Lilith Metaverse · Features

Governance, Safety & Recording-Consent

A focused page within the Lilith Metaverse Features documentation. The full map and every sibling page live in the Features hub.

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State diagramState diagram: 11 states and 11 transitions.recording or broadcast proposedevery required participant grants current scopeany participant refuses or cannot consentconsent changes participant joins or policy signalconsent set revalidatedhost end rights safety or incidentgoverned retention redaction and provenanceaudience rights and safety review passconsent rights safety or minor policy failswithdrawal claim or policy decisionPrivateConsentRequestedRecordingDeclinedPausedStoppedProcessingPublishedWithheldTakenDown
State machine: State diagram. State diagram: 11 states and 11 transitions.

This picture is wider than it can be shown here. Move across it, or read it as text.

Drawn from its Mermaid source.

As text
Parts:
- Start (initial)
- Private
- ConsentRequested
- Recording
- Declined
- Paused
- Stopped
- Processing
- Published
- Withheld
- TakenDown

Connections:
- Start to Private
- Private to ConsentRequested: recording or broadcast proposed
- ConsentRequested to Recording: every required participant grants current scope
- ConsentRequested to Declined: any participant refuses or cannot consent
- Recording to Paused: consent changes participant joins or policy signal
- Paused to Recording: consent set revalidated
- Recording to Stopped: host end rights safety or incident
- Stopped to Processing: governed retention redaction and provenance
- Processing to Published: audience rights and safety review pass
- Processing to Withheld: consent rights safety or minor policy fails
- Published to TakenDown: withdrawal claim or policy decision
Show source
stateDiagram-v2
  [*] --> Private
  Private --> ConsentRequested: recording or broadcast proposed
  ConsentRequested --> Recording: every required participant grants current scope
  ConsentRequested --> Declined: any participant refuses or cannot consent
  Recording --> Paused: consent changes participant joins or policy signal
  Paused --> Recording: consent set revalidated
  Recording --> Stopped: host end rights safety or incident
  Stopped --> Processing: governed retention redaction and provenance
  Processing --> Published: audience rights and safety review pass
  Processing --> Withheld: consent rights safety or minor policy fails
  Published --> TakenDown: withdrawal claim or policy decision

Consent is scoped, revocable, participant-aware, and versioned. A room-level toggle cannot silently authorize a newly joined member, a different audience, voice cloning, or later reuse.

V3 ("Lilith") is the first Oshun product where a member has a body in a room full of strangers — and three of the platform's oldest promises have to be re-answered at body resolution and in real time. Children must be protected when a 13-year-old and an adult can share a yoga commons. Harassment must have an instant, self-serve answer and an accountable operator trail, because a shove or a slur in an embodied room is gone the moment it happens unless someone captures it. And no one is recorded without a real choice, even when the "room" is a 4,096-seat stadium concert whose master capture is the artist's catalog. V3's stance is the same one it takes everywhere: it does not fork the trust spine. Embodiment is a thin, server-authoritative layer of computed decisions over V1's audit ledger, persona policy, and DSAR pipeline — the library decides, the world server and tenant services persist and enforce. This page covers the operator-and-policy side of that promise: minor-protection mode, harassment and abuse response, and the recording-consent flow, end to end. The companion that owns the at-the-body evaluators (tone, crisis, costume, persona) is Identity, Embodied Safety & Provenance Foundations; the section hub is ../V3_features.md.

What ships, honestly#

This layer scores high on the implemented-vs-spec axis because its hard parts are pure decision logic, not art or engine plugins. Two real TypeScript modules carry it, each backed by an automation suite.

  • The in-world governance engine is real, computed code. The minor-protection defaults, the point-at-avatar reporting pipeline with its 60-second replay evidence buffer, the operator-review SLA dashboard, the progressive-sanction state machine, and the minor-cohort background-check gate are all implemented as pure functions in @oshun/tenant-lilith-commons (libs/v3/lilith-commons/src/index.ts). Each capability is declared in the package descriptor with an operational metric (in-world-reporting, operator-review-sla, progressive-sanctions, minor-protection-defaults, minor-operator-alerts, minor-instructor-background-checks) and exercised by src/__tests__/index.spec.ts.
  • The recording-consent policy is real, computed code. libs/v3/lilith-identity-bridge/src/recording-consent.ts resolves every class and concert capture decision — full/observer/decline, the free privacy seat, the front-row visibility exception, the publication gate, DSAR coverage, and post-publication withdrawal — as discriminated-union functions, tested by src/__tests__/recording-consent.spec.ts.
  • The evidence trail is the genuine V1 audit platform. Every decision below publishes a canonical event (v3.lilith.in_world_report.submitted, v3.lilith.progressive_sanction.transitioned, recording_consent.*, …) into V1's @oshun/audit-platform — the same hash-chained, tamper-evident ledger V1 ships, with investigation export and retention tooling. V3 produces evidence; Oshun retains it.

