Eve library

Access Control Policy

Guide

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Document Version: 1.0
Last Updated: 2025-10-03
Owners: Platform Security Guild & Identity Engineering

The Lilith platform enforces a unified access-control strategy that combines role-based access control (RBAC) with attribute-based access control (ABAC). This document defines the canonical roles, attribute constraints, service-account lifecycle policies, and least-privilege guardrails that every service must honour.

RBAC Model#

The RBAC model enumerates platform roles and their baseline permissions. Roles map to personas (human users) or workloads (service accounts) and are always additive—no implicit wildcards are granted.

Role Permissions Scope Service Accounts
user profile:read, profile:update:self, content:view:published, comments:create:self, comments:update:self, comments:delete:self Tenant-scoped N/A
support user:roles:view, user:status:update, content:view:drafts Restricted to customer-tenants assigned N/A
auditor audit-log:read:any, compliance:report:download Read-only, redacted PII N/A
admin user:roles:update, audit-log:read:any, policy:update, service-account:manage Production only, trusted network N/A
service_bff auth.tokens.issue, session:validate Production, BFF to Auth bridge svc-bff-gateway
service_observability telemetry:ingest, telemetry:read:aggregated Observability plane svc-observe

Roles are provisioned through the Auth service with explicit audit logging. All privileged roles (support, auditor, admin) require break-glass approval and hardened network paths.

ABAC Conditions#

ABAC rules overlay RBAC permissions to ensure contextual checks (ownership, network, geography) are enforced consistently.

  • Self-access guardrail: Standard users (user) may only read or mutate resources where resource.ownerId === principal.id. The engine enforces this via the SELF_ACCESS_REQUIRED denial reason when violated.
  • Admin network policy: Administrative actions must originate from approved IP ranges supplied via AUTH_ADMIN_ALLOWED_IPS. Requests outside the allow list are denied with ADMIN_NETWORK_RESTRICTED.
  • Geo sensitivity: Moderator and auditor actions evaluate the context.location.country attribute; high-risk locales require MFA elevation (enforced upstream).
  • Temporal controls: Break-glass administrator sessions expire after 60 minutes and are invalid for batch automation workloads.

Service Accounts#

Service accounts power service-to-service flows and are isolated from human credentials. Each service account is defined by:

  • Deterministic identifier (sa_<slug>), owner, and business justification.
  • Scoped roles that map to workload personas (service_bff, service_observability, etc.).
  • Explicit scopes/permissions (e.g., auth.tokens.issue).
  • IP allow lists and environment bindings.
  • Rotation policy (default 30 days) with automation tracked in Vault.

Provisioning and rotation are orchestrated through the Auth service service-account:manage endpoints. Secrets are stored in the secrets manager; only hashed fingerprints are persisted in app stores.

Least Privilege Matrix#

The following table captures the least-privilege expectations that are verified continuously via automated tests.

Principal Allowed Actions Attributes Required Denial Reason on Violation
End user (user) profile:read, profile:update:self context.attributes.isOwner === true SELF_ACCESS_REQUIRED
Service account (svc-bff-gateway) auth.tokens.issue context.ip in allow list & environment === 'production' INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE, SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NETWORK_RESTRICTED
Administrator (admin) user:roles:update, audit-log:read:any context.ip in trusted range & short-lived session ADMIN_NETWORK_RESTRICTED

Policy Artefacts#

The canonical machine-readable policy is stored at docs/schemas/access-policy.schema.json and is validated in CI through tests/security.rbac-abac.spec.ts. All services must align their enforcement logic with this schema; deviations require a security review and updated regression coverage.