Document Version: 1.1 Date: 2025-10-03 Status: Active Review Frequency: Quarterly
Executive Summary#
This document provides a comprehensive threat model for the Lilith AI-powered wisdom platform, following the STRIDE methodology. It identifies potential security threats, attack vectors, and mitigation strategies across all system components.
Table of Contents#
- System Overview
- Assets & Trust Boundaries
- Data Flow Diagrams
- Threat Analysis using STRIDE
- Threat Scenarios
- Risk Register
- Mitigation Strategies
- Security Controls
- Monitoring & Detection
- Incident Response
System Overview#
Lilith is a microservices-based platform providing AI-powered wisdom content through multiple channels (chat, lectures, meditations). The system processes user queries, generates responses using LLMs, and delivers content via web, mobile, and API interfaces.
Key Components:#
- Frontend: Web (Next.js PWA), Mobile (iOS/Android)
- API Layer: Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) service
- Core Services: Auth, Conversation, AI, Content, Media, Notification, Moderation
- Data Stores: PostgreSQL, Redis, S3-compatible storage
- External: AI Providers (OpenAI, Anthropic), TTS/STT services
- Infrastructure: Kubernetes, Istio service mesh, AWS
Assets & Trust Boundaries#
High-Value Assets#
| Asset | Classification | Description | Impact if Compromised |
|---|---|---|---|
| User Conversations | Confidential | Chat history, personal queries | Privacy breach, reputation damage |
| AI Model Prompts | Confidential | System prompts, persona definitions | Competitive advantage loss |
| User Authentication Data | Restricted | JWT secrets, password hashes | Account takeover |
| API Keys & Secrets | Restricted | LLM provider keys, service credentials | Financial impact, service disruption |
| Personal Data | Confidential | Email hashes, preferences, profiles | GDPR violations, privacy breach |
| Content Database | Confidential | Courses, lectures, meditation content | IP theft |
| Voice/Audio Data | Confidential | TTS output, voice cloning data | Privacy breach |
| System Configuration | Internal | Service configs, infrastructure setup | System compromise |
Trust Boundaries#
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Internet │
└─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│ HTTPS/WSS
┌─────────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ CDN / WAF │
│ Trust Boundary 1: External Traffic Filtering │
└─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│
┌─────────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ API Gateway / Load Balancer │
│ Trust Boundary 2: Authentication & Rate Limiting │
└─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│ mTLS
┌─────────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Service Mesh (Istio) │
│ Trust Boundary 3: Internal Service Communication │
│ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌─────────┐ │
│ │ BFF │ │ Auth │ │ AI │ │ Content │ │
│ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ └─────────┘ │
└─────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│ Encrypted at rest
┌─────────────────────▼───────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Data Layer (DB, Redis, S3) │
│ Trust Boundary 4: Data at Rest │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
External Dependencies#
| Service | Purpose | Trust Level | Data Shared |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI/Anthropic | LLM completion | Low | User prompts (anonymized) |
| AWS Services | Infrastructure | Medium | Encrypted data |
| TTS Providers | Voice synthesis | Low | Text content only |
| Email Providers | Notifications | Low | Email addresses (hashed) |
| CDN | Content delivery | Medium | Public content only |
Data Flow Diagrams#
DFD Level 0: System Context#
┌─────────────┐
│ Users │
│ (Web/Mobile)│
└──────┬──────┘
│ HTTPS/WSS
▼
┌────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐
│ Admin │◄───│ Lilith AI │────►│ AI Providers│
│ Console │ │ Platform │ │ (OpenAI,etc)│
└────────────┘ └─────────┬───────┘ └─────────────┘
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ Content Store │
│ (S3, CDN) │
└─────────────────┘
DFD Level 1: High-Level Architecture#
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ Users │◄──────────────────►│ BFF │
│ (Clients) │ 1. Auth Request │ (Aggregator) │
└─────────────┘ 2. Chat Stream └─────────┬───────┘
3. Content Req │ 4. Forward Req
4. Notifications ▼
┌─────────────────┐
┌─────────────┐ 8. AI Response │ Auth │
