# Bellona Remote Creative Control Plane — Privacy & Legal Review (Review-Prep, 180.C.27.10)

Status: `180.C.27.10` — privacy/legal review-preparation artifact.

Implementation date: 2026-06-21.

## What this document is — and is not

This is a **review-preparation artifact**: a structured privacy and legal analysis
of the Bellona Remote Creative Control Plane, written by engineering to bring
counsel and the data-protection function to a productive sign-off conversation. It
documents what the system captures, the jurisdictions implicated, the privacy
risks (notably the employee-monitoring misuse risk), and the **already-implemented
technical controls** that mitigate each — citing the exact module that enforces
each control.

It is **not legal advice and is not a sign-off.** Legal sign-off by qualified
counsel (and, where applicable, a Data Protection Impact Assessment under GDPR
Art. 35, a CPRA risk assessment, and works-council / employee-representative
consultation in jurisdictions that require it) is an **external step this document
prepares for**. Open legal questions are flagged inline as **[Counsel decision]**.
Nothing here may be relied on as a determination that a given deployment is lawful;
that determination is counsel's, informed by the concrete deployment's
jurisdictions, data subjects, and lawful basis.

The Remote Creative Control Plane lets a remote operator (or an Oshun agent acting
under that operator) drive creative tools — Blender, Unreal, a browser, the desktop
— on a **physically separate host machine**, streaming the host's screen back and
sending commands forward. That capability is powerful and inherently
privacy-sensitive, which is why it ships with the controls catalogued below.

---

## 1. Remote screen capture

### What is captured

A live (optionally recorded) video stream of the host operator's screen, plus
OCR'd text from screenshots and captured artifacts. The screen of a creative
workstation routinely shows far more than the work in hand: open chat windows,
email, a second person on a video call, a document left visible, a browser with
the operator's logged-in sessions.

### Data subjects and jurisdictions

- **The host operator** — the primary subject; their screen, and by extension
  their activity, is captured.
- **Incidental subjects** — anyone whose image, voice (via a dictation overlay),
  or personal document is on screen but who is not a party to the session.

Screen and (especially) audio capture is regulated differently across
jurisdictions: EU/UK GDPR treat the captured imagery as personal data requiring a
lawful basis and data-minimization; many US states (and all-party-consent states
for any audio) impose consent requirements; recording another identifiable person
without their consent raises image-rights and, for audio, wiretap-statute exposure.
**[Counsel decision]** which lawful basis (consent vs. legitimate interest) and
which consent model (operator-only vs. all-incidental-subjects) applies per
deployment region.

### Controls implemented

- **Operator consent + visibility.** A session that opens a real personal profile
  or a privileged surface is a consented, visible-streamed session
  (`apps/bellona/remote-host/src/browser-adapter.ts` privileged-profile session;
  the operator sees the live stream of what is shared).
- **Incidental-subject fail-closed redaction.** Detected video-call windows,
  dictation overlays, bystander-camera regions, and visible documents are
  **redacted unless explicitly consented**, via
  `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/incidental-consent.ts` (27.14)
  `resolveIncidentalSubjectDisposition` — the default disposition is
  `redact-no-consent`, and a visible document is redacted even with a generic grant
  unless an operator explicitly opts that exact region in. The redaction is a real
  stream-privacy region the host masks before the frame is encoded.
- **Credential-entry blackout.** While a secret is typed locally, the stream and
  recording are paused (`credential-entry-mode.ts`, 27.04), so a password is never
  in the captured video.

---

## 2. Browser session handling

### What is captured

When a session drives a real browser, it operates **inside the operator's own
authenticated browser profile**: the operator's logged-in cookies, saved sessions,
and page content are present in the tab. The stream captures the rendered page;
artifacts may capture scraped DOM text and traces. This is the most sensitive
surface, because the operator's authenticated identity (their email, banking,
internal tools) can be reachable from the automated tab.

### Credential handling

- **No automated credential entry on a real profile.** The credential-entry
  privacy control (`browser-adapter.ts` `assertCredentialEntryAllowed`,
  19.06) refuses automated typing into a password field on a real personal profile
  unless the operator has explicitly allowed it. An injected page instructing the
  agent to "auto-fill the saved password and submit" is refused at this gate.
- **Local secret entry is blacked out.** When the operator must type a credential,
  `credential-entry-mode.ts` (27.04) pauses capture and drops keystrokes.

### What page content cannot do

Page content is treated as **data, never control**. The 19.08 prompt-injection
corpus (`browser-prompt-injection.ts`) pins each malicious page to the host gate it
must not defeat; the command-envelope schema (`command.ts`) makes
"privileged ⇒ approval required" structural, so a page cannot flip a command's
approval bit. Navigation/redirect/upload to a foreign origin is refused by the
origin gates; cookie exfiltration to an attacker origin is refused by the
navigation-origin policy.

