Status: repository-complete / closed. The named V1 publication and V8 release boundaries require exact artifact-rights receipts, authoritative asset bytes, embedded C2PA verification, authenticated release context, and mixed human/agent lineage, or they fail closed. This status does not claim that production rights registries, external trust lists, signing authorities, asset stores, timestamp services, or human approval systems are deployed.
Work-package charter#
- Task ID:
PROOF-003 - Owner: canonical contracts, V1 autonomy/BFF, V8 case-production, and shared signing/C2PA maintainers; implementation owner: Elikem Agudogo
- Accountable product: rights-safe V1 publication and authenticated, byte-bound V8 case release
- Priority: P0
- Target milestone: 2026-07-15 SOTA gap-closure program
- Risk tier: Critical rights, authenticity, and release-integrity risk
- Audit finding: provider identity, locator hashes, unkeyed checksums, and C2PA-shaped metadata could be presented as rights or cryptographic proof
- Dependencies: PROOF-001 exact proof meanings, governed rights/consent receipts, C2PA SDK mint/verify, content-signing primitives, authoritative media storage/fetch, case evaluation, exact V8 G1–G8 release gates, and human-quality launch evidence
- Affected schemas and content slots: artifact-specific rights and consent bundles; V1 generated artifact publication; aggregate provenance; selected media candidate locator/digest evidence; embedded C2PA manifests; V8 case bundles; verifier reports; exact G1–G8 release context; human-quality launch evidence; timestamp receipts; and mixed human/agent lineage. No rendered UI or database migration changed in this refresh.
- Linked task IDs:
PROOF-001,PROOF-003,MEDIA-001,EVAL-005,V1-002,V1-003,V8-005, andAUTH-001 - Rollout strategy: additive canonical rights/provenance contracts followed by fail-closed enforcement at V1 publication and V8 release boundaries
- Rollback strategy: revert the original proof-boundary source, subsequent release-binding hardening, and current fixture remediation together. Partial rollback can leave consumers compiled against missing or weaker proof requirements.
- Evidence-pack location: this file
Closure matrix#
| Ledger requirement | Repository closure proof |
|---|---|
| Artifact-specific V1 rights and consent | The canonical bundle requires current, exact-subject output-license, model-license, and dataset-license receipts for every artifact. Likeness and voice material additionally require exact granted consent receipts. The governed HTTP adapter validates node, output, model, dataset, likeness, and voice identities; provider names and generic rights booleans are inert. Every artifact must pass before V1 publication. |
Preserve hashScope and signed |
Yemaya aggregate provenance retains both fields plus embedded C2PA validation detail. Regression coverage proves that byte scope, signature state, actions, agents, ingredients, transformations, and human edits survive aggregation. |
| Bind V8 media to downloaded bytes | Loom permits only exact approved HTTPS origins, with loopback HTTP reserved for tests. Credentials, redirects, oversized or empty assets, and insecure schemes fail. It fetches authoritative bytes, hashes them, verifies their embedded C2PA credential with the SDK, and only then upgrades provenance to hashScope: asset-bytes and signed: true. The selected best-of-N candidate's exact locator and digest must also match the evaluation evidence; a weaker score proxy, locator hash, or url + seed cannot pass. |
| Authenticated V8 release report | The release envelope signs the verifier report, release context, asset-manifest digest, exact G1–G8 results, human-quality launch evidence, and mixed lineage with Ed25519 under an identified key and policy. A separate authority signs a timestamp receipt bound to the payload digest and report signature. checksumSha256 stays explicitly separate and cannot satisfy authentication. |
| Real C2PA claims | The shared c2pa-node wrapper mints and reads standards-compliant embedded claims. Manifests include creation, machine transformations, identified human edits, ingredients, and software agents. Verification exposes the SDK verdict, active manifest, signature issuer/time, actions, agents, ingredient count, transformation count, and human-edit count. V8 case bundles persist the SDK-signed bytes at the authoritative URI and read them back before release. |
| Key lifecycle and adversarial proof | Offline verification enforces key ID, signer/authority identity, active validity interval, revocation, rotation metadata, timestamp binding, verification-policy identity, age, and future-skew policy. Invalid numeric policy values fail closed. Tests cover rotation, revoked report keys, revoked timestamp keys, unsigned bytes, and substituted bytes. |
| Mixed lineage and edit invalidation | A release lineage contains ordered, byte-bound agent and human events with valid parent references. Its tip digest must match the signed release context. A human edit increments the revision, appends the edit, replaces the artifact digest, and nulls both report signature and timestamp receipt until the revised artifact is authenticated again. |
Canonical artifact-rights proof#
libs/contracts/src/common/artifact-rights.ts owns the V1 artifact-rights
vocabulary and evaluator. A passing bundle is exact and non-substitutable:
- the bundle subject is the concrete generated artifact;
- active output, model, and dataset license receipts name the exact artifact, model, and datasets used;
- receipt scope, issuer, evidence references, effective time, expiry, and status are explicit;
- likeness and voice declarations name the exact subjects and material, and exact granted consent receipts cover them;
- revoked, expired, future-effective, mismatched, generic, or missing receipts fail evaluation.
