Phase: 180.C.20.09
Status: Decision matrix.
Scope: The four ways Bellona can touch a remote browser/desktop, and the
exact conditions under which each is allowed, conditionally allowed, or
refused. This is the operator- and planner-facing rule for which surface a
task may use, consolidating the decisions in
browser-use-vs-direct-cdp-evaluation.md (180.C.20.01),
chrome-extension-value-evaluation.md (180.C.20.06), the 180.C.20.04 policy
gate, and the desktop-fallback rollback policy
(desktop-compensating-actions.md).
The governing principle, unchanged across all four: direct CDP is the verified default; everything else is opt-in, narrower, and policy-gated. No surface is ever auto-selected to be "more capable," and the deterministic browser MVP never requires anything but direct CDP (180.C.20.10).
0. The four surfaces in one line each#
| Surface | What it is | Determinism | Where it runs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Direct CDP | First-party Playwright-over-CDP host adapter; the plan fully determines the actions, no LLM in the loop | Deterministic | On-box, loopback CDP, isolated managed profile |
| Browser Use (local / cloud) | An LLM agent loop that decides each browser action; behind the provider interface | Non-deterministic | Local: on-box browser, model context off-box; Cloud: browser + page content off-box |
| Extension mode (MV3) | An optional trust-surface layer (indicator / consent popup / per-origin grant); not an automation backend | n/a (does not drive tasks) | In-page isolated world + extension service worker |
| Desktop fallback | Coordinate-based native input (click/type/focus) when no browser/API path exists; no trustworthy undo | Deterministic dispatch, irreversible effects | On-box OS input |
1. The allowance matrix#
Legend: ✅ allowed · ⚠️ conditionally allowed (gate must pass) · ⛔ refused.
| Situation | Direct CDP | Browser Use (local) | Browser Use (cloud) | Extension mode | Desktop fallback |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A task expressible as a deterministic plan (the 180.C.19.09 templates) | ✅ default | ⛔ (no silent downgrade) | ⛔ | n/a backend | ⛔ (use the browser) |
| All regression / CI runs | ✅ | ⛔ | ⛔ | n/a | ⛔ |
| An under-specified / exploratory objective the templates can't pre-express | ⚠️ if it can be planned | ✅ (explicit select) | ⚠️ explicit select + approval | n/a | ⛔ |
| Touching credentials / a sensitive origin / upload / form submit | ✅ (host gates: 19.04/.06) | ⚠️ plan-bound operator approval (20.04) | ⚠️ plan-bound approval (20.04) | ⚠️ explicit capability grant + approval token + allow-listed origin | ⛔ unless no browser path AND operator approval |
| Page content must NOT leave the box | ✅ | ⚠️ only model context leaves | ⛔ (page DOM leaves the box) | ✅ (stays in-page) | ✅ |
| An authenticated / granted personal profile | ✅ (privileged, consented, visible-stream session) | ⛔ without 20.04 approval | ⛔ | ⚠️ per-origin grant surface only; no wholesale profile hand-off | ⛔ |
| Need a tamper-resistant "automation is active" indicator a page can't remove | (CDP overlay is removable) | — | — | ✅ this is its job | — |
| Need a spoof-proof consent/approval prompt in browser chrome | (Control Room dialog) | — | — | ✅ (action popup) refines Control Room + 20.04 | — |
| Need a human-visible, revocable per-origin grant | (host config) | — | — | ✅ (host_permissions model) |
— |
| A target with no CDP/browser/API path (native app dialog, OS-level UI) | ⛔ | ⛔ | ⛔ | ⛔ | ⚠️ last resort, rollback-declared, operator-approved |
<all_urls> / unrestricted origin scope |
⛔ (origin allow-list) | ⛔ | ⛔ | ⛔ forbidden by construction | ⛔ |
2. Per-surface allowance rules (the conditions behind the ⚠️/⛔)#
2.1 Direct CDP — allowed by default, refused only by origin/profile gates#
- Allowed: any task that can be expressed as a deterministic plan; every CI and regression run; any credential/sensitive-origin/upload/submit work (it is the only backend trusted with these by default, behind the 180.C.19.04/.06 upload + credential guards and the origin allow-list).
- Refused: an origin outside the session's allow-list; a real personal
profile without the explicit human-consent + visible-stream + restricted-origin
preconditions (
browser-profile-isolation.md);<all_urls>. - Never: silently downgraded to a third-party agent
(
selectRemoteBrowserAgentProvider→no_silent_downgrade).
