Eve library

Phase 182 Human-Video Dependency Diagram and Data-Flow Threat Model

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Written 2026-09-09 for 182.C.04.08. Companion to docs/domains/isis/adr/ADR-0006-canonical-human-video-contracts.md.

The subject of this document is every copy of four sensitive materials: face images, voice audio, intermediate clips, and evaluation artifacts. A threat model that only covers the happy path misses the copies — and the copies are where likeness and voice actually leak.

Dependency and data-flow diagram#

FlowchartAn overview: 5 groups. Open a group to see inside it.request + uploads3 connectionscapabilities, no data3 connections4 connectionsCOPY 3: provider-held output2 connectionsExternal — outside ourboundaryWorkersObject storage — ourboundaryOshun BFF — trustboundaryClient (browser / mobile) —NO provider secrets
Flowchart: Flowchart. Flowchart: 20 steps and 25 connections.

This is an overview. Open a group to see inside it.

Drawn from its Mermaid source.

As text
Groups:
- External — outside our boundary: OpenRouter video API, Direct lanes fal · PiAPI · Ark, RunPod / Comfy self-hosted weights
- Workers: P5 Generation, P6 Evaluation video-probe · audio-probe · ASR, P7 Correction disclosed, P8 Encoding, P9 Provenance watermark · C2PA, P10 Release gate + proof record
- Object storage — our boundary: Reference images + digests, Approved speech audio, Candidate clips, Released renditions
- Oshun BFF — trust boundary: Admission request-validation · budget · quota gates, P1 AssetIngestion digest · authorization binding, P2 SpeechProduction narration-executor, P3 ShotPlanning, P4 CapabilityDiscovery cached catalog, Job envelope jobs-route · Postgres snapshot
- Client (browser / mobile) — NO provider secrets: Studio surface apps/oshun/web routes

Parts:
- Studio surface apps/oshun/web routes, in Client (browser / mobile) — NO provider secrets
- Admission request-validation · budget · quota gates, in Oshun BFF — trust boundary
- P1 AssetIngestion digest · authorization binding, in Oshun BFF — trust boundary
- P2 SpeechProduction narration-executor, in Oshun BFF — trust boundary
- P3 ShotPlanning, in Oshun BFF — trust boundary
- P4 CapabilityDiscovery cached catalog, in Oshun BFF — trust boundary
- Job envelope jobs-route · Postgres snapshot (data), in Oshun BFF — trust boundary
- Reference images + digests (data), in Object storage — our boundary
- Approved speech audio (data), in Object storage — our boundary
- Candidate clips (data), in Object storage — our boundary
- Released renditions (data), in Object storage — our boundary
- P5 Generation, in Workers
- P6 Evaluation video-probe · audio-probe · ASR, in Workers
- P7 Correction disclosed, in Workers
- P8 Encoding, in Workers
- P9 Provenance watermark · C2PA, in Workers
- P10 Release gate + proof record, in Workers
- OpenRouter video API, in External — outside our boundary
- Direct lanes fal · PiAPI · Ark, in External — outside our boundary
- RunPod / Comfy self-hosted weights, in External — outside our boundary

Connections:
- Studio surface apps/oshun/web routes to Admission request-validation · budget · quota gates: request + uploads
- Admission request-validation · budget · quota gates to P1 AssetIngestion digest · authorization binding
- P1 AssetIngestion digest · authorization binding to Reference images + digests
- P1 AssetIngestion digest · authorization binding to Approved speech audio
- Admission request-validation · budget · quota gates to Job envelope jobs-route · Postgres snapshot
- P2 SpeechProduction narration-executor to Approved speech audio
- P3 ShotPlanning to Job envelope jobs-route · Postgres snapshot
- P4 CapabilityDiscovery cached catalog to OpenRouter video API (dotted): capabilities, no data
- Job envelope jobs-route · Postgres snapshot to P5 Generation
- Reference images + digests to P5 Generation: COPY 1: leaves our boundary
- Approved speech audio to P5 Generation: COPY 2: leaves our boundary
- P5 Generation to OpenRouter video API
- P5 Generation to Direct lanes fal · PiAPI · Ark
- P5 Generation to RunPod / Comfy self-hosted weights
- OpenRouter video API to P5 Generation: COPY 3: provider-held output
- P5 Generation to Candidate clips
- Candidate clips to P6 Evaluation video-probe · audio-probe · ASR
- P6 Evaluation video-probe · audio-probe · ASR to RunPod / Comfy self-hosted weights: COPY 4: frames + audio to evaluator
- P6 Evaluation video-probe · audio-probe · ASR to P7 Correction disclosed
- P7 Correction disclosed to P8 Encoding
- P8 Encoding to P9 Provenance watermark · C2PA
- P9 Provenance watermark · C2PA to P10 Release gate + proof record
- P10 Release gate + proof record to Released renditions
- Released renditions to Studio surface apps/oshun/web routes
- P10 Release gate + proof record to Job envelope jobs-route · Postgres snapshot
Show source
flowchart TB
  subgraph client["Client (browser / mobile) — NO provider secrets"]
    UI["Studio surface<br/>apps/oshun/web routes"]
  end

  subgraph bff["Oshun BFF — trust boundary"]
    ADM["Admission<br/>request-validation · budget · quota gates"]
    ING["P1 AssetIngestion<br/>digest · authorization binding"]
    TTS["P2 SpeechProduction<br/>narration-executor"]
    PLAN["P3 ShotPlanning"]
    CAP["P4 CapabilityDiscovery<br/>cached catalog"]
    JOB[("Job envelope<br/>jobs-route · Postgres snapshot")]
  end

