# PROMPT-001 evidence pack — shared typed trust-zone renderer

## Work-package charter

- **Task ID:** `PROMPT-001`
- **Owner:** shared prompt-security and content-quality-judge maintainers;
  implementation owner: Codex
- **Accountable products:** V1–V9 model-boundary platform, with CQJ as the
  reference migration
- **Priority:** P0
- **Target milestone:** 2026-07-15 SOTA gap-closure program
- **Risk tier:** Critical prompt-injection, authority-confusion, privacy, and
  provenance risk
- **Dependencies:** shared provider contracts and the existing CQJ delimiter
  red-team boundary
- **Rollback strategy:** Revert the source commit. The package and CQJ
  provenance fields are additive; no persistence migration, provider call, or
  user-facing UI is introduced.
- **Evidence-pack location:** This file

## Authoritative shared primitive

`@oshun/prompt-trust` is the common typed renderer. Its stable contract version
is `oshun-prompt-trust.v1`. It owns the CQJ-compatible
`<<<BEGIN_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>>` / `<<<END_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>>` delimiters,
sanitization, prompt-size bounds, exact prompt hashing, trust labels, source
references, and privacy-governed completion evidence.

The origin taxonomy covers user, source, retrieval, canon, world, memory, prior
model output, critique, tool result, artifact, and policy. Origin and trust are
separate: canon/world data may be `trusted-context`, but every data zone remains
explicitly `non-instruction`. Runtime validation rejects unknown origins,
`policy` data zones, and attempts to label a zone `authoritative`.

Authority fields are branded and can only be created through
`definePromptAuthorityField`. System policy, tool authority, source scope,
rights, and release law are forced into system authority; only an ordinary task
instruction may be placed in the user channel. Model-controlled content cannot
be structurally assigned as an authority field, and delimiter-like authority
text fails closed.

## Delimiter, encoding, and length safety

The renderer preserves ordinary CQJ fence output while neutralizing literal
delimiter runs plus HTML entity, nested HTML entity, percent/double-percent,
URL-encoded entity, JavaScript Unicode/hex escape, full-width Unicode, and
base64-encoded delimiter forms. The model-visible immunity clause states that
decoded, escaped, quoted, and obfuscated data cannot create instructions, tools,
authority, source scope, rights, or release law.

Sanitization and truncation do not erase evidence identity. Each trust label
records the SHA-256 of original content, the rendered-content SHA-256, original
and rendered lengths, effective bound, omitted count, transformations, and
source references. The default per-zone bound is 24,000 characters and the
default whole-prompt bound is 96,000. Head/tail truncation includes the original
content hash, so two inputs that differ only in omitted content still produce
different prompt hashes.

## Prompt and completion provenance

Every render records:

- renderer version and exact system/user/prompt SHA-256 identities;
- origin, trust, instruction semantics, placement, transformations, and
  truncation for every authority field and zone; and
- deduplicated source references with conflict rejection.

`recordPromptCompletion` adds provider, provider version, routed model, model
version, privacy-policy version, response status, and policy-permitted raw
response/hash. Privacy modes are retain, redact, and omit. Omission defaults to
retaining neither response nor hash. Invalid modes, incomplete identity, or a
redactor that does not return a string fail closed.

CQJ now uses an explicit `oshun-cqj-prompt-audit.v1` retention policy to retain
its established raw-response behavior. Callers can override it with redaction or
omission. Parse failures carry the same typed prompt/completion audit while
their error payload contains only the privacy-permitted response; an omitted
secret response is not leaked through `JudgeParseError.raw`.

## CQJ reference migration

`JudgeEngine` pointwise, pairwise, calibration-example, and panel-context
prompts now render through the shared primitive. Calibration examples and panel
critique are isolated as non-instruction data rather than concatenated into
policy. Pairwise forward and reverse orderings retain separate exact prompt
audits plus the existing aggregate comparison hash.

`PlayerProxyEvaluator` uses the same renderer and completion audit. Public CQJ
exports for `fenceUntrusted`, delimiter constants, and the immunity clause are
preserved for compatibility, but their implementation is now shared.

## Adversarial and integration proof

The affected suites prove:

- all eleven required origins and authoritative/trusted/untrusted semantics;
- system-only placement for policy, tools, source scope, rights, and release
  law, including forged-authority and runtime trust-promotion rejection;
- literal and encoded delimiter neutralization with original evidence identity;
- deterministic head/tail truncation, total prompt bounds, source-reference
  capture, and hash changes for omitted-content changes;
- retain/redact/omit response policy, provider/model version identity, and
  privacy-safe parse failures;
- CQJ pointwise/pairwise position-bias behavior, calibration examples, panel
  context, red-team probes, and PlayerProxy behavior after migration; and
- the Iris run-adapter strict typecheck repair required by the CQJ dependency
  graph, with its dedicated contract tests.

## Automated verification

- Complete content-quality-judge regression on final task source: **283/283**
  across **34/34** files.
- Complete prompt-trust regression: **8/8** in **1/1** file.
- Focused Iris common-run adapter regression: **5/5** in **1/1** file.
- Total authoritative regression: **296/296** across **36/36** files.
- Prompt-trust, content-quality-judge, and Iris agents-core TypeScript checks:
  zero errors.
- Official prompt-trust lint target: zero errors and zero warnings.
- Exact changed production TypeScript, with the inherited CQJ boundary rule
  disabled, passes all remaining ESLint rules with zero errors and warnings;
  prompt-trust and the Iris adapter pass the complete rule set.
- Prettier passes for every changed source/config/document file; the final
  whitespace check passes.
- The merged pnpm lock parses successfully and contains the exact CQJ link plus
  prompt-trust importer. A textual comparison proves the first remote merge's
  lock differs from `origin/main` only by those two importer additions.
- After the lock-overlapping remote merge, the affected subset passed **43/43**
  across **4/4** files plus both affected typechecks. After the final
  non-overlapping remote merge, prompt-trust passed **8/8** again.