│ AI Services │◄──────────────────│ Service │
│ (External) │ 7. Prompt └─────────┬───────┘
└─────────────┘ │ 5. Validate
▼
┌─────────────┐ 11. Store Chat ┌─────────────────┐
│ Database │◄──────────────────│ Conversation │
│ (Postgres) │ 10. Fetch Hist │ Service │
└─────────────┘ └─────────┬───────┘
│ 6. Generate
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ AI Service │
│ (Orchestrator) │
└─────────────────┘
DFD Level 2: Authentication Flow#
┌─────────────┐ 1. Login Req ┌─────────────────┐
│ Client │──────────────────►│ BFF/Auth │
└─────────────┘ └─────────┬───────┘
▲ │ 2. Hash & Verify
│ ▼
│ ┌─────────────────┐
│ 6. JWT Token │ User Store │
│ │ (PostgreSQL) │
│ └─────────┬───────┘
│ │ 3. User Found
│ ▼
│ ┌─────────────────┐
│ │ JWT Service │
│ │ (Token Gen) │
│ └─────────┬───────┘
│ │ 4. Generate
│ ▼
│ ┌─────────────────┐
│ │ Session Store │
│ │ (Redis) │
│ └─────────┬───────┘
│ │ 5. Cache Session
└──────────────────────────────────┘
DFD Level 2: Chat Processing Flow#
┌─────────────┐ 1. Chat Msg ┌─────────────────┐
│ Client │─────────────────►│ BFF │
└─────────────┘ └─────────┬───────┘
▲ │ 2. Validate & Forward
│ 9. Stream Response ▼
│ ┌─────────────────┐
│ │ Conversation │ 3. Store Message
│ │ Service │─────────────────┐
│ └─────────┬───────┘ │
│ │ 4. Send to AI ▼
│ ▼ ┌──────────────┐
│ ┌─────────────────┐ │ PostgreSQL │
│ │ AI Service │ │ (Messages) │
│ └─────────┬───────┘ └──────────────┘
│ │ 5. Get Prompt
│ ▼
│ ┌─────────────────┐ 6. LLM Call ┌──────────────┐
│ 8. Stream Back │ Prompt Store │──────────────►│ OpenAI/Claude│
│ │ (Config) │◄──────────────│ (External) │
│ └─────────────────┘ 7. Response └──────────────┘
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Threat Analysis using STRIDE#
STRIDE Framework Application#
For each component, we analyze threats across six categories:
- Spoofing - Impersonating another user or service
- Tampering - Modifying data or code
- Repudiation - Denying actions performed
- Information Disclosure - Exposing protected information
- Denial of Service - Making system unavailable
- Elevation of Privilege - Gaining higher access levels
STRIDE Checklist Summary#
The authoritative STRIDE control matrix is maintained in
STRIDE_CHECKLIST.md. The snapshot below highlights
the most critical safeguards and any residual actions tracked in the security
backlog.
| Component | Key Preventive/Detective Controls | Residual Follow-Up |
|---|---|---|
| BFF Service | mTLS, JWT audience validation, correlation-id tracing, schema-based response filtering | Expand synthetic traffic tests for new aggregations |
| Auth Service | WebAuthn MFA, adaptive throttling, audited admin workflows, key rotation | Complete client-bound token rollout for legacy OAuth apps |
| Conversation Service | Row-level encryption, ACL enforcement, streaming backpressure controls | Continue fuzzing SSE/WebSocket handlers with malformed payload suites |
| AI Orchestration | Prompt firewall, provider certificate pinning, tool-call gating, red-team regression suites | Run pre-release prompt injection exercises for new model families |
| Data Stores | Vault-issued short-lived creds, row level security, tamper-evident WAL archival | Extend cryptographic logging to Redis cache invalidations |
| Observability Stack | Sigstore-signed pipelines, privacy scrubbing filters, RBAC dashboards | Automate drift detection for logging agent configs |
Component-by-Component STRIDE Analysis#
1. BFF (Backend-for-Frontend) Service#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | API spoofing via forged requests | Medium | High | JWT verification, mTLS |
| T | Request/response tampering | Low | Medium | HTTPS, input validation |
| R | Request repudiation | Low | Low | Request logging with correlation IDs |
| I | Sensitive data exposure in aggregated responses | Medium | High | Response filtering, data classification |
| D | Resource exhaustion via complex aggregations | Medium | Medium | Rate limiting, timeout controls |
| E | Bypass service boundaries via aggregation | Low | High | Authorization checks per service call |
2. Authentication Service#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Credential spoofing/replay attacks | High | Critical | Password hashing, JWT expiration, MFA |
| T | JWT token tampering | Medium | High | Token signing, encryption at rest |
| R | Authentication bypass claims | Medium | Medium | Audit logging, non-repudiation tokens |
| I | Password/token exposure | Medium | Critical | Hashing, encrypted storage, secret rotation |
