# Phase 182 Human-Video Dependency Diagram and Data-Flow Threat Model

Written 2026-09-09 for `182.C.04.08`. Companion to
`docs/domains/isis/adr/ADR-0006-canonical-human-video-contracts.md`.

The subject of this document is **every copy** of four sensitive materials: face
images, voice audio, intermediate clips, and evaluation artifacts. A threat
model that only covers the happy path misses the copies — and the copies are
where likeness and voice actually leak.

## Dependency and data-flow diagram

```mermaid
flowchart TB
  subgraph client["Client (browser / mobile) — NO provider secrets"]
    UI["Studio surface<br/>apps/oshun/web routes"]
  end

  subgraph bff["Oshun BFF — trust boundary"]
    ADM["Admission<br/>request-validation · budget · quota gates"]
    ING["P1 AssetIngestion<br/>digest · authorization binding"]
    TTS["P2 SpeechProduction<br/>narration-executor"]
    PLAN["P3 ShotPlanning"]
    CAP["P4 CapabilityDiscovery<br/>cached catalog"]
    JOB[("Job envelope<br/>jobs-route · Postgres snapshot")]
  end

  subgraph store["Object storage — our boundary"]
    REF[("Reference images<br/>+ digests")]
    AUD[("Approved speech audio")]
    CAND[("Candidate clips")]
    REL[("Released renditions")]
  end

  subgraph worker["Workers"]
    GEN["P5 Generation"]
    EVAL["P6 Evaluation<br/>video-probe · audio-probe · ASR"]
    COR["P7 Correction<br/>disclosed"]
    ENC["P8 Encoding"]
    PROV["P9 Provenance<br/>watermark · C2PA"]
    GATE["P10 Release gate<br/>+ proof record"]
  end

  subgraph ext["External — outside our boundary"]
    OR["OpenRouter video API"]
    DIR["Direct lanes<br/>fal · PiAPI · Ark"]
    RP["RunPod / Comfy<br/>self-hosted weights"]
  end

  UI -->|"request + uploads"| ADM
  ADM --> ING
  ING --> REF
  ING --> AUD
  ADM --> JOB
  TTS --> AUD
  PLAN --> JOB
  CAP -.->|"capabilities, no data"| OR
  JOB --> GEN
  REF -->|"COPY 1: leaves our boundary"| GEN
  AUD -->|"COPY 2: leaves our boundary"| GEN
  GEN --> OR
  GEN --> DIR
  GEN --> RP
  OR -->|"COPY 3: provider-held output"| GEN
  GEN --> CAND
  CAND --> EVAL
  EVAL -->|"COPY 4: frames + audio to evaluator"| RP
  EVAL --> COR
  COR --> ENC
  ENC --> PROV
  PROV --> GATE
  GATE --> REL
  REL --> UI
  GATE --> JOB
```

## The copy inventory

Ten places a sensitive byte exists. Each row is the thing a retention or
deletion story must actually cover.

| #   | Copy                               | Material                     | Lives where                  | Retention rule                                                          |
| --- | ---------------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1   | Upload in flight                   | Face images, voice audio     | BFF request body             | Never written to disk unencrypted; digested and moved to storage        |
| 2   | Reference store                    | Face images                  | Object storage               | Bound to an authorization record; deleted on revocation (`182.C.16.09`) |
| 3   | Approved-audio store               | Voice audio                  | Object storage               | Biometric class (`182.C.27`); shortest retention of any copy            |
| 4   | **Provider-side input**            | Face images, voice audio     | OpenRouter / direct / RunPod | **Outside our control** — see below                                     |
| 5   | Provider-side output               | Intermediate clip            | Provider, until job expiry   | Provider TTL; we do not rely on it                                      |
| 6   | Candidate clips                    | Intermediate clips           | Object storage               | Deleted after selection + retention window; never released untouched    |
| 7   | Evaluation frames / audio segments | Derived face + voice         | Evaluator host (RunPod)      | Ephemeral; must not persist past the evaluation run                     |
| 8   | Evaluation artifacts               | Scores, embeddings, overlays | Object storage + job record  | Embeddings are biometric derivatives, not "just numbers"                |
| 9   | Released renditions                | Final media                  | Object storage / CDN         | Watermarked, C2PA-signed, disclosed                                     |
| 10  | Event log + proof records          | **Digests only**             | Event store                  | Long-lived — which is why rule 4 of `182.C.04.06` forbids payloads      |

## Threats and mitigations

| ID  | Threat                                                                     | Affected copies | Mitigation                                                                                                                                                                |
| --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| T1  | Likeness submitted to a provider without authorization                     | 1, 2, 4         | `182.C.26.01`–`.02` bind an authorization to the reference digests **before** upload; no binding, no submission                                                           |
| T2  | Consent revoked after the bytes already reached a provider                 | 4, 5            | Revocation deletes copies 2, 3, 6, 9 and blocks new submissions; **it cannot recall copy 4** — stated to the creator at consent time, not discovered later                |
| T3  | Zero-data-retention tenant routed to a non-ZDR lane                        | 4, 5            | OpenRouter video is **not ZDR-eligible at all**; such a tenant fails admission with `zdr_tenant_ineligible` rather than being warned                                      |
| T4  | Provider download URL leaking our Bearer token to a client                 | 5               | `unsigned_urls` are fetched server-side only; the client receives our storage URL (`182.C.04.04`)                                                                         |
| T5  | Face embeddings treated as anonymous numbers and retained loosely          | 8               | Embeddings are biometric derivatives under `182.C.27`; same retention class as copy 3                                                                                     |
| T6  | Evaluator host retaining frames or voice after a run                       | 7               | Ephemeral working set, wiped per run; the self-hosted Whisper recommendation (`182.C.02.12`) exists partly for this                                                       |
| T7  | Draft/candidate clip escaping as a delivery                                | 6               | `draft` tier is not releasable and has no delivery path (`182.C.03.06`)                                                                                                   |
| T8  | Un-watermarked master leaking                                              | 6, 9            | Release serves only the watermarked, signed rendition; provenance floors block when signals are `null`                                                                    |
| T9  | Biometric material in the durable event log                                | 10              | Events carry digests only (`182.C.04.06` rule 4)                                                                                                                          |
| T10 | Corrective processing applied silently, making output undiagnosable        | 6, 9            | P7 is disclosed by construction — manifest + creator-visible evidence                                                                                                     |
| T11 | Erasure request satisfied for the primary artifact but not its derivatives | 2, 3, 6, 8, 9   | `generated-artifact-erasure.ts` extended to propagate to derivatives **and** evaluation artifacts (`182.C.16.09`)                                                         |
| T12 | Webhook spoofing a completion for a job that never ran                     | 5               | HMAC-SHA256 `X-OpenRouter-Signature` verified before the payload is trusted; `generation_id` may be null on early failures, so a null-id callback can never resolve a job |

## The two honest limits

1. **Copy 4 is not ours.** Once reference images and approved audio reach a
   provider, retention is governed by that provider's policy, not ours, and
   revocation cannot recall them (T2). The product must say this at the moment
   consent is captured. The only way to avoid copy 4 entirely is the self-hosted
   RunPod path, which is one of the reasons that route is preferred wherever it
   can carry the mode.
2. **ZDR and video are mutually exclusive on OpenRouter.** A tenant that
   enforces zero data retention is ineligible for every OpenRouter video lane —
   not degraded, not warned. That is an admission-time refusal (T3), and it is a
   product constraint, not a bug to route around.