Three honest qualifications. First, these libraries are pure decision kernels: no database, no socket. The report-submission function returns a typed operator-queue entry and an audit event; the world server is what actually files the report and the tenant service is what runs the 30-minute mute clock. Second, two spec-level product behaviors in V3features.md are not in this code and are labeled as such below: the one-tap "step back" (personal-space expansion + per-avatar self-mute) and the automatic "report-and-remove → quiet cell" routing are documented UX flows; what is _coded is the report → evidence → operator-queue pipeline and the operator-applied mute sanction level. (The solo-quiet-cell venue itself is a real Commons capability — privacyMode: 'solo-quiet-cell' — it just isn't auto-triggered from a report here.) Third, the platform-level trust-safety domains @themis and @kuanyin are not imported by V3's in-world governance: those operate at the V1/V2 layer (e.g. @v2/themis-privacy-dsr-routing joins @themis/privacy for data-subject requests, per V2 Security, Compliance & Sister-Monorepo Integration). V3 reuses V1's spine instead. The one real Themis touchpoint for V3 is rights adjudication in saraswati-stage/themis-rights-adjudication.ts, which belongs to Commerce, Rights & Takedown, not to in-world moderation.

Minor-protection mode#

V3 admits minors aged 13+, with realm-level age gates (Tara and Commons admit 13+; Saraswati Stage is 16+ at the realm boundary). The protection that travels with a minor account is enforced as computed defaults that cannot be toggled off, plus two structural gates around them.

Defaults that fail closed — and prove they can't be bypassed#

evaluateV3MinorProtectionDefaults treats any account under V3_MINOR_PROTECTION_ADULT_AGE_YEARS (18) as protected and resolves four locked surfaces (V3_MINOR_PROTECTION_LOCKED_SURFACES): voice-chat → off, presence-outside-cohort → hidden, signed-edition-purchase → blocked, and remix-licensing → blocked. Presence is the nuanced one: a minor's "online in Lilith" presence is visible only to themselves, an operator, or a viewer who shares a cohort (hasCohortOverlap) — a non-cohort stranger sees nothing. The function does not merely set these states; it derives a bypassProofPassed flag that is true only when every requested bypass was denied. runV3MinorProtectionThirteenYearOldBypassFixture drives exactly the adversarial case — a 13-year-old (V3_MINOR_PROTECTION_TEST_ACCOUNT_AGE_YEARS) who requests voice chat on, presence exposed, purchases unlocked, and remix licensing enabled, observed by a non-cohort viewer — and asserts all four locks hold. The capability's operational metric is literally minor-protection:13yo-locked-no-bypass. This is a fail-closed default a child cannot click their way out of, not a settings page with a recommended toggle.

Any flagged minor interaction pages an operator within 30 seconds#

createV3MinorFlaggedInteractionOperatorAlert is deliberately one-sided: it returns null for an adult-only flag, but for any interaction with at least one participant under 18 it emits a P0-minor-safety alert to the v3-lilith-minor-safety-alerts queue, console-visible, with the minor avatar/ account ids attached and an audit event v3.lilith.minor_flagged_interaction.operator_alerted. The delivery SLA is a hard 30 seconds (V3_MINOR_INTERACTION_OPERATOR_ALERT_SLA_MS = 30_000), and deliveredWithinSla is computed against it. runV3MinorFlaggedInteractionOperatorAlertFixture asserts that adult-only flags are ignored, every minor flag produces a console-visible alert, and every alert lands inside the 30-second window — so a flagged minor interaction can never sink quietly into the normal queue.

The background-check gate runs at scheduling time, not at the door#

The strongest minor protection is the one a child never sees, because it fires before the room exists. evaluateV3MinorCohortClassScheduling blocks an adult instructor from being scheduled against a minor cohort unless their background check is cleared and valid through at least V3_MINOR_COHORT_BACKGROUND_CHECK_MIN_VALIDITY_MS (24 h) past the scheduled start. Every other status — missing, pending, failed, expired — produces a blocked decision with a precise reason (minor-cohort-background-check-missing, …-not-cleared, …-expired) and an audit event. runV3MinorCohortBackgroundCheckEnforcementFixture proves all four failure modes block, a cleared instructor is allowed, and an adult-only cohort does not require the check (background-check-not-required) — so a non-cleared adult never reaches a room with minors in the first place. Minors in recordings are handled by the recording-consent flow below: observer-by-default for classes, an auto-assigned, un-disable-able privacy seat for concerts.