| D | Account lockout attacks | High | Medium | Rate limiting, CAPTCHA, monitoring |
| E | Privilege escalation via token manipulation | Medium | Critical | Role-based access control, token validation |
3. AI Service (LLM Orchestration)#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Impersonation of AI providers | Low | Medium | Provider certificate validation |
| T | Prompt injection attacks | High | Medium | Input sanitization, prompt filtering |
| R | Denial of AI-generated harmful content | Medium | High | Content logging, moderation |
| I | Training data exposure via prompts | Medium | Medium | Prompt anonymization, data masking |
| D | AI service exhaustion | Medium | Medium | Rate limiting, circuit breakers |
| E | Bypass safety controls via crafted prompts | High | High | Multi-layer content filtering |
4. Conversation Service#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Message spoofing | Medium | Medium | Message authentication, user validation |
| T | Chat history tampering | Low | Medium | Database integrity, audit trails |
| R | Message repudiation | Medium | Low | Digital signatures, immutable logs |
| I | Unauthorized conversation access | High | High | User-based isolation, encryption |
| D | WebSocket flooding | High | Medium | Connection limits, message rate limiting |
| E | Cross-user conversation access | Medium | High | Authorization checks, data isolation |
5. Content Service#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Content source spoofing | Low | Medium | Content signing, provenance tracking |
| T | Content modification | Low | High | Versioning, integrity checks |
| R | Content usage repudiation | Low | Low | Access logging |
| I | Unauthorized premium content access | Medium | Medium | Subscription validation |
| D | Content delivery overwhelm | Medium | Low | CDN, caching |
| E | Content management privilege abuse | Low | High | Admin access controls |
6. Media Service#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Media URL spoofing | Medium | Medium | Signed URLs, time-limited access |
| T | Audio/transcript tampering | Low | Medium | File integrity checks |
| R | Media access repudiation | Low | Low | Access logging |
| I | Unauthorized media downloads | Medium | Medium | Access controls, DRM |
| D | Storage/bandwidth exhaustion | Medium | Medium | Upload limits, CDN |
| E | Media management bypass | Low | Medium | Storage access controls |
7. Database Layer (PostgreSQL/Redis)#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Database connection spoofing | Low | Critical | Connection authentication, certificates |
| T | SQL injection, data tampering | Medium | Critical | Parameterized queries, input validation |
| R | Data modification repudiation | Low | Medium | Transaction logging, audit trails |
| I | Data breach, unauthorized access | Medium | Critical | Encryption at rest/transit, access controls |
| D | Database resource exhaustion | Medium | High | Connection limits, query timeouts |
| E | Database privilege escalation | Low | Critical | Least privilege, role separation |
Cross-Component Threats#
Network & Transport Layer#
| STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S | Man-in-the-middle attacks | Medium | High | mTLS, certificate pinning |
| T | Network traffic tampering | Medium | High | TLS encryption, message integrity |
| R | Network activity repudiation | Low | Medium | Network flow logging |
| I | Traffic interception/analysis | Medium | High | End-to-end encryption |
| D | Network-level DoS attacks | High | High | DDoS protection, rate limiting |
| E | Network segmentation bypass | Low | High | Firewall rules, microsegmentation |
Threat Scenarios#
Scenario 1: Account Takeover via Credential Compromise#
Attack Vector: Phishing → Credential Theft → Token Abuse Impact: User impersonation, data access, reputation damage
Attack Flow:
- Attacker phishes user credentials
- Logs in to obtain valid JWT tokens
- Uses tokens to access user's conversations and data
- Potentially manipulates user's AI interactions
Mitigations:
- Implemented: WebAuthn-based MFA with resident-key support and recovery factors for accessibility compliance.
- Implemented: Geo-velocity, ASN anomaly detection, and impossible-travel heuristics feeding the adaptive risk engine.
- Planned (Q4 2025): Privacy-preserving device fingerprinting integrated with consent-aware risk scoring.
- Planned (Q1 2026): Opt-in login notification framework with channel preferences and secure dismissal flows.