  subgraph store["Object storage — our boundary"]
    REF[("Reference images<br/>+ digests")]
    AUD[("Approved speech audio")]
    CAND[("Candidate clips")]
    REL[("Released renditions")]
  end

  subgraph worker["Workers"]
    GEN["P5 Generation"]
    EVAL["P6 Evaluation<br/>video-probe · audio-probe · ASR"]
    COR["P7 Correction<br/>disclosed"]
    ENC["P8 Encoding"]
    PROV["P9 Provenance<br/>watermark · C2PA"]
    GATE["P10 Release gate<br/>+ proof record"]
  end

  subgraph ext["External — outside our boundary"]
    OR["OpenRouter video API"]
    DIR["Direct lanes<br/>fal · PiAPI · Ark"]
    RP["RunPod / Comfy<br/>self-hosted weights"]
  end

  UI -->|"request + uploads"| ADM
  ADM --> ING
  ING --> REF
  ING --> AUD
  ADM --> JOB
  TTS --> AUD
  PLAN --> JOB
  CAP -.->|"capabilities, no data"| OR
  JOB --> GEN
  REF -->|"COPY 1: leaves our boundary"| GEN
  AUD -->|"COPY 2: leaves our boundary"| GEN
  GEN --> OR
  GEN --> DIR
  GEN --> RP
  OR -->|"COPY 3: provider-held output"| GEN
  GEN --> CAND
  CAND --> EVAL
  EVAL -->|"COPY 4: frames + audio to evaluator"| RP
  EVAL --> COR
  COR --> ENC
  ENC --> PROV
  PROV --> GATE
  GATE --> REL
  REL --> UI
  GATE --> JOB

The copy inventory#

Ten places a sensitive byte exists. Each row is the thing a retention or deletion story must actually cover.

# Copy Material Lives where Retention rule
1 Upload in flight Face images, voice audio BFF request body Never written to disk unencrypted; digested and moved to storage
2 Reference store Face images Object storage Bound to an authorization record; deleted on revocation (182.C.16.09)
3 Approved-audio store Voice audio Object storage Biometric class (182.C.27); shortest retention of any copy
4 Provider-side input Face images, voice audio OpenRouter / direct / RunPod Outside our control — see below
5 Provider-side output Intermediate clip Provider, until job expiry Provider TTL; we do not rely on it
6 Candidate clips Intermediate clips Object storage Deleted after selection + retention window; never released untouched
7 Evaluation frames / audio segments Derived face + voice Evaluator host (RunPod) Ephemeral; must not persist past the evaluation run
8 Evaluation artifacts Scores, embeddings, overlays Object storage + job record Embeddings are biometric derivatives, not "just numbers"
9 Released renditions Final media Object storage / CDN Watermarked, C2PA-signed, disclosed
10 Event log + proof records Digests only Event store Long-lived — which is why rule 4 of 182.C.04.06 forbids payloads

Threats and mitigations#

ID Threat Affected copies Mitigation
T1 Likeness submitted to a provider without authorization 1, 2, 4 182.C.26.01–.02 bind an authorization to the reference digests before upload; no binding, no submission
T2 Consent revoked after the bytes already reached a provider 4, 5 Revocation deletes copies 2, 3, 6, 9 and blocks new submissions; it cannot recall copy 4 — stated to the creator at consent time, not discovered later
T3 Zero-data-retention tenant routed to a non-ZDR lane 4, 5 OpenRouter video is not ZDR-eligible at all; such a tenant fails admission with zdr_tenant_ineligible rather than being warned
T4 Provider download URL leaking our Bearer token to a client 5 unsigned_urls are fetched server-side only; the client receives our storage URL (182.C.04.04)
T5 Face embeddings treated as anonymous numbers and retained loosely 8 Embeddings are biometric derivatives under 182.C.27; same retention class as copy 3
T6 Evaluator host retaining frames or voice after a run 7 Ephemeral working set, wiped per run; the self-hosted Whisper recommendation (182.C.02.12) exists partly for this
T7 Draft/candidate clip escaping as a delivery 6 draft tier is not releasable and has no delivery path (182.C.03.06)
T8 Un-watermarked master leaking 6, 9 Release serves only the watermarked, signed rendition; provenance floors block when signals are null
T9 Biometric material in the durable event log 10 Events carry digests only (182.C.04.06 rule 4)
T10 Corrective processing applied silently, making output undiagnosable 6, 9 P7 is disclosed by construction — manifest + creator-visible evidence
T11 Erasure request satisfied for the primary artifact but not its derivatives 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 generated-artifact-erasure.ts extended to propagate to derivatives and evaluation artifacts (182.C.16.09)
T12 Webhook spoofing a completion for a job that never ran 5 HMAC-SHA256 X-OpenRouter-Signature verified before the payload is trusted; generation_id may be null on early failures, so a null-id callback can never resolve a job

The two honest limits#

  1. Copy 4 is not ours. Once reference images and approved audio reach a provider, retention is governed by that provider's policy, not ours, and revocation cannot recall them (T2). The product must say this at the moment consent is captured. The only way to avoid copy 4 entirely is the self-hosted RunPod path, which is one of the reasons that route is preferred wherever it can carry the mode.
  2. ZDR and video are mutually exclusive on OpenRouter. A tenant that enforces zero data retention is ineligible for every OpenRouter video lane — not degraded, not warned. That is an admission-time refusal (T3), and it is a product constraint, not a bug to route around.