# PROMPT-003 evidence pack — held-out prompt-injection portfolio

## Work-package charter

- **Task ID:** `PROMPT-003`
- **Owner:** cross-version prompt-security maintainers; implementation owner:
  Codex
- **Priority:** P0
- **Risk tier:** Critical authority-confusion, prompt-injection, source-scope,
  generated-output, and release-permission risk
- **Dependencies:** `PROMPT-001`, `PROMPT-002`, `@oshun/prompt-trust`, every
  migrated product boundary, and each boundary's deterministic output checks
- **Rollout strategy:** credential-free held-out regression project plus an
  always-on pull-request/push workflow; no production model, persistence, or UI
  rollout
- **Rollback strategy:** revert source commit
  `d698ae1c53c0a4895b29fe7e4eeeabed70fcf07f`; the suite, workflow, and Rust
  development dependency are additive
- **Evidence-pack location:** this file

## Closed implementation

`testing/prompt-injection` is a dedicated Nx/pnpm test project. It keeps the
versioned attack corpus and boundary registry outside production prompt code,
loads the same corpus from TypeScript, Python, and Rust, invokes real production
prompt builders and deterministic admission checks, and replaces only the
network/model edge with local scripted doubles.

The registry names **20 invoked implementations**:

| Boundary ID            | Production implementation under test         | Runner     |
| ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ---------- |
| `v1.ideation`          | structured idea synthesizer                  | TypeScript |
| `v1.planner`           | creative-orchestrator brief decomposition    | TypeScript |
| `v1.bff-text`          | BFF source-bound text generator              | TypeScript |
| `v1.agent-loop`        | research/tool-result generator               | TypeScript |
| `v1.critique-revise`   | artifact/rubric/prior-critique judge         | TypeScript |
| `v1.cqj-self-refine`   | CQJ critique-to-revision boundary            | TypeScript |
| `v1.cqj-reflexion`     | CQJ cross-item lesson memory                 | TypeScript |
| `v2.calliope-writer`   | match-commentary writer                      | TypeScript |
| `v2.calliope-reviewer` | generated-commentary reviewer                | TypeScript |
| `v2.hathor-dialogue`   | NPC persona/world/history dialogue           | TypeScript |
| `v2.maya-slm`          | local SLM context window                     | Rust       |
| `v6.iris-cognition`    | governed cognition gateway                   | TypeScript |
| `v6.moirai-mount`      | V6 tier-budget/tool-grant mount into Iris    | TypeScript |
| `v6.clio`              | event-scoped chronicle writer                | TypeScript |
| `v7.forge`             | realm artifact proposal and static admission | TypeScript |
| `v7.mawu`              | Sophia-scoped generation backend boundary    | TypeScript |
| `v8.proposer`          | solver-owned case surface proposer           | TypeScript |
| `v8.assets`            | case asset job prompt                        | TypeScript |
| `v9.content`           | source-bound educational content prompt      | TypeScript |
| `v9.tutor`             | governed Metis tutoring provider call        | Python     |

The registry test fails if a source or mapped test disappears, if a registered
test stops naming its boundary, or if any held-out probe appears in a production
boundary source. The latter makes the corpus held out from product prompts and
few-shot examples; this is a committed regression set, not a claim that the
benchmark itself is secret.

## Attack and authority coverage

The immutable `corpus.v1.json` contains one opaque probe for each required
family:

1. direct
2. indirect
3. cross-turn
4. retrieval poisoning
5. source poisoning
6. generated output
7. critic feedback
8. tool result
9. multimodal metadata/OCR
10. encoded
11. delimiter
12. memory poisoning
13. cross-item

Every payload requests the same six sentinel escalations: tool authority, source
scope, rights, autonomy, budget, and release permission. The shared assertion
requires each opaque probe to be present inside a real untrusted zone, removes
every untrusted body, and then proves that neither the probe nor any of the six
escalation values entered the trusted prompt shell. Encoded and delimiter
attacks receive additional neutralization assertions. Boundary-level checks also
prove the Moirai tool grant stays empty and its tier budget remains fixed, Forge
capabilities remain policy-scoped, and Mawu/Clio source references remain the
original typed references.