Scenario 2: AI Prompt Injection Attack#
Attack Vector: Malicious Input → Prompt Manipulation → Content Policy Bypass Impact: Generation of harmful content, service reputation damage
Attack Flow:
- Attacker crafts input to manipulate AI system prompts
- Bypasses safety filters through prompt engineering
- Generates inappropriate or harmful content
- Content is delivered to other users
Mitigations:
- Implemented: Input sanitisation, schema validation, and content-aware token filters before provider invocation.
- Implemented: Multi-layer safety stack combining provider moderation, Lilith classifiers, and deterministic guardrails.
- Implemented: Prompt template sealing with checksum validation in CI and runtime integrity attestation.
- In Progress: Real-time content monitoring dashboards with replay triage (beta rollout with Safety Guild).
Scenario 3: Data Exfiltration via API Abuse#
Attack Vector: API Discovery → Rate Limit Bypass → Data Harvesting Impact: Large-scale data theft, privacy violations
Attack Flow:
- Attacker discovers unprotected API endpoints
- Uses distributed requests to bypass rate limiting
- Systematically extracts user conversations and content
- Sells or publishes sensitive data
Mitigations:
- Implemented: Adaptive rate limiting, token bucket throttling, and defensive aggregation protections.
- Implemented: Continuous API surface discovery with Stoplight contract diffs and alerting.
- Planned (Q1 2026): Behavioural analytics for high-volume data extraction attempts.
- Implemented: mTLS-backed service authentication plus signed client tokens with audience scoping.
Scenario 4: Supply Chain Attack via Dependencies#
Attack Vector: Compromised Package → Code Injection → System Compromise Impact: Full system compromise, data theft, service disruption
Attack Flow:
- Attacker compromises npm package used by services
- Malicious code is deployed during regular updates
- Code establishes persistent access to systems
- Attacker exfiltrates data or disrupts services
Mitigations:
- Implemented: Weekly SBOM generation (CycloneDX) with artifact attestations stored in Sigstore Rekor.
- Implemented: Continuous dependency scanning via OSV + GitHub Advanced Security with build breakers on critical CVEs.
- Implemented: Sigstore provenance verification for CI artefacts and preflight checksum validation.
- Implemented: Minimal dependency policy enforced via automated PR checks and unused dependency audits.
Scenario 5: Insider Threat via Privileged Access#
Attack Vector: Employee Access → Data Harvesting → Information Sale Impact: Intellectual property theft, customer data breach
Attack Flow:
- Malicious insider uses legitimate access
- Downloads conversation data, AI prompts, user information
- Circumvents monitoring through authorized channels
- Sells information to competitors or bad actors
Mitigations:
- Implemented: Principle-of-least-privilege IAM roles, quarterly access reviews, and immutable audit logging.
- Implemented: Insider behaviour analytics leveraging UEBA baselines across data domains.
- Implemented: Data access monitoring with consent ledger correlation and automated alerting.
- Implemented: Scheduled access recertification with tracked sign-off and separation-of-duties enforcement.
Risk Register#
| Risk ID | Description | Likelihood | Impact | Residual Risk | Primary Controls | Owner | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R-001 | Compromise of user credentials via phishing or credential stuffing | Medium | High | Medium | WebAuthn MFA, risk-based auth, session binding | Auth Guild | Mitigated — monitor |
| R-002 | Prompt injection leading to unsafe completions | Medium | High | Medium | Prompt firewall, layered moderation, automated red-team regressions | AI Safety Guild | Mitigated — continuous validation |
| R-003 | Large-scale data exfiltration through API misuse | Low | Critical | Low | Adaptive rate limiting, mTLS, behavioural analytics roadmap | Platform Security | Mitigated — backlog analytics |
| R-004 | Supply chain compromise of npm dependencies | Low | Critical | Low | SBOM attestation, Sigstore provenance, dependency review gates | Developer Productivity | Mitigated |
| R-005 | Insider misuse of privileged data | Very Low | High | Low | RBAC, consent ledger correlation, insider analytics | Privacy Office | Mitigated — quarterly review |
| R-006 | Regional outage affecting AI providers | Medium | Medium | Medium | Multi-provider failover, cached completions, workload shedding | AI Operations | Mitigated |
Scoring rubric: Likelihood/Impact use a 3-point scale aligned with NIST 800-30. Residual risk is re-evaluated quarterly alongside control efficacy metrics.