Harassment and abuse response#

Harassment in an embodied room is ephemeral — the durable artifact is whatever the platform chooses to keep. V3's answer pairs an immediate report with a 60-second replay buffer so the operator sees what happened, routes it through a measured SLA, and escalates repeat offenders through an audited, appealable sanction ladder.

Point-at-avatar reporting, built as a short interaction#

The report is a few seconds of pointing, not a form you leave the world to fill out. createV3InWorldReportDraft → pointV3InWorldReportAtAvatar → selectV3InWorldReportCategory advance a draft through target → category → comment → submitted, and renderV3InWorldReportUiModel drives the in-world panel (category options unlock only once an avatar is targeted). The six categories (V3_IN_WORLD_REPORT_CATEGORIES) are harassment, impersonation, unsafe-conduct, voice-abuse, minor-safety, and other — and minor-safety is special: submitV3InWorldReport stamps it P0-immediate on the operator queue while everything else is P1-same-day.

The 60-second evidence buffer, and why voice transcripts stay ephemeral#

A report is only as good as its evidence. validateV3InWorldReportReplayBuffer requires a full 60-second window (V3_IN_WORLD_REPORT_REPLAY_WINDOW_MS) of both voice and target-avatar motion coverage, and submitV3InWorldReport throws if the buffer is incomplete — the report cannot be filed on a partial record. The submission's evidenceKinds are ['voice-replay-buffer', 'avatar-motion-replay-buffer'], and every object is written under a tenant-resident partition (tenant:<tenantId>:<REGION>:safety-reports:<reportId>) so evidence never leaves the user's residency zone.

The privacy design here is the interesting part. Voice transcript is normally ephemeral: createV3VoiceTranscriptRollingBuffer keeps only the trailing 60 seconds of the current session and sets durablePersistence: 'none'. Transcript becomes durable only when attachV3VoiceTranscriptBufferToReport binds it to a specific report (persistenceScope: 'attached-report-only'). auditV3Voice TranscriptRetention then proves the invariant, flagging unattached-voice-content-persisted, voice-content-beyond-60s-buffer, or window drift, and passed is true only with zero violations. In plain terms: the platform keeps a rolling buffer to make reports possible, but it cannot retain your voice beyond 60 seconds unless you filed a report about it — the evidence trail and the privacy ceiling are the same mechanism.

The operator review SLA is a release gate, not an aspiration#

Reports land on v3-lilith-safety-report-review, and evaluateV3OperatorReviewSlaDashboard scores every review against a 30-minute SLA during programmed hours and a 2-hour SLA off-hours (V3_OPERATOR_REVIEW_PROGRAMMED_HOURS_SLA_MS / ..._OFF_HOURS_SLA_MS). It buckets events into daily windows and exposes releaseGateGreen — true only when the most recent 7 consecutive UTC days each clear 95% compliance (V3_OPERATOR_REVIEW_SLA_MIN_COMPLIANCE = 0.95, ..._CONSECUTIVE_DAYS = 7). The gate is strict on both axes: it checks the days are genuinely consecutive (areConsecutiveUtcDays) and the fixture refuses fewer than 20 reviews/day, so a green light means a real, sustained queue, not one quiet afternoon. This is the follow-the-sun staffing promise made measurable.

Progressive sanctions, every step audited and appealable#

Repeat offenders escalate through a four-step ladder (V3_PROGRESSIVE_SANCTION_LEVELS): warning → mute → realm-ban → account-ban. advanceV3ProgressiveSanctionState is the transition function — a mute stamps muteUntilMs 30 minutes out (V3_PROGRESSIVE_SANCTION_MUTE_DURATION_MS), a realm-ban/account-ban flips the corresponding flag, and every transition carries both an appeal route to v3-lilith-appeals-review (7-day window) and an audit event v3.lilith.progressive_sanction.transitioned, appended to the state's transitions and auditLog. runV3ProgressiveSanctionsIntegrationTest drives the full sequence and passes only when the final level is account-ban, the exercised order equals the canonical ladder, all transitions are audit-logged, and all appeals are routed — so "recorded and appealable" is a coded invariant, not a policy paragraph. The operator-applied mute here is distinct from the self-serve, in-the-moment controls below.