### Captured-content redaction

Scraped browser content, traces, and logs pass through the unified redaction
engine (`redaction-engine.ts`, 27.05): API keys, tokens, JWTs, bearer headers, and
form-field secret values (e.g. a `value="…"` on a password input) are removed
before the text reaches an artifact or the audit. **[Counsel decision]** whether,
for some deployments, real-browser sessions must run only in an isolated
throwaway profile (see `browser-profile-isolation.md`) rather than the operator's
personal profile.

---

## 3. Employee-monitoring risk (the central misuse concern)

### The risk

A tool that streams an employee's screen, records it, and logs every action **could
be repurposed as covert surveillance** — an employer silently watching a worker.
This is the highest-severity privacy risk in the system. In the EU/UK, covert
monitoring of employees is tightly constrained (proportionality, transparency, and
in many member states works-council consultation); the UK ICO's employment-practices
guidance and EDPB Opinion 2/2017 on data processing at work both stress
transparency and necessity. Several US states require notice of electronic
monitoring (e.g. NY, CT, DE). **Covert, surreptitious monitoring is the misuse this
tool must actively resist, not merely discourage.**

### Explicit guidance

**Bellona is not a covert employee-monitoring tool and must never be deployed as
one.** It is built for a creative operator to *delegate work on their own machine*,
with the operator a visible, consenting participant. Deploying it to watch an
employee without their knowledge and consent is a misuse the organization is
responsible for preventing, and may be unlawful. This guidance is normative for any
deployment.

### Controls that mitigate the misuse

- **Review-only template.** `organization-template.ts` (27.06/27.11) ships a
  `review-only` org template under which **no mutating command may run** and
  **recording is forbidden** — a posture for observe-only use that minimizes captured
  data. `checkReviewOnlyCommand` enforces it (any mutating command is refused).
- **Operator presence + consent are structural.** Privileged/personal-profile
  sessions are visible-streamed and consented (§1, §2); they are not designed to run
  invisibly behind the operator's back.
- **Recording is deny-by-default and gated.** Stream recording requires explicit
  organization permission and a recorder allowlist
  (`organization-control.ts` `stream-access`); it is not on by default.
- **Incidental subjects fail closed** (§1) so even a recorded session does not
  silently capture third parties.
- **Audit transparency.** Every command and approval is recorded in an append-only,
  hash-chained audit trail with full actor attribution
  (`actor-attribution.ts`, 27.13: operator → orchestrator → specialist → adapter),
  so monitoring activity is itself auditable and attributable — covert use leaves a
  trail.
- **Redaction-by-default** of secrets/PII (§6 of the security review) limits what
  any captured text can expose.

**[Counsel decision]** the required employee-facing notice/consent text and whether
works-council / employee-representative consultation is needed per deployment
jurisdiction before any session that captures an employee's screen.

---

## 4. Consent

### Operator consent

The operator initiates and sees the session; privileged and real-personal-profile
surfaces are consented, visible-streamed sessions (`browser-adapter.ts`). Pairing a
device and starting a session are themselves gated organization surfaces
(`organization-control.ts` `device-pairing`, `session-start`).

### Incidental-subject consent

`incidental-consent.ts` (27.14) implements a **prompt-based consent flow** for
subjects swept into the capture who are not the operator:

- On detection of a video-call window / dictation overlay / bystander / visible
  document, a consent **request** is raised (`createIncidentalConsentRequest`) tied
  to the exact region and subject kind, shown to the operator.
- Until answered, the disposition is **fail-closed**: the region is redacted.
- A grant is recorded as a durable who/when/scope record
  (`RemoteIncidentalConsentRecord`): who decided, when, and the scope
  (`this-region` vs `this-session`). A grant for one region/kind/stream/session can
  never authorize another (the disposition function refuses cross-region,
  cross-kind, cross-stream, and cross-session reuse), and grants expire.

**[Counsel decision]** whether operator-mediated consent on behalf of an incidental
subject is sufficient in a given jurisdiction, or whether the subject's own consent
is required (in which case the correct posture is to keep the region redacted).

---

## 5. Recording retention

`retention.ts` (27.16) implements **jurisdiction-aware retention defaults** with a
bounded operator override and automated expiry enforcement, across three data
classes (`audit`, `recording`, `artifact`):

- **EU** — GDPR storage-limitation (Art. 5(1)(e)): recordings/artifacts purged
  quickly; audit kept only as long as the integrity obligation requires.
- **UK** — UK GDPR / DPA 2018 parity with the EU posture.
- **California** — CCPA/CPRA bounded, disclosed retention; a middle ground.
- **US-federal** — longer holds for classes that may be subject to litigation hold /
  regulatory audit.
- **default** — a conservative organization baseline when no jurisdiction is
  asserted.