Mitigation Strategies#
Defense in Depth Strategy#
Layer 1: Perimeter Defense#
- Implemented: WAF with DDoS protection (Cloudfront + AWS Shield Advanced).
- Implemented: Adaptive rate limiting and throttling at edge and gateway layers.
- Planned (Security backlog): Geo-fencing for high-risk regions with privacy-safe exemptions.
- Planned (Prototype): Bot detection leveraging device telemetry and behavioural scoring.
Layer 2: Application Security#
- Implemented: Centralised input validation/sanitisation middleware with schema enforcement.
- Implemented: JWT token-based authentication with rotating signing keys.
- Implemented: WebAuthn MFA rollout for staff and high-risk cohorts (general availability targeted Q1 2026).
- Implemented: HTTPS/TLS 1.3 mandatory with HSTS across all ingress points.
- Implemented: Secrets management via HashiCorp Vault with automated rotation pipelines.
Layer 3: Service Security#
- Implemented: Istio service mesh enforcing mutual TLS and traffic policies.
- Implemented: Service-to-service authentication with SPIFFE identities and OPA authorization.
- Implemented: Least-privilege access controls codified in Terraform modules.
- In Progress: Runtime security monitoring (Falco + eBPF) with automated alerting.
Layer 4: Data Security#
- Implemented: Encryption at rest (KMS-managed) and in transit across data stores.
- Implemented: Database access controls with per-service credentials and RLS.
- Planned: Data loss prevention for exported reports leveraging differential privacy budgets.
- In Progress: Database activity monitoring via AWS Database Activity Streams.
Layer 5: Infrastructure Security#
- Implemented: Kubernetes PodSecurity admission + Gatekeeper policies.
- Implemented: Network segmentation using Calico network policies and security groups.
- Implemented: Resource limits/quotas enforced in all namespaces.
- Implemented: Infrastructure-as-code scanning (Checkov + tfsec) in CI fail-the-build mode.
Priority Security Controls#
Immediate Implementation (P0)#
-
Multi-Factor Authentication
- WebAuthn implementation for all users
- Backup TOTP methods
- Admin account enforcement
-
Enhanced Monitoring
- Real-time anomaly detection
- Behavioral analytics for users and APIs
- Security incident alerting
-
Content Safety
- Multi-layer prompt injection detection
- Real-time content filtering
- Human moderation workflows
30-Day Implementation (P1)#
-
API Security Hardening
- API gateway with comprehensive policies
- Advanced rate limiting with user reputation
- API endpoint monitoring and alerting
-
Supply Chain Security
- Automated dependency vulnerability scanning
- Package signing and verification
- SBOM integration with security tools
-
Data Protection
- Enhanced data classification
- Data access anomaly detection
- Automated data retention policies
Security Controls#
Technical Controls#
| Control | Status | Description | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication | ✅ Implemented | JWT with refresh tokens | All services |
| Authorization | ✅ Implemented | RBAC with service boundaries | All services |
| Encryption (Transit) | ✅ Implemented | TLS 1.3, mTLS in service mesh | All communications |
| Encryption (Rest) | ✅ Implemented | KMS-managed keys | Database, storage |
| Input Validation | ✅ Implemented | Schema validation, sanitization | All inputs |
| Logging | ✅ Implemented | Structured logging with correlation | All services |
| Monitoring | 🔄 Partial | Basic metrics, needs enhancement | Infrastructure |
| Secret Management | ✅ Implemented | KMS with rotation | All secrets |
| Network Security | ✅ Implemented | Service mesh, firewalls | All traffic |
| Container Security | ✅ Implemented | Security policies, scanning | All containers |
Administrative Controls#
| Control | Status | Description | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security Policy | 📋 Documented | Information security policy | Security Team |
| Access Management | ✅ Implemented | User provisioning/deprovisioning | IT Team |
| Security Training | 🔄 Ongoing | Developer security awareness | All Team |
| Incident Response | 📋 Documented | Security incident procedures | Security Team |
| Vulnerability Management | ✅ Implemented | Scanning and patching process | DevOps Team |
| Change Management | ✅ Implemented | Secure development lifecycle | Development |
| Risk Assessment | 📋 Documented | Regular threat modeling | Security Team |
| Compliance | 🔄 Ongoing | GDPR, SOC2 preparation | Legal/Security |
Physical Controls#
| Control | Status | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud Security | ✅ Implemented | AWS security best practices |
