Eve library

Does an embedded provenance manifest survive a transcode? (182.C.28.03)

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Measured 2026-09-11 on the Linux dev server, ffmpeg 6.1.1-3ubuntu5. Reproduce with bash measure.sh <outdir>; raw output in results.json.

What was measured#

Question Result
Does a CUSTOM metadata key (c2pa_manifest=...) get written into MP4 at all? No
Does a RECOGNISED key (comment) survive a re-encode + scale to 160x120? Yes
Does it survive a stream-copy remux? Yes
Does -map_metadata -1 remove it? Yes (one flag)
How much payload survives a transcode? 8000 characters, intact
Is a stream-copy remux byte-identical to its source? Yes
Is a transcode byte-identical to its source? No
After MP4 -> WebM, is the key still readable? Yes, but the case changes (comment -> COMMENT; ffprobe resolves either)

What follows#

A manifest that survives a transcode reports TAMPERING. The manifest binds the SHA-256 of exact bytes, and a transcode produces different bytes by definition, so a surviving manifest verifies as media hash mismatch. That is the same result a verifier gives for a maliciously edited file. Carrying provenance through a transcode therefore does not preserve provenance; it manufactures a tamper signal.

So "survives" is the wrong goal. A remux is byte-identical, so the manifest stays valid and must be carried. A transcode needs its own manifest, issued over the new bytes, whose edit assertion names the parent's media hash. An inherited manifest must be replaced, never passed through.

Two secondary findings shape the transport:

  • A custom tag key is silently dropped by the MP4 muxer, so a manifest cannot ride in one. The recognised comment field does carry 8000 characters through a full re-encode, which is enough for a manifest but is a field anything else may also write.
  • -map_metadata -1 removes it, and that flag is in most sanitising pipelines. Embedded metadata is therefore a convenience, not a guarantee; the sidecar is the authority.