The BFF rights adapter requests this bundle from a governed service after generation. It validates returned identities against the actual node output and generation hints before attaching the bundle. No provider-name heuristic is retained. Generation can remain observable without the service, but the publication rights gate stays unsatisfied and blocks release.
V8 byte-bound and C2PA provenance#
The Loom asset verifier treats each media URL strictly as a locator until it has
fetched the referenced bytes. It blocks redirects and non-allowlisted origins,
enforces time and byte limits, calculates SHA-256 over the response body, and
runs verifyC2paExport on those exact bytes. A claim must have a valid SDK
verdict, an active manifest, a signature issuer, a c2pa.created action, and at
least one software agent. Only that path emits canonical byte_bound_integrity
and c2pa_verification proof records.
Current media hardening additionally binds provenance to the evaluated best-of-N winner: the selected candidate's locator and digest must exactly match the admitted evaluation evidence. Substituting another candidate or relying on the winning score without exact identity cannot release.
The V8 case-bundle forge embeds real credentials into generated PNG bytes, persists the signed result at the same authoritative URI, reads the manifest back with the SDK, and records the signed-byte digest, manifest label, validation reference, and signer identity. Its Ed25519 sidecar remains supplemental integrity evidence and does not substitute for C2PA.
Authenticated release reports and lineage#
The Minos report's deterministic unkeyed field is named checksumSha256 and is
verified only as a checksum. V8 release authentication separately signs a
canonical envelope that binds:
- the exact verifier report and checksum;
- case ID, seed, artifact reference, asset-manifest SHA-256, and the exact signed G1–G8 release gates;
- passing human-quality launch evidence rather than a declared quality score;
- the ordered mixed human/agent lineage and its byte-bound tip;
- signer key ID, signer identity, signing time, and verification-policy reference.
A separately signed timestamp token binds the release payload digest and actual release-signature digest. Verification is pure and offline against a supplied policy containing trusted public keys, identities, validity windows, revocation state, rotation metadata, maximum signature age, and allowed clock skew. Production composition requires explicit report and timestamp key pairs, identities, validity metadata, and human approval actor/receipt references; the offline fixture composition is labelled and uses ephemeral test authorities.
Adversarial fixture matrix#
| Fixture | Presented condition | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Provider-name rights | A first-party provider and generic rights: true flag have no receipts |
Publication rights gate remains unsatisfied |
| Wrong artifact receipt | License subject names another node or output | Canonical rights evaluation fails |
| Missing consent | Likeness or voice material lacks an exact granted receipt | Canonical rights evaluation fails |
| Locator provenance | URL, seed, and locator hash exist without fetched-byte verification | Asset remains unsigned locator scope and release blocks |
| Wrong evaluated candidate | Provenance bytes do not match the evaluated winner's locator/digest | Release blocks; a score alone cannot substitute |
| Unsigned asset bytes | Fetched PNG has no embedded C2PA credential | SDK verdict cannot pass; release blocks |
| Substituted signed bytes | A byte changes after C2PA signing | SDK returns invalid/tampered; release blocks |
| Insecure origin | HTTP, FTP, credentials, redirect, or non-allowlisted origin is presented | Rejected before proof upgrade |
| Checksum substitution | Valid Minos checksum exists without authenticated envelope | No release-report signature; release blocks |
| Partial/extra gate context | Signed release context omits or adds a gate outside the exact G1–G8 manifest | Release authentication fails |
| Quality-score proxy | Declared score exists without passing human-quality launch evidence | Release authentication fails |
| Release-context mutation | Signed digest, gate, quality evidence, or other context changes after signing | Payload, signature, and lineage checks fail |
| Revoked report key | Signature verifies cryptographically but policy marks the key revoked | Offline verification fails |
| Revoked timestamp key | Timestamp token verifies but authority key is revoked | Offline verification fails |
| Invalid time policy | Maximum age is NaN or allowed future skew is negative |
Policy fails closed |
| Agent-only lineage | No named human review or approval event exists | Authentication refuses to sign |
| Post-signing human edit | Artifact changes after approval | Revision increments and both signatures are invalidated |
Automated verification#
Current admitted value ledger#
The current implementation was rerun sequentially with VITEST_MAX_WORKERS=1.