Self-serve "step back" and the quiet cell — honestly labeled#

V3features.md describes two immediate, self-serve controls: a one-tap "step back" that expands the target's personal-space radius and mutes the chosen avatar with no operator in the loop, and a one-tap "report and remove" that files the report _and routes the reporter out into a quiet cell. These are real product commitments, but in the libraries on this page they are spec-level: lilith-commons implements the report draft → evidence → submit → operator-queue pipeline and the operator-side sanction ladder, while the personal-space expansion, the per-avatar self-mute, and the automatic reporter-to-quiet-cell hop are world-server behaviors not present in this module. The destination is real — the solo-quiet-cell venue is a coded Commons capability (privacyMode: 'solo-quiet-cell', reflection-scope-bound) — but the report-triggered routing into it is documented, not yet computed here. Crisis routing (a non-dismissible in-world soft prompt, a V1 crisis-pipeline handoff, and an on-call page, gated at recall ≥ 0.95 / FPR ≤ 0.02) lives in @oshun/lilith-body-policy and is detailed on Identity, Embodied Safety & Provenance Foundations.

Class and concert capture have different scales and customs, so they use two different consent models — but both resolve to a concrete avatar/voice/chat treatment, both audit into @oshun/audit-platform, and both route DSAR and withdrawal through the same V1 pipeline. The whole flow is real code in recording-consent.ts.

resolveV3ClassRecordingConsent maps a participant's choice to a treatment. Consent in full → visible / master-mix / included. Observer mode → generic-silhouette / excluded-from-master-mix / redacted, stamped redactionStatus: 'observer-redaction'. Decline and leave → routed to the lobby (route: 'lobby') with the ticket retained and nothing recorded. The load-bearing branch is the minor one: a minor choosing full triggers guardianConfirmationRequired, and absent a guardianConfirmedAtIso the decision downgrades to observer automatically rather than recording the child in the master mix — fail-closed, by computation, not by reviewer diligence. A mid-class change of heart is honored by resolveV3ClassMidSessionOptOut, which downgrades to observer and sets retroactiveFromMs to the opt-out instant, so the recording is redacted from that point forward.

Concert recording — blanket terms with a free, un-removable privacy seat#

Per-attendee dialogs at 4,096 seats are impractical, so concerts use blanket ticket-terms consent plus a non-recorded option. resolveV3ConcertTicketRecording throws if ticketTermsAffirmed is false — you cannot hold a concert ticket without acknowledging the recording. From there it branches by tier: a minor is auto-assigned a privacy-seat with privacySeatLocked: true (the toggle cannot be turned off); a crowd-band LL-HLS spectator is spectator-aggregate-only (not in the master recording, chat counted only in aggregate); a front-256 named seat throws unless the buyer both affirms full visibility and was offered an alternate tier, and throws again if they try to request a privacy seat (front-row is inherently visible); any other attendee may opt into a privacy seat. Crucially, privacySeatCostDeltaCents is the literal type 0 — privacy is free by construction. Two server-enforced guards back this: validateV3AudienceCamCue refuses to publish any cue whose targetSection is privacy (the audience camera can never sweep the privacy section), and resolveV3ConcertMidShowPrivacySwitch lets an attendee switch mid-show, excluding them from audience-cam sweeps thereafter and forcing retroactiveRedaction with an operator review gate.

Publication gate, DSAR, and post-publication withdrawal#

Consent is enforced again at the moment of release. evaluateV3RecordingPublicationGate sets publishAllowed only when the consent ledger is valid, the privacy-seat ledger is valid, and redaction has actually been applied — otherwise it returns precise blockedReasons (consent-ledger-invalid, privacy-seat-ledger-invalid, redaction-not-applied). DSAR coverage is a gate, not best-effort: buildV3RecordingDsarCoverage throws if the export is missing the consent ledger, the privacy-seat decisions, or the list of recordings the user appears in — the three exportSections are all required. And consent is revocable after the fact: resolveV3PostPublicationWithdrawal returns rerenderRequired, redactionReapplied, and v1TakedownCascade, all true, with a 48-hour deadline — a withdrawal forces a re-render, re-redaction, and a hand-off into the V1 takedown pipeline. "Published" is never the end of the consent story.

How it connects#

This page is the operator-and-policy face of a trust foundation owned elsewhere. The at-the-body evaluators it leans on — tone scoring, the measured crisis gate, costume rules, avatar-swap impersonation blocking, and AI-persona enforcement — are Identity, Embodied Safety & Provenance Foundations, and the rights side of a recording — the Isis provenance bundle, the C2PA signature, and the Themis 24-hour adjudication a takedown rides on — is Commerce, Rights & Takedown. The internal mechanics this page summarizes (the rolling-window math, the crisis thresholds, the consent-ledger shape, and the audit hash-chain) are dissected in Persona Policy, Provenance & Rights (architecture). The honest line throughout: the minor-protection defaults, the reporting and evidence pipeline, the SLA and sanction gates, and the recording-consent policy are real, computed, and tested; the personal-space "step back," the report-triggered quiet-cell routing, and the operator-console UI are the runtime and surfaces these decisions drive.