| Data Center | ✅ Implemented | AWS physical security controls |
| Device Management | 📋 Policy | Employee device security requirements |
Monitoring & Detection#
Security Monitoring Strategy#
Real-Time Detection#
-
Authentication Anomalies
- Multiple failed login attempts
- Login from unusual locations/devices
- Concurrent sessions from different locations
- Privilege escalation attempts
-
API Abuse Detection
- Unusual API usage patterns
- Rate limit threshold breaches
- Data exfiltration patterns
- Unauthorized endpoint access
-
Content Safety Monitoring
- Prompt injection attempts
- Policy violation in AI outputs
- Unusual content generation patterns
- User report spikes
Security Metrics & KPIs#
| Metric | Target | Current | Alert Threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failed login rate | <5% | TBD | >10% |
| API error rate | <1% | TBD | >5% |
| Token validation failures | <0.1% | TBD | >1% |
| Content moderation flags | <2% | TBD | >10% |
| Security incident MTTD | <15 min | TBD | >30 min |
| Security incident MTTR | <4 hours | TBD | >24 hours |
Alert Definitions#
Critical Alerts (P0)#
- Authentication bypass attempts
- Mass data extraction patterns
- Critical vulnerability exploits
- Service compromise indicators
High Priority Alerts (P1)#
- Repeated authentication failures
- Unusual API access patterns
- Content policy violations
- Privilege escalation attempts
Medium Priority Alerts (P2)#
- Rate limit threshold breaches
- Unusual user behavior patterns
- Non-critical security events
- Performance security impacts
Incident Response#
Security Incident Classification#
Severity Levels#
Critical (S1)
- Active data breach
- System compromise
- Service-wide security failure
- Response: Immediate (15 minutes)
High (S2)
- Account compromise
- Significant vulnerability exploitation
- Limited data exposure
- Response: 1 hour
Medium (S3)
- Security policy violations
- Attempted attacks (blocked)
- Non-critical vulnerabilities
- Response: 4 hours
Low (S4)
- Security awareness issues
- Minor policy violations
- Informational security events
- Response: 24 hours
Incident Response Process#
Phase 1: Detection & Analysis (0-30 minutes)#
-
Alert Triage
- Automated security alert evaluation
- Manual verification of critical alerts
- Initial impact assessment
-
Incident Declaration
- Severity classification
- Incident commander assignment
- Stakeholder notification
-
Initial Analysis
- Scope of impact determination
- Attack vector identification
- Evidence collection initiation
Phase 2: Containment (30-60 minutes)#
-
Immediate Containment
- Isolate affected systems
- Block malicious traffic
- Disable compromised accounts
-
System Recovery
- Service restoration planning
- Data integrity verification
- Security control reinforcement
Phase 3: Eradication & Recovery (1-4 hours)#
-
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerability identification
- Attack methodology analysis
- Security gap assessment
-
System Hardening
- Patch deployment
- Configuration updates
- Additional monitoring implementation
Phase 4: Post-Incident Activities (24-48 hours)#
-
Lessons Learned
- Incident timeline documentation
- Response effectiveness analysis
- Process improvement identification
-
Preventive Measures
- Security control enhancements
- Monitoring rule updates
- Team training updates
Communication Plan#
Internal Communication#
- Immediate: Security team, incident commander
- 30 minutes: Engineering leadership, on-call teams
- 1 hour: Executive team, legal counsel
- 4 hours: All employees (if appropriate)
External Communication#
- Regulatory: Data protection authorities (if required)
- Customers: Affected users (if data involved)
- Partners: Third-party integrations (if affected)
- Public: Media/community (for significant incidents)
Review & Maintenance#
Regular Review Schedule#
- Monthly: Threat landscape updates, new vulnerabilities
- Quarterly: Full threat model review, risk reassessment
- Annually: Complete security architecture review
- Ad-hoc: After significant system changes or incidents
Updates & Versioning#
- Document version control with change tracking
- Stakeholder review and approval process
- Distribution to relevant teams and leadership
- Integration with security awareness training
Success Metrics#
- Reduction in successful attacks
- Faster incident detection and response times
- Improved security control effectiveness
- Enhanced security awareness across teams
Document Approval:
- Security Lead: [Signature Required]
- Engineering Lead: [Signature Required]
- Product Lead: [Signature Required]
Next Review Date: 2025-12-14