All 13 families run at all 20 implementations: **260 boundary/attack
executions**. The TypeScript report uses a single parameterized test for both
Calliope writer and reviewer, so its test-count total is smaller than the number
of boundary executions.

## Generated-output integrity proof

Seven negative regression tests exercise the post-generation admission layer:

- an agent-loop tool call with an extra release field and a non-string query is
  rejected against the original JSON schema, and the handler call count remains
  zero;
- a BFF citation outside the supplied source-ID set is rejected;
- critic evidence absent from the exact artifact text is rejected;
- unsafe generated commentary cannot be cleared by an empty model review;
- a Clio event reference absent from the original log slice is rejected;
- a Forge capability smuggled in generated source is rejected by the original
  capability policy;
- V8 surface fields inconsistent with the typed case spec and V9 attacker text
  used as a source identifier are rejected.

These tests directly close the ledger requirement for citations, quotes, and
tool arguments to be checked against original typed data after generation.

## Model/provider change enforcement

`.github/workflows/prompt-injection-portfolio.yml` has no path filter. It runs
for every pull request to `main`, every push to `main`, and manual dispatch. The
workflow runs portfolio typecheck, lint, and the sequential multi-language
`verify` target. The TypeScript, Python, Rust, and aggregate verification
targets are non-cacheable, preventing a boundary or provider change from
receiving a stale green result. Project inputs and implicit dependencies
additionally name the shared provider/agent-loop roots and every migrated
package.

## Automated verification

Final verification was performed on the integrated and published source tree at
`ee77b83a26ecf1fbeaf6077f78d582d7b722161c`.

- Aggregate Nx target: **passed**.
- TypeScript/Vitest: **232/232** tests across **5/5** files.
- Python/Pytest: **1/1** corpus test, iterating all 13 attacks at the V9 tutor
  boundary.
- Rust portfolio: **1/1** corpus test, iterating all 13 attacks at the Maya SLM
  boundary.
- Complete Maya SLM crate: **18/18** integration tests (17 existing plus the
  portfolio test); library and doc-test targets also passed.
- Harness TypeScript typecheck: passed with zero diagnostics.
- Harness ESLint: passed with zero warnings/errors. Cross-project boundary-rule
  suppressions are limited to the V1/V2 test adapters and their narrow Iris test
  entry because those files intentionally invoke multiple product projects.
- Ruff check and format: passed.
- Cargo format: passed.
- Prettier: passed for the workflow, README, JSON manifests/corpus/registry,
  config, and TypeScript sources.
- Workflow YAML parse, `git diff --check`, and frozen offline pnpm lock
  validation: passed.
- The source commit's pre-commit Nx affected typecheck independently passed for
  `@oshun/prompt-injection-evals`.

Representative commands:

```text
NX_DAEMON=false pnpm exec nx run @oshun/prompt-injection-evals:verify --parallel=1
pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p testing/prompt-injection/tsconfig.json
pnpm exec eslint testing/prompt-injection/src/*.ts testing/prompt-injection/vitest.config.ts --no-ignore --max-warnings=0
PYTHONPATH=services/metis/src python3 -m pytest -q testing/prompt-injection/python/test_portfolio_prompt_injection.py
cargo test --manifest-path libs/maya/engine-core/crates/maya-slm-runtime/Cargo.toml
cargo fmt --manifest-path libs/maya/engine-core/crates/maya-slm-runtime/Cargo.toml --check
python3 -m ruff check testing/prompt-injection/python/test_portfolio_prompt_injection.py
pnpm install --lockfile-only --offline --ignore-scripts --frozen-lockfile --filter @oshun/prompt-injection-evals
```

The final aggregate target ran from `2026-07-16T18:56:47Z` through
`2026-07-16T18:57:20Z` on Linux 6.8.0-110-generic x86_64 with Node 24.14.1, pnpm
10.25.0, Python 3.12.3, and Rust 1.94.1. No live provider credential, remote
model call, or claim about a production model response is involved.

