Eve library

Remote-control mode allowance matrix — when is each of direct CDP, Browser Use, extension mode, and desktop fallback allowed?

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Phase: 180.C.20.09 Status: Decision matrix. Scope: The four ways Bellona can touch a remote browser/desktop, and the exact conditions under which each is allowed, conditionally allowed, or refused. This is the operator- and planner-facing rule for which surface a task may use, consolidating the decisions in browser-use-vs-direct-cdp-evaluation.md (180.C.20.01), chrome-extension-value-evaluation.md (180.C.20.06), the 180.C.20.04 policy gate, and the desktop-fallback rollback policy (desktop-compensating-actions.md).

The governing principle, unchanged across all four: direct CDP is the verified default; everything else is opt-in, narrower, and policy-gated. No surface is ever auto-selected to be "more capable," and the deterministic browser MVP never requires anything but direct CDP (180.C.20.10).


0. The four surfaces in one line each#

Surface What it is Determinism Where it runs
Direct CDP First-party Playwright-over-CDP host adapter; the plan fully determines the actions, no LLM in the loop Deterministic On-box, loopback CDP, isolated managed profile
Browser Use (local / cloud) An LLM agent loop that decides each browser action; behind the provider interface Non-deterministic Local: on-box browser, model context off-box; Cloud: browser + page content off-box
Extension mode (MV3) An optional trust-surface layer (indicator / consent popup / per-origin grant); not an automation backend n/a (does not drive tasks) In-page isolated world + extension service worker
Desktop fallback Coordinate-based native input (click/type/focus) when no browser/API path exists; no trustworthy undo Deterministic dispatch, irreversible effects On-box OS input

1. The allowance matrix#

Legend: ✅ allowed · ⚠️ conditionally allowed (gate must pass) · ⛔ refused.

Situation Direct CDP Browser Use (local) Browser Use (cloud) Extension mode Desktop fallback
A task expressible as a deterministic plan (the 180.C.19.09 templates) ✅ default ⛔ (no silent downgrade) ⛔ n/a backend ⛔ (use the browser)
All regression / CI runs ✅ ⛔ ⛔ n/a ⛔
An under-specified / exploratory objective the templates can't pre-express ⚠️ if it can be planned ✅ (explicit select) ⚠️ explicit select + approval n/a ⛔
Touching credentials / a sensitive origin / upload / form submit ✅ (host gates: 19.04/.06) ⚠️ plan-bound operator approval (20.04) ⚠️ plan-bound approval (20.04) ⚠️ explicit capability grant + approval token + allow-listed origin ⛔ unless no browser path AND operator approval
Page content must NOT leave the box ✅ ⚠️ only model context leaves ⛔ (page DOM leaves the box) ✅ (stays in-page) ✅
An authenticated / granted personal profile ✅ (privileged, consented, visible-stream session) ⛔ without 20.04 approval ⛔ ⚠️ per-origin grant surface only; no wholesale profile hand-off ⛔
Need a tamper-resistant "automation is active" indicator a page can't remove (CDP overlay is removable) — — ✅ this is its job —
Need a spoof-proof consent/approval prompt in browser chrome (Control Room dialog) — — ✅ (action popup) refines Control Room + 20.04 —
Need a human-visible, revocable per-origin grant (host config) — — ✅ (host_permissions model) —
A target with no CDP/browser/API path (native app dialog, OS-level UI) ⛔ ⛔ ⛔ ⛔ ⚠️ last resort, rollback-declared, operator-approved
<all_urls> / unrestricted origin scope ⛔ (origin allow-list) ⛔ ⛔ ⛔ forbidden by construction ⛔

2. Per-surface allowance rules (the conditions behind the ⚠️/⛔)#

2.1 Direct CDP — allowed by default, refused only by origin/profile gates#

  • Allowed: any task that can be expressed as a deterministic plan; every CI and regression run; any credential/sensitive-origin/upload/submit work (it is the only backend trusted with these by default, behind the 180.C.19.04/.06 upload + credential guards and the origin allow-list).
  • Refused: an origin outside the session's allow-list; a real personal profile without the explicit human-consent + visible-stream + restricted-origin preconditions (browser-profile-isolation.md); <all_urls>.
  • Never: silently downgraded to a third-party agent (selectRemoteBrowserAgentProvider → no_silent_downgrade).