2.2 Browser Use (local) — opt-in, explicit, for under-specified objectives#
- Allowed: only by explicit provider id/mode, for objectives the templates cannot pre-express, where a local model is available and page context staying on-box matters.
- Conditional (⚠️): any guarded exposure (authenticated/granted profile,
sensitive origin, upload, form submit) requires a plan-bound, single-use,
unexpired operator approval that matches the exact plan hash + provider and
enumerates every detected reason/origin (180.C.20.04). Unconfigured → fails
loud
provider_not_configured(never fabricated). - Refused: as a substitute for a deterministic plan; in CI.
2.3 Browser Use (cloud) — last-choice agent, page content leaves the box#
- Allowed: only when neither direct CDP nor local Browser Use is viable,
with explicit operator approval, accepting that page DOM/screenshots
leave the box (
offBoxExecution: true). - Conditional (⚠️): the 180.C.20.04 gate applies with the highest blast radius; same plan-bound approval discipline as local, plus the off-box-privacy acceptance.
- Refused: any task where page content must not leave the box; CI; deterministic tasks.
2.4 Extension mode — optional trust surface, never an automation backend#
- Allowed (✅): for the three value gaps it exists to fill (180.C.20.06):
the tamper-resistant visible-automation indicator, the browser-chrome
consent/approval popup, and the per-origin profile-grant surface. It runs only
on its explicit
host_permissionsorigin allow-list. - Conditional (⚠️): any sensitive action it mediates (clipboard, file
upload, form submission) is closed-by-default — refused unless the matching
capability was explicitly granted and a single-use approval token +
allow-listed origin match (
evaluateClipboardAccess/evaluateFileUpload/evaluateFormSubmission). Page-world messages must passverifyExtensionMessageOrigin(per-session token; malicious iframes rejected). - Refused (⛔): as a task-driving backend (that is CDP); wholesale personal
profile access;
<all_urls>(rejected fail-loud bycompileExtensionOriginAllowList/assertManifestDomainScoped); any authority after disable/uninstall (runExtensionTeardownrevokes everything). - Never required: the deterministic browser MVP runs entirely without the extension (180.C.20.10).
2.5 Desktop fallback — genuine last resort, irreversible, always approved#
- Allowed (⚠️ only): when there is no browser/CDP/API path to the target
(a native app dialog, OS-level UI a browser cannot reach), AND the mutation is
rollback-declared with a compensating-action descriptor, AND the operator
has approved it. Desktop input has no trustworthy native undo — every
mutating desktop command is
manual_remediation_only(desktop-compensating-actions.md). - Refused (⛔): anything reachable via the browser (use CDP); any mutation
without a declared compensating action; unattended/auto use.
desktop.emergency_stopinterrupts dispatch but does not undo already-sent input — so the bar to start is high.
3. Selection order (how a task picks a surface)#
- Can it be a deterministic plan? → Direct CDP. (Stop here for the templates, CI, and anything touching credentials/uploads/submits.)
- Is it under-specified / needs an agent, and can stay on-box? → Browser Use local, by explicit selection, gated by 180.C.20.04 for any exposure.
- Under-specified, on-box not viable, off-box acceptable? → Browser Use cloud, explicit + approved, accepting page content leaves the box.
- Is the need a trust surface (indicator / consent / per-origin grant), not driving the task? → Extension mode, additive on top of (1).
- Is the target unreachable by any browser/API path? → Desktop fallback, last resort, rollback-declared, approved.
At no step is a more-capable surface chosen to be "nicer"; each step is reached only when the prior, more-trusted surface genuinely cannot do the job.
4. Evidence pointers#
- Backend tradeoffs + the "direct CDP default, no silent downgrade" decision:
browser-use-vs-direct-cdp-evaluation.md(180.C.20.01),libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/browser-agent-provider.ts. - The third-party exposure policy gate (authenticated profile / sensitive origin / upload / submit need plan-bound approval): same file, 180.C.20.04.
- Extension value, scope, and trust posture:
chrome-extension-value-evaluation.md(180.C.20.06); extension security primitivesapps/bellona/remote-extension/src/. - Profile isolation / personal-profile preconditions:
browser-profile-isolation.md. - Desktop fallback irreversibility + rollback declarations:
desktop-compensating-actions.md,libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/desktop.ts.