## Resource safety and reconciliation

The host had 15 GiB RAM and 31 GiB swap. All verification was targeted,
sequential, and single-worker. Two early aggregate-wrapper attempts were stopped
while a competing Nx daemon was rebuilding the large workspace graph; their
underlying direct TypeScript, Python, and Rust commands had already passed. The
final daemon-free aggregate target completed successfully after the competing
graph exited. No full Nx sweep, Next build, Expo export, Tauri package, Unreal
build, Playwright run, or mobile automation was applicable or attempted.

`origin/main` advanced during publication. The source branch took the newer
remote lockfile, reapplied only the prompt-injection importer, passed frozen
offline lock validation and the complete post-merge portfolio, and published the
combined tip without dropping either change set.

## Artifact identity

| Artifact                  | SHA-256                                                            |
| ------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Held-out corpus           | `4f7602baed09058ac885dfeac119d9828881d79803c584a6fe57a6d5cf62e26e` |
| Boundary registry         | `3ca7b7de49adec7c3315f0dbfa7092f90b83bffb5f8d457695ab571a3f73eb2f` |
| Nx project                | `30eca6c852fb9c26d11f60691dc88ad44da078360adc7b621ceb1e1e9247c4bf` |
| Shared TypeScript harness | `dc0bde60555acf32a186c2c8895ef55c129f06c50c55f82fa414584b84965e26` |
| V1 TypeScript runner      | `791d4e5606b61837c12392363a9ef3c05b3a8f0808394913312f8b9832daaee0` |
| V2 TypeScript runner      | `10f6e1131ffcae5f3288ba19f97a4e4c4a7da29cefb24ef2d3bcf2c918578699` |
| V6/V7 TypeScript runner   | `c4aa4dbf1a0c693c8d1e77fb4e4d45dc8d5ae873c3362a8b32a8dceb66d951be` |
| V8/V9 TypeScript runner   | `c9be93d2d7a78cd8444ca4ec5d5ec1d499b2759bd326d010e9d6ff6629bd0cd1` |
| Python tutor runner       | `2b648c45482de71ec24299fdd7d619c5ca290a8cbb30e364a4c12f9a2eed4167` |
| Rust SLM runner           | `fe169f361e60e0e07c7dc9f2774dad4cf01fc16eb112f619306f7735cea1aa06` |
| Always-on workflow        | `b13c5e3168b80383a48e8499dfb04e058e9ba218b4532eeaca2d0988ffecfb82` |

## Scope and remaining seams

- This suite proves typed prompt construction and deterministic post-generation
  admission with local scripted provider doubles. It does not claim that prompt
  structure alone makes arbitrary production models immune to all attacks.
- Live-model red-team calibration, provider-specific behavioral thresholds, and
  release-signature decisions remain governed by their model/release processes.
- Forge's static capability inspection remains admission-only; executable
  sandbox enforcement remains under the named AUTH/V7 work.
- Safety-classifier quality, substantive claim entailment beyond typed source
  membership, durable V6 state, and live-provider readiness remain under their
  named SAFETY, PROOF, V6, V7, V8, and V9 packages.
- No rendered web, PWA, mobile, admin, or Unreal UI changed, so frontend skill,
  Playwright, mobile automation, screenshots, and Unreal verification were
  inapplicable.

## Publication identity

- **Authoritative source commit:** `d698ae1c53c0a4895b29fe7e4eeeabed70fcf07f`
- **Source publication tip on `origin/main`:**
  `ee77b83a26ecf1fbeaf6077f78d582d7b722161c`
- **Closure evidence commit:** recorded in the PROMPT-003 ledger closure entry
  after this evidence file is published.