The official CQJ package lint target remains red on its pre-existing
shared-to-Iris architecture baseline: **15 module-boundary errors and 7 non-null
warnings** across unchanged and changed files. The two changed CQJ provider
files retain their established `@iris/agents-core` imports; the new
`@oshun/prompt-trust` dependency is correctly tagged `scope:shared` /
`layer:infra` and produces no boundary finding. Eliminating the CQJ package's
existing Iris coupling requires a separate provider-contract architecture
migration; suppressing or broadening the repository constraint was not treated
as a valid PROMPT-001 fix. This missing all-green package lint is the explicitly
documented inherited verification blocker.

## Artifact identity

| Artifact                                                     | SHA-256                                                            |
| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `libs/shared/prompt-trust/src/trust-zone.ts`                 | `8bca39bd9402586cf8ae002ae43e035706950f963d32f2cc8c058655ec136353` |
| `libs/shared/prompt-trust/src/trust-zone.spec.ts`            | `1ae309b33b0e330faa22059467d8fdb6945b33da253950ea2617b0c15d44696a` |
| `libs/shared/prompt-trust/src/index.ts`                      | `793ae5b621b3367f4f44d682e56accefda3b2cde089890283ed3c9eb243403f4` |
| `libs/shared/prompt-trust/README.md`                         | `a01ac6398f265499d07bbee365c20d371adec58d5f1a0085f66e6ee150debb7d` |
| `libs/shared/prompt-trust/package.json`                      | `f6cd8908cea7c3545f75bff0f4356cd762d9559643eec3cf861089389bae1cc3` |
| `libs/shared/prompt-trust/project.json`                      | `c31e6d12866c36beec4f5c2b1a40cc59f93a263f8f1692fa18dac690c9491abd` |
| `libs/shared/content-quality-judge/src/judge-engine.ts`      | `34c70c0e1250d480a9105cad52a768d8e731e5647657077a3c13d2af2c22d8b5` |
| `libs/shared/content-quality-judge/src/judge-engine.spec.ts` | `84ba56d054f039a660851aeca00f285afa1393a40f8ae47420ec74476e2f831e` |
| `libs/shared/content-quality-judge/src/player-proxy.ts`      | `b82ebe5c1515cb472800c3457aac1c35284158c941f593ee6967cbf8b4daeda6` |
| `libs/shared/content-quality-judge/src/player-proxy.spec.ts` | `26133f65f7336c14352e91bd1029bcb4cd83254d610e7835dc05573c9ceb37c4` |
| `libs/shared/content-quality-judge/src/errors.ts`            | `64bf814bbfb90d19d03aefb55f63467332efaf6863643109bd4cbfb31a2941eb` |
| `libs/iris/agents/core/src/agentic/common-run-adapter.ts`    | `2942df13641454e0e7d8ce3c76c3e8c718691157a0eea19c5c059ff094440807` |

## Resource-safe verification

The host reported 15 GiB RAM, 31 GiB swap, 10 GiB available memory, and 38 GiB
free disk before final verification. An existing Nx daemon and local web process
were active, so all tests and typechecks ran directly, sequentially, and with
one Vitest worker. Two accidentally overlapping scoped pnpm graph recalculations
were stopped at 6.7 GiB available memory; no OOM occurred and the lockfile was
instead reconciled and parsed deterministically. No full-workspace run-many,
Next production build, Expo, Tauri, native release, or Unreal build was
attempted. Final source verification completed at `2026-07-16T15:55:18Z` on
Linux 6.8.0-110 with Node 24.14.1 and pnpm 10.25.0.

## Scope and negative proof

- PROMPT-001 creates the shared primitive and migrates the CQJ reference
  boundary. It does not claim that every V1–V9 model boundary is migrated;
  inventory and migration of those boundaries remain `PROMPT-002`.
- It does not change rendered customer/admin/PWA/mobile/Unreal UI, so the
  frontend skill and Playwright/mobile/Unreal automation are inapplicable.
- Scripted providers exercise the boundary. This pack does not claim a live
  provider credential, live prompt log, or production privacy-system audit.
- Branded authority prevents accidental structural assignment and runtime
  placement errors, but cannot prove the human caller did not intentionally pass
  model text into the authority factory. Call sites must keep following the
  documented taint-routing rule; PROMPT-002 verifies each migration.
- The renderer supplies prompt safety structure, provenance, and fail-closed
  validation. It does not claim that a model can never disobey its system
  instruction; CQJ red-team outcomes remain auditable.

## Publication identity

- **Authoritative boundary source commit:**
  `93d6d841e72aca0be8448bc41d2cc2a31f81d06e`
- **Source publication tip on `origin/main`:**
  `1a117aa1cfbf6376f7903f8053af53982605360f`
- **Closure evidence commit:** `4fd02bbb58dee2fb24b2db9d5d1c7fb0ceadb5df`