`resolveRetentionPolicy` produces the effective policy for a (jurisdiction, data
class, override) tuple, and `computeExpiry` drives automated purge (`now >=
expiresAt`). An operator override may **shorten** recording/artifact retention
(data-minimization is always allowed) and may lengthen up to a jurisdiction maximum,
but can **never push audit retention below the integrity floor** — the hash-chained
audit must outlive the operational data it describes so the chain stays verifiable.
**[Counsel decision]** the concrete day counts per jurisdiction and data class (the
table ships documented defaults; counsel confirms them against the deployment's
obligations).

---

## 6. Audit export (who may export, and redaction)

- **Who may export.** `organization-control.ts` (27.06) `audit-export` gates
  exports to an allowlist of participants; the restricted org templates
  (enterprise/education/review-only) **pin audit-export to the administrator**
  participant id (`organization-template.ts`), so an ordinary operator cannot export
  the trail.
- **Redaction on export.** When the org's `redactionRequired` is set (the default),
  an **unredacted export is refused** — the export must be redacted. The audit
  content itself is scrubbed through the unified redaction engine
  (`redaction-engine.ts`, 27.05), and the credential-entry / incidental-subject
  paths never write the underlying secret or raw subject into the audit in the first
  place (`payloadCaptured: false`).
- **Who did what.** Every audit entry carries the full actor-attribution chain
  (`actor-attribution.ts`, 27.13): the human operator at the root through the
  agent/adapter that executed, rendered as a readable delegation label — so an
  exported trail attributes each action without inventing attribution.

**[Counsel decision]** any data-subject access-request (DSAR) handling for an
incidental subject who appears in a recording/audit, beyond the redaction and the
erasure path (`erasure.ts`).

---

## 7. Cross-border artifact storage (data residency)

`organization-governance.ts` (27.08) implements a **data-residency policy** that
refuses storing artifacts/audit/recordings in a region the organization does not
permit:

- `DATA_RESIDENCY_REGIONS` enumerates concrete storage regions (`eu-west`,
  `eu-central`, `uk-south`, `us-east`, `us-west`, `ca-central`, `ap-southeast`),
  and `DATA_RESIDENCY_REGION_JURISDICTION` maps each to the retention jurisdiction
  that governs data stored there — so residency and retention stay consistent (an
  EU-only org's data is governed by the EU retention posture).
- `checkDataResidency` / `assertDataResidency` **refuse** a storage target whose
  region is not in the org's `allowedRegions`. An EU-only organization
  (`allowedRegions = [eu-west, eu-central]`) handed a `us-east` bucket is refused
  (`DataResidencyViolationError`) under the default `enforce: true` posture.

This is the technical control that keeps a remote-control session's captured data
from silently crossing a border the organization (or the law applicable to its data
subjects) does not allow. Cross-border transfer of personal data out of the EU/UK
additionally requires a transfer mechanism (adequacy decision, SCCs, or equivalent);
the residency control keeps data **in-region by default**, and any deliberate
out-of-region storage is a **[Counsel decision]** requiring the appropriate transfer
basis.

---

## Implementing modules (index)

| Topic | Module | TODO |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Incidental-subject consent + fail-closed redaction | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/incidental-consent.ts` | 27.14 |
| Credential-entry blackout (stream pause, no keystrokes) | `apps/bellona/remote-host/src/credential-entry-mode.ts` | 27.04 |
| Browser credential-entry privacy control | `apps/bellona/remote-host/src/browser-adapter.ts` | 19.06 |
| Prompt-injection corpus (page content ≠ control) | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/browser-prompt-injection.ts` | 19.08 |
| Unified secret/PII redaction engine | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/redaction-engine.ts` | 27.05 |
| Sensitive-path default-deny (secret stores) | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/sensitive-paths.ts` | 27.03 |
| Organization controls (recording, audit-export, providers) | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/organization-control.ts` | 27.06 |
| Org policy templates (review-only) + audit-export pinning | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/organization-template.ts` | 27.06 / 27.11 |
| Jurisdiction-aware retention | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/retention.ts` | 27.16 |
| Data residency (cross-border refusal) | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/organization-governance.ts` | 27.08 |
| Actor attribution (who, in the audit) | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/actor-attribution.ts` | 27.13 |
| Erasure / right-to-be-forgotten path | `libs/bellona/remote-protocol/src/erasure.ts` | — |

## Sign-off boundary (restated)

This artifact prepares for, but does **not** constitute, legal sign-off. Before a
deployment that captures any person's screen — and especially any deployment in an
employment context — qualified counsel and the data-protection function must
review: the lawful basis, the consent/notice model, the per-jurisdiction retention
day counts, the cross-border transfer basis for any out-of-region storage, and any
required employee-representative consultation. The **[Counsel decision]** markers
above enumerate the specific questions to resolve. Engineering's role here is to
have made the controls real and to have stated honestly what they do and do not
cover; the legal determination is counsel's.
