Implementation task: 180.C.11.09
Bellona browser automation uses Bellona-managed isolated Chrome/Chromium profiles only. Personal browser profiles remain blocked at this stage.
This document is the operator and agent-facing policy for the Browser CDP MVP.
It summarizes the behavior implemented by the remote protocol schemas and the
remote-host browser adapter through 180.C.11.08.
Current Policy#
- Browser commands must use
adapter:browser-local. - Managed browser sessions must use
capability:browser-managed-session. browser.launch_managedcreates a new Bellona-managed profile directory.browser.navigate,browser.snapshot, andbrowser.screenshotoperate only against a launched managed browser session.browser.closecloses the managed browser context and removes the managed profile by default.- Chrome/Chromium remote debugging is bound to
127.0.0.1; CDP is not exposed directly to LAN or internet. - Real profile access is represented as blocked in adapter metadata, capability metadata, discovery output, and command metadata.
The allowed profile mode is isolated. Protocol browser command schemas reject
real-profile assumptions and require localhost-only CDP metadata. Host
capabilities advertise browser.profile.isolated; the adapter does not grant
browser.profile.real.
Managed Profile Shape#
The host creates browser profiles under the Bellona-managed profile root, which defaults to the host runtime's browser profile directory. A caller may provide a different managed root for tests or controlled deployments, but the root must not be a recognized Chrome/Chromium user-data directory.
Every created profile:
- lives under the configured managed profile root
- uses a
bellona-profile-directory prefix - receives a
bellona-profile.jsonmarker - records
isolated: true - records
personalProfileAccess: false - records cleanup strategy
rm_recursive_managed_path
The host rejects roots and profile paths that look like real browser profile
locations, including Chrome/Chromium user-data roots, Default, and Profile N
directories. Cleanup also validates that the path remains inside the managed
root before recursive removal.
Why Personal Profiles Stay Blocked#
Personal browser profiles are not just local files. They are an authority boundary for signed-in accounts and private browsing state. A profile can contain cookies, session tokens, local storage, autofill data, browser extensions, password-manager integration state, history, downloads, and cached page data. Exposing that profile to a remote agent would let malicious pages, prompt-injected content, or a compromised control path access state that the operator did not explicitly grant.
The current Phase 180 browser stack is intentionally read-only after launch except for managed-profile lifecycle and screenshot artifact creation. It does not yet have the full set of controls required for real profile access:
- explicit per-profile grants and revocation
- operator approval UX for sensitive browser state
- cookie, storage, download, upload, extension, and password-manager policy boundaries
- origin-scoped allowlists and prompt-injection containment
- redaction rules for account pages and authenticated screenshots
- durable evidence-retention and deletion policy for sensitive browser data
- distributed locks for shared browser profile access
- rollback and compensating-action rules for account mutations
- manual hardware evidence on a real host profile
Until those controls exist and an ADR accepts the remaining risk, real personal profiles remain out of scope.
Audit And Timeline Expectations#
Browser command audit entries must preserve enough context for later replay and incident review without exposing personal profile contents:
- command id, device id, adapter id, capability id, and command name
- actor chain and participant id
- profile mode
isolated - localhost CDP metadata
- current page URL after blocked-domain enforcement
- screenshot artifact ids and evidence ids when screenshots are captured
- redaction status and redaction hook metadata for screenshot artifacts
Gateway timeline events merge command-store, audit-log, and artifact-store
events. After 180.C.11.08, browser screenshot command results expose artifact
and evidence IDs in command.completed, artifact.registered, and
command.result timeline entries.
Future Unlock Criteria For Real Profiles#
Real profile access requires a later Phase 180 task or ADR to explicitly change this policy. At minimum, that work must add:
- protocol fields that distinguish real profile grants from isolated profile sessions
- host policy preflight that denies real profile commands without an active grant
- an approval request that names the exact profile path, profile kind, page origin, command risk, retention policy, and rollback limitations
- host tests that prove real profile access cannot be reached through managed profile arguments, cleanup paths, command metadata spoofing, or gateway routing
- manual hardware evidence on a controlled test profile, not an operator's personal daily-use profile
Until then, agents must launch isolated profiles, navigate within the blocked domain policy, capture artifacts with redaction metadata, and close the managed session when finished.