The current publication tip is 84d1c2f65cb672a4943d5c8ed8a1cdc68c9d534c; that
final commit changes only the static type of the artifact-rights test fixture,
and its contract row was rerun after publication with the same result.
| UTC interval | Files | Result | Surface |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-29T14:25:44.751Z–2026-07-29T14:25:45.894Z | 2 | 10/10 | canonical artifact rights and contract/Prisma alignment |
| 2026-07-29T14:25:45.894Z–2026-07-29T14:25:58.722Z | 3 | 49/49 | V1 BFF rights provider, autonomy bindings, and end-to-end boundary |
| 2026-07-29T14:25:58.722Z–2026-07-29T14:26:01.215Z | 1 | 8/8 | full shared C2PA export package |
| 2026-07-29T14:26:01.215Z–2026-07-29T14:26:07.488Z | 1 | 7/7 | full V8 case-bundle package |
| 2026-07-29T14:26:16.705Z–2026-07-29T14:26:33.922Z | 10 | 41/41 + 3 skip | full V8 Loom package |
| 2026-07-29T14:26:51.944Z–2026-07-29T14:26:53.586Z | 3 | 28/28 | full authenticated Yemaya case-verifier package |
| 2026-07-29T14:26:58.222Z–2026-07-29T14:27:00.091Z | 3 | 38/38 | full Yemaya aggregate case-pipeline package |
| 2026-07-29T14:27:07.865Z–2026-07-29T14:27:08.823Z | 1 | 18/18 | full V8 case-contracts package |
| 2026-07-29T14:27:13.150Z–2026-07-29T14:27:21.990Z | 3 | 27/27 | full V8 case-eval package |
| 2026-07-29T14:27:26.784Z–2026-07-29T14:27:33.549Z | 1 | 3/3 | full Daedalus compiler package |
| 2026-07-29T14:34:54.500Z–2026-07-29T14:34:56.708Z | 2 | 7/7 | full shared content-signing package |
| Unique total | 30 | 236/236 | no focused row or executed assertion is counted twice; skips excluded |
The three Loom skips are reported separately and are not counted as passing assertions. The former 183/183 total accurately described the older suite set; the current full packages contain more coverage.
Representative commands:
pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/contracts/vitest.config.ts <artifact-rights and alignment tests>
pnpm exec vitest run --config apps/oshun/bff/vitest.config.ts <three rights/autonomy tests>
pnpm exec vitest run --config libs/oshun/c2pa-export/vitest.config.ts
pnpm exec vitest run # affected package roots
pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p <affected-tsconfig>
node tools/typecheck/ratchet.mjs --app apps/oshun/bff --tsconfig tsconfig.typecheck.json
pnpm exec nx run @oshun/content-signing:build --skip-nx-cache
pnpm exec nx run @oshun/c2pa-export:build --skip-nx-cache
git diff --check
Type, lint, and build gates#
- contracts library typechecking passed. Its broad spec configuration still
reports 178 lines of unrelated repository debt; the two task-owned
artifact-rights.test.tsfixture errors were corrected by exactArtifactRightsMaterialReceipttyping, and the diagnostic log contains no remaining PROOF-003-owned error; - 13 directly affected non-contract configurations passed serial TypeScript checks: C2PA library/spec, case-bundle, Loom, case-verifier library/spec, case-pipeline library/spec, case-contracts library/spec, case-eval library/spec, and Daedalus;
- the shared content-signing library TypeScript check passed;
- the dependency-aware BFF ratchet reported 0 known app-owned errors;
- exact ESLint and Prettier over the changed fixture passed, and
git diff --checkpassed; - uncached content-signing and C2PA export production builds passed.
The aggregate yemaya-case-verifier:build expands to 37 sequential dependency
targets. Its direct library/spec typechecks and 28/28 runtime assertions
pass, but the aggregate build encountered unrelated existing
@iris/agents-core:build errors: a missing
@iris/conversation-providers-google module and a function without a terminal
return. The supervised process group was stopped once that dependency failure
made the gate red. The verifier aggregate build is therefore not represented as
passing. Loom, Daedalus, and case-bundle have passing direct TypeScript gates;
the current case-bundle project exposes no separate build target.
Refresh-discovered regressions and bounded exclusions#
- The artifact-rights fixture constructed a material receipt through an inferred object type that widened literal fields. It now returns the exact canonical receipt type; runtime behavior is unchanged and the current contract suite passes 10/10.
- Root-launched package-relative Vitest selectors for Loom and the case verifier discovered no tests. Those invocations are not represented as passing. The correct package-root runs pass 41/41 plus three explicit skips and 28/28, respectively.
