Document Version: 1.0
Last Updated: 2025-10-03
Owners: Platform Security Guild & Identity Engineering
The Lilith platform enforces a unified access-control strategy that combines role-based access control (RBAC) with attribute-based access control (ABAC). This document defines the canonical roles, attribute constraints, service-account lifecycle policies, and least-privilege guardrails that every service must honour.
RBAC Model#
The RBAC model enumerates platform roles and their baseline permissions. Roles map to personas (human users) or workloads (service accounts) and are always additive—no implicit wildcards are granted.
| Role | Permissions | Scope | Service Accounts |
|---|---|---|---|
user |
profile:read, profile:update:self, content:view:published, comments:create:self, comments:update:self, comments:delete:self |
Tenant-scoped | N/A |
support |
user:roles:view, user:status:update, content:view:drafts |
Restricted to customer-tenants assigned | N/A |
auditor |
audit-log:read:any, compliance:report:download |
Read-only, redacted PII | N/A |
admin |
user:roles:update, audit-log:read:any, policy:update, service-account:manage |
Production only, trusted network | N/A |
service_bff |
auth.tokens.issue, session:validate |
Production, BFF to Auth bridge | svc-bff-gateway |
service_observability |
telemetry:ingest, telemetry:read:aggregated |
Observability plane | svc-observe |
Roles are provisioned through the Auth service with explicit audit logging. All
privileged roles (support, auditor, admin) require break-glass approval
and hardened network paths.
ABAC Conditions#
ABAC rules overlay RBAC permissions to ensure contextual checks (ownership, network, geography) are enforced consistently.
- Self-access guardrail: Standard users (
user) may only read or mutate resources whereresource.ownerId === principal.id. The engine enforces this via theSELF_ACCESS_REQUIREDdenial reason when violated. - Admin network policy: Administrative actions must originate from approved
IP ranges supplied via
AUTH_ADMIN_ALLOWED_IPS. Requests outside the allow list are denied withADMIN_NETWORK_RESTRICTED. - Geo sensitivity: Moderator and auditor actions evaluate the
context.location.countryattribute; high-risk locales require MFA elevation (enforced upstream). - Temporal controls: Break-glass administrator sessions expire after 60 minutes and are invalid for batch automation workloads.
Service Accounts#
Service accounts power service-to-service flows and are isolated from human credentials. Each service account is defined by:
- Deterministic identifier (
sa_<slug>), owner, and business justification. - Scoped roles that map to workload personas (
service_bff,service_observability, etc.). - Explicit scopes/permissions (e.g.,
auth.tokens.issue). - IP allow lists and environment bindings.
- Rotation policy (default 30 days) with automation tracked in Vault.
Provisioning and rotation are orchestrated through the Auth service
service-account:manage endpoints. Secrets are stored in the secrets manager;
only hashed fingerprints are persisted in app stores.
Least Privilege Matrix#
The following table captures the least-privilege expectations that are verified continuously via automated tests.
| Principal | Allowed Actions | Attributes Required | Denial Reason on Violation |
|---|---|---|---|
End user (user) |
profile:read, profile:update:self |
context.attributes.isOwner === true |
SELF_ACCESS_REQUIRED |
Service account (svc-bff-gateway) |
auth.tokens.issue |
context.ip in allow list & environment === 'production' |
INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE, SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NETWORK_RESTRICTED |
Administrator (admin) |
user:roles:update, audit-log:read:any |
context.ip in trusted range & short-lived session |
ADMIN_NETWORK_RESTRICTED |
Policy Artefacts#
The canonical machine-readable policy is stored at
docs/schemas/access-policy.schema.json
and is validated in CI through tests/security.rbac-abac.spec.ts. All services
must align their enforcement logic with this schema; deviations require a
security review and updated regression coverage.