Minimal Manifest V3 browser extension for the Bellona remote-control surface
(180.C.20.06–.08).
It exists to provide the three things the 180.C.20.06 evaluation found that direct CDP cannot cleanly deliver:
- a tamper-resistant, page-visible automation indicator that the page cannot remove (shadow-DOM-isolated, re-mounted on tamper),
- a native-ish consent/approval popup (the extension action popup), and
- a per-origin profile-grant surface (an explicit allow-list of origins the extension will operate on).
Security model (all decisions are pure, unit-tested functions)#
| Concern | Function | Module |
|---|---|---|
Origin allow-list (closed-by-default, <all_urls> forbidden) |
isExtensionOriginAllowed, compileExtensionOriginAllowList |
origin-policy.ts |
| Extension-origin authentication (handshake, per-session token) | verifyExtensionMessageOrigin, verifyExtensionMessageSender, mintSessionToken |
extension-auth.ts |
| Sensitive-action guards (clipboard / upload / form) | evaluateClipboardAccess, evaluateFileUpload, evaluateFormSubmission |
action-guards.ts |
| Visible automation indicator (mount / re-mount on tamper) | mountAutomationIndicator, indicatorNeedsRemount |
automation-indicator.ts |
| Disable/uninstall teardown (revoke token, drop grants, remove indicator) | runExtensionTeardown, ExtensionSessionRegistry |
session-lifecycle.ts |
| Manifest domain-scoping invariants | assertManifestDomainScoped |
manifest-policy.ts |
The Chrome-runtime wiring (background.ts, content-script.ts) is a thin shell
around these functions; it cannot be loaded in CI, so the LOGIC is tested
directly via the pure functions (the established dependency-boundary approach).
host_permissions are an explicit allow-list — NOT <all_urls>#
manifest.json declares host_permissions and content_scripts.matches as an
explicit list of *.bellona.internal origins (placeholders an operator replaces
at packaging time). <all_urls>, *://*/*, http://*/*, and https://*/* are
forbidden and rejected fail-loud by compileExtensionOriginAllowList /
assertManifestDomainScoped. externally_connectable.matches names a single
trusted gateway origin, not a wildcard.
permissions is the justified minimal set ["scripting", "activeTab", "storage"]; clipboardRead/clipboardWrite are optional (requested at
runtime, gated by evaluateClipboardAccess).
Build / test#
# type-check the source
tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.app.json
# run the adversarial unit tests
vitest run