The third stacked-load freeze of this MacBook Air (after 2026-06-03 and 2026-07-10), and the first with a complete diagnostic chain on disk. The rules in CLAUDE.md § "Machine limits" are derived from this file.
What happened, with evidence#
- A
next devserver outlived three sessions. The member web app's dev server was started in session s30 (Aug 13) and left running through s32 and s33 — roughly two days — while the Eve-polish harness drove hundreds of Playwright page loads and recompiles through it (phases 12.5–12.7 alone navigated 20 admin routes × repeats, 10-context probes, and three full lock suites). Its log (/tmp/claude-eve-s30-web.log) shows it still serving at 13:44:26 on Aug 15 — two minutes before the freeze. next devleaks, and its workers died of it. Three node crash reports (~/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/node-2026-08-15-0850*.ips,085401*.ips) show fresh worker processes launched 08:49–08:50 aborting within 40s–3.5min atv8::internal::V8::FatalProcessOutOfMemory— JavaScript-heap OOM — with 4.8–5.9 GB writable regions. That is the crash-respawn-recompile loop: each respawn recompiles the app, which is itself a memory and CPU spike.- The disk confirmed the thrash. An "excessive disk writes" diagnostic fired
at 09:06 (
disk writes_2026-08-15-090652), and by 13:44 the dev server's filesystem-cache writes were taking 11.8–13.6 s each. - Jetsam ended it.
JetsamEvent-2026-08-15-134604.ips: with 743 processes tracked, ~2 GB swap effectively full (1.15 GB still resident at idle after recovery) and the compressor at 4.47 billion compressions, macOS jettisoned a wave of system daemons —trustd,secd,accountsd,cloudd,UIKitSystem, … Killing those is what a full UI freeze looks like. Uptime shows no reboot (24 days): this was a memory-pressure freeze, not a kernel panic.
The early warning that was visible and ignored#
Near the end of s33, grep invocations against files that demonstrably
contained the pattern started returning empty output (a Python read of the
same file found the matches). A machine under memory pressure fails weirdly
before it fails loudly. That is a stop-the-line signal, not a curiosity.
Why the rules already on file did not prevent it#
CLAUDE.md already said "tear down at task boundaries, not session end" and "production over dev for long Playwright runs". Two failure modes got around them:
- The harness recipe outranked the hygiene rule in practice. The Eve-polish stack recipe (memory + TODOS) pins dev servers for hot-iteration, so each session followed the recipe and inherited the long-lived server instead of restarting it.
- "Task boundary" was read as "phase boundary I felt like honoring". The admin server was torn down at its boundary; the web server and BFF were not, because they were "still needed soon".
The rewritten rules therefore bind to observable events (session end, phase close, N page loads, a memory reading) rather than to judgment.