- Loom emitted known missing-source-map warnings for generated
libs/shared/database/src/*.js.map; no runtime assertion failed. - The broad contracts spec errors and
@iris/agents-coredependency build failure are outside the task-owned files and remain explicit exclusions. No compiler rule, assertion, or release requirement was weakened to clear them. - No full-workspace sweep or AUD-003's separate 54-config refresh was attempted or claimed.
Artifact identity#
These hashes were computed from the current implementation publication tip
84d1c2f65cb672a4943d5c8ed8a1cdc68c9d534c.
| Artifact | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
| Canonical artifact-rights contract | 3dea9bf010d3b77b179c88198d5dce65c671815f2fcb0455d8e04fbb1ec43a25 |
| V1 governed rights adapter | f541aee174ff51dae78352194148ebf740654be3886fa667ccbfc1afe5550cbb |
| V8 authoritative asset verifier | b61c27ca2bce15e88cc4bd814d2e494c4f140c4b8b3d99bcea4ba42159cad512 |
| C2PA mint path | 9f6223436c21789c9b8f5ad585d8ef51e195489ac62806af06ba8e55199205ae |
| C2PA verify path | be40da784cb85bc29aeb93d2546340347bc6d3e7c5684dc60f883fce97c056e1 |
| Authenticated V8 release report | a34f39513b493438f8ec7dbbdcf0e76e41de27cd99f2f434ecd65d5430f618be |
| Real-C2PA V8 case bundle | f012b4749624f43a0ddf29ce782d9ee1a3269a9f73e8a46094f5f54a767755a9 |
| Aggregate provenance preservation | 24203122b248fddbdfc8e2cdeeebcc4fcb8153c2dd58962d9fd14f9a85b6a589 |
| Shared content-signing primitives | 363a0cb15ea6715610eb39c0e21664cc523d0c7f5c7598ae7263536effcc9b48 |
| Workspace dependency lock | 08b055786e9b8a6104d5313601d7eef3205dedcf395066fd9a8264c9859d690f |
Human authority and external deployment boundary#
Repository publication of these boundaries and deterministic fixtures requires no fabricated human signoff, and none is claimed. The fixture keys and authorities are ephemeral. A passing fixture proves contract and cryptographic behavior against local bytes; it is not a production rights decision, consent grant, public-trust decision, timestamp, human approval, or deployment.
- production rights/consent registries, C2PA public trust lists and certificate policy, KMS/HSM-backed report keys, public timestamp authorities, human approval systems, and asset stores remain external composition;
- absence of required service configuration, credentials, receipts, fetched bytes, or approval evidence intentionally blocks release;
- embedded SDK mint/verify and substituted-byte detection are real local cryptographic operations, but do not claim a live public trust-list or third-party authority;
- no live external rights service, KMS, timestamp authority, production asset fetch, population outcome, or deployment is claimed;
- PROOF-003 closes the named V1 and V8 boundaries, not every media producer in the monorepo.
Resource-safe verification and UI scope#
The refresh host was app-dev-server, Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, Linux
6.8.0-134-generic x86_64, with 15 GiB RAM, 31 GiB swap, and 16 GiB free disk.
The toolchain was Node.js v24.15.0, pnpm 10.25.0, TypeScript 6.0.3, and
Vitest 4.1.7.
An unrelated checkout's long-running Vitest worker and this checkout's Nx daemon were active. Focused gates ran sequentially. The BFF ratchet peaked near 6.3 GiB RSS while roughly 6.6 GiB remained available. The 37-target verifier build was supervised and stopped after its unrelated dependency failure. No full workspace gate was started.
This refresh changes a backend test fixture and evidence only. It does not change customer/admin/PWA/mobile/Unreal UI, so the frontend skill, Playwright, mobile automation, screenshots, and Unreal verification are inapplicable.
Publication identity#
- Original source commit on the current graph:
2968665255d826439aa8ca355aaa397f9b605182 - Historical equivalent source identity (identical tree):
abae1eae6eba168f334e66e9135cc1af217f8957 - Historical evidence-pack commit on the current graph:
a76dcc1e58e38ee36999178dae8010d9f1211985 - Historical equivalent evidence identity (identical tree):
0b0d101e20f9f1ad19ebfede5e611f3e49ab316f - Historical ledger closure commit:
7034b651ef10ddbbfd7cfd7a913c318f341ab8ed - Selected-candidate provenance hardening:
54f183278714144ac35bdbca2e0aac4838a1a496 - Human-quality launch-evidence hardening:
2a8aea8f2107616e6bf0a87ac879dd3051db61de - Exact signed G1–G8 release-gate hardening:
4d0707691584e1053a15521764c7efb32a41ec21 - Current fixture remediation and admitted verification tip:
84d1c2f65cb672a4943d5c8ed8a1cdc68c9d534c - Current evidence-refresh commit: recorded by the task-scoped commit that contains this file.