0073cf4feee86df22f575ac05de3507e9a2d1a01`
- **Historical equivalent evidence identity (identical tree):**
  `9453041294efd6888274ca640666276879527427`
- **Historical ledger closure commit:**
  `b3dce86f52fcde33ed7b913a77e2b2588d7b40e3`
- **V2 surfaced-output hardening:** `4436396cc24e26b19abe5a3ba4d898ae97df5146`
- **V7 invocation-authority hardening:**
  `b8f637a8d7817b0e58635fea8e47c19239cbb93d`
- **V7 complete restricted-program hardening:**
  `16d3588f7824d44cd31dbe6b9a54cf1722bd4f4d`
- **V8 exact eight-gate admission hardening:**
  `b0d07ff5a8a7d1ddaa08e5fd297e7354b1667013`
- **Current static-gate remediation and admitted source tip:**
  `6299a9fc53213fcd0dd02ebd2a6596ea3021f50a`
- **Current evidence-refresh commit:** recorded by the task-scoped commit that
  contains this file.