2.2 Browser Use (local) — opt-in, explicit, for under-specified objectives#

  • Allowed: only by explicit provider id/mode, for objectives the templates cannot pre-express, where a local model is available and page context staying on-box matters.
  • Conditional (⚠️): any guarded exposure (authenticated/granted profile, sensitive origin, upload, form submit) requires a plan-bound, single-use, unexpired operator approval that matches the exact plan hash + provider and enumerates every detected reason/origin (180.C.20.04). Unconfigured → fails loud provider_not_configured (never fabricated).
  • Refused: as a substitute for a deterministic plan; in CI.

2.3 Browser Use (cloud) — last-choice agent, page content leaves the box#

  • Allowed: only when neither direct CDP nor local Browser Use is viable, with explicit operator approval, accepting that page DOM/screenshots leave the box (offBoxExecution: true).
  • Conditional (⚠️): the 180.C.20.04 gate applies with the highest blast radius; same plan-bound approval discipline as local, plus the off-box-privacy acceptance.
  • Refused: any task where page content must not leave the box; CI; deterministic tasks.

2.4 Extension mode — optional trust surface, never an automation backend#

  • Allowed (✅): for the three value gaps it exists to fill (180.C.20.06): the tamper-resistant visible-automation indicator, the browser-chrome consent/approval popup, and the per-origin profile-grant surface. It runs only on its explicit host_permissions origin allow-list.
  • Conditional (⚠️): any sensitive action it mediates (clipboard, file upload, form submission) is closed-by-default — refused unless the matching capability was explicitly granted and a single-use approval token + allow-listed origin match (evaluateClipboardAccess / evaluateFileUpload / evaluateFormSubmission). Page-world messages must pass verifyExtensionMessageOrigin (per-session token; malicious iframes rejected).
  • Refused (⛔): as a task-driving backend (that is CDP); wholesale personal profile access; <all_urls> (rejected fail-loud by compileExtensionOriginAllowList / assertManifestDomainScoped); any authority after disable/uninstall (runExtensionTeardown revokes everything).
  • Never required: the deterministic browser MVP runs entirely without the extension (180.C.20.10).

2.5 Desktop fallback — genuine last resort, irreversible, always approved#

  • Allowed (⚠️ only): when there is no browser/CDP/API path to the target (a native app dialog, OS-level UI a browser cannot reach), AND the mutation is rollback-declared with a compensating-action descriptor, AND the operator has approved it. Desktop input has no trustworthy native undo — every mutating desktop command is manual_remediation_only (desktop-compensating-actions.md).
  • Refused (⛔): anything reachable via the browser (use CDP); any mutation without a declared compensating action; unattended/auto use. desktop.emergency_stop interrupts dispatch but does not undo already-sent input — so the bar to start is high.

3. Selection order (how a task picks a surface)#

  1. Can it be a deterministic plan? → Direct CDP. (Stop here for the templates, CI, and anything touching credentials/uploads/submits.)
  2. Is it under-specified / needs an agent, and can stay on-box? → Browser Use local, by explicit selection, gated by 180.C.20.04 for any exposure.
  3. Under-specified, on-box not viable, off-box acceptable? → Browser Use cloud, explicit + approved, accepting page content leaves the box.
  4. Is the need a trust surface (indicator / consent / per-origin grant), not driving the task? → Extension mode, additive on top of (1).
  5. Is the target unreachable by any browser/API path? → Desktop fallback, last resort, rollback-declared, approved.

At no step is a more-capable surface chosen to be "nicer"; each step is reached only when the prior, more-trusted surface genuinely cannot do the job.


4. Evidence pointers#

  • Backend tradeoffs + the "direct CDP default, no silent downgrade" decision: browser-use-vs-direct-cdp-evaluation.md (180.C.20.01), libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/browser-agent-provider.ts.
  • The third-party exposure policy gate (authenticated profile / sensitive origin / upload / submit need plan-bound approval): same file, 180.C.20.04.
  • Extension value, scope, and trust posture: chrome-extension-value-evaluation.md (180.C.20.06); extension security primitives apps/bellona/remote-extension/src/.
  • Profile isolation / personal-profile preconditions: browser-profile-isolation.md.
  • Desktop fallback irreversibility + rollback declarations: desktop-compensating-actions.md, libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/desktop.ts.