The second chapter of the Governance and commerce track. It rewrites the guide
privacy-tenants, whose eleven inherited slides come from two content files:
25-governance-deepdives.json:privacy-tenants-boundary,privacy-tenants-workedandprivacy-tenants-failure;10-governance-privacy-tenants.json: the other eight.
With the cover, the close and two dividers, the chapter has fifteen slides.
Everything below was read or executed at b6f1ccf1c11. The sources were:
- the eleven slides as they stand, and their source pages
V1/features/privacy-consent-portability.md,V1/features/tenant-toolkit.mdandV1/features/admin-products.md; libs/oshun/privacy(consent, export and deletion, residency, DSAR and operator access);libs/oshun/tenant-console(tenant model, identity, roles, audit explorer, bulk operations, integrations) andlibs/oshun/developer-portal.
The job#
Two questions an administrator asks before touching someone's data or authority.
What may be done with this person's data? Whatever the purpose-specific consent, the data class and the organization's boundary allow.
- Nine consent families. Memory, voice, avatar, synthetic media,
notifications, privacy surface, support, research and educational context
(
CONSENT_FAMILIES). The slide's nine match the code. - A withdrawal plan marks an immediate effect only for memory, and plans the
rest.
planWithdrawalCascadelists eviction from memory as effective immediately when the withdrawn family ismemory. It returns that marker; it does not reach or change a memory store, and its test asserts the marker, not an eviction (Eve review 40811eae). For every other family, voice included, nothing is immediate. Each downstream artifact becomes a cleanup step planned aspending. The type also names in flight, completed and failed, but no library function advances a step: that is the runtime's job. - Export and deletion carry evidence. Eleven export scopes (
EXPORT_SCOPES) and a canonical manifest with entry digests and a bundle SHA-256.verifyExportBundlecompares the manifest with the entry digests the caller supplies; it does not re-hash the bytes. Deletion has tombstones, legal-hold checks and a shred outcome reported as it happened.
Who may change authority, and what did the change do?
- Tenants inherit bounded policy. Seven tenant kinds (
TENANT_KINDS) and a hierarchy depth cap of six (HIERARCHY_DEPTH_CAP). Policy inherits by override, merge or tighten-only, and a child tenant cannot set a looser value than its parent's tighten-only key. - Identity and roles need evidence. SAML and OIDC mapping, JIT, SCIM and roster sync; a role change carries a capability diff, a risk score and a dry run.
- Bulk and integration work is previewed. Bulk rows are validated before a staged commit; API keys are stored as a prefix plus a hash; webhooks back off, dead-letter and replay.
- The boundary is stated. The tenant toolkit page marks what is real and
what is a seam, and the privacy page does the same for its library:
- the libraries are deterministic functions and state machines;
- live SAML and OIDC parsing is a runtime seam;
- OIDC login fails closed with 503 when unconfigured;
- the tenant-admin SSO configuration UI is partial.
- Executed here:
libs/oshun/privacy: 113 passed and 1 skipped, in 6 files;libs/oshun/tenant-console: 202 of 202 in 10 files;libs/oshun/developer-portal: 41 of 41 in 5 files.
Running example. One learner withdraws memory consent:
- The withdrawal is recorded with its purpose and audited.
- The plan marks eviction from memory as required at once, the one immediate effect the library names. A runtime would have to carry it out.
- Derived instances and shares become cleanup steps, planned as pending. The runtime would advance them, and a failed step would stay visible as failed.
Separately, the learner files a subject access request, which closes only with each export scope's outcome. The learner's class tenant sits two levels down a school hierarchy and cannot set a looser value than the school's tighten-only key. The rewrite follows this learner across every slide.
Three learning promises (the cover)#
- Consent is purpose-specific and granular. Nine families, each withdrawn on its own, with its effects planned step by step rather than assumed.
- Evidence travels with the data. Export hashes, deletion tombstones and a shred outcome reported as it happened.
- Authority changes are previewed and attributable. Role diffs, dry runs, bulk previews and tighten-only inheritance.
Three things to remember (the close)#
- Ask which consent family, and which purpose.
- Ask what the evidence proves. A matching manifest proves the bundle agrees with its declared digests, not that the bytes were re-hashed or the scope was permitted.
- Ask what is still pending. A withdrawal marked immediate can still have everything left to carry out.
Bridge. The next chapter follows a message out of Oshun: messaging and Telegram.
Sections#
Two sections, plus the cover and the close.
| Section | Slides | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy | 6 | privacy-tenants-boundary, privacy-consent, privacy-withdrawal, privacy-portability, privacy-access, privacy-tenants-worked |
| Tenancy and admin | 5 | tenant-hierarchy, tenant-identity-roles, tenant-bulk-integrations, admin-operations, privacy-tenants-failure |
privacy-tenants-worked closes the privacy section, after the withdrawal it
walks.
Treatment decisions#
The plan's per-slide treatments stand, with these notes:
privacy-tenants-failurebecomes a compare panel of the four "looks done but is not" pairs (role template, bulk preview, export hashes, row removal). The chapter then needs no table.tenant-identity-rolesstates the live-parser seam and the 503 on the slide, not only in Explain.- One real capture. The chapter needs one. Which admin surface renders the privacy or tenant views is to be checked at authoring time, rather than captured from a stand-in.
Corrections to the plan#
- Withdrawal is not immediate for every family. The inherited
privacy-withdrawalslide says "Disable the affected storage or recall immediately". The only effect the library marks as immediate is eviction from memory, for thememoryfamily, and it marks it in a plan. - Cleanup states are planned, not tracked. The same slide's "Report pending, in-flight, completed and failed steps" describes a type. The library plans every step as pending, and no function advances one.
The counts on the inherited slides (nine families, eleven export scopes, seven tenant kinds, a depth cap of six) match the code.
What this chapter does not establish#
- No request ran against a live privacy or tenant service for this brief.
- Executed: the three libraries' suites (above), and the four counts read from their sources.
- Read, not run: the admin products page's claims about workspaces, assistance and mobile urgency. The rewrite re-reads them slide by slide.
- Not established: that any runtime advances withdrawal steps. The library only plans them.