# Phase 182: Controlled Human Video Generation — Multi-Reference Identity, Active Performance, Exact Dialogue, Native Audiovisual Lip Sync, Quality-Gated Delivery, and OpenRouter Routing

Build the production video system that lets a creator provide one or more
authorized reference images of a person, specify exactly what that person must
say, direct how they move and perform in an arbitrary scene, and receive a
coherent video whose visible speech is synchronized to the approved audio. The
system must support active people in cinematic and everyday situations—not just
front-facing talking heads—and it must preserve identity, voice, wardrobe,
scene, camera, motion, and dialogue intent across shots.

This phase treats **“perfect lip sync” as a delivery requirement, not an honest
claim that every model's first sample will be perfect**. Oshun may use a native
audio-conditioned model so generation and synchronization happen in one render,
but it must still inspect the actual output frames and audio. A take that misses
words, assigns speech to the wrong person, drifts out of sync, hides the mouth
for an unjustified duration, damages identity, or crosses a release threshold
must be rejected, retried, rerouted, or sent for explicitly disclosed corrective
processing. The product promise is therefore: **no known bad-sync take is
released**, while measured pass rates and limitations remain visible.

The primary path for exact wording is:

`authorized references → approved script → controlled speech audio → shot plan → native audio-conditioned video candidates → audiovisual/identity/safety evaluation → select or retry → encode/provenance → release`

Supplying speech audio to the video model is not a separate post-generation
lip-sync step. Prompt-only generated dialogue remains an optional creative mode,
not the exact-dialogue mode, because a video model may paraphrase, omit words,
mispronounce names, or change timing.

**Primary owning domains:** Isis, Oshun BFF, Nous, Psyche, Veritas, Contracts,
Studio Web/Desktop/Mobile, Admin, Trust & Safety, Media Infrastructure, MLOps,
and Release Engineering.

**Existing anchor points to extend rather than duplicate:**

- `libs/isis/curated-cards/src/card-types.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/video-executor.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/openrouter-video-provider.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/video-provider-env.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/provider-quality-router.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/comfy-video-provider.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/comfy-video-longform.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/video-probe.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/video-governance.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/video-hero-gate.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/generated-artifact-object-store.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/release-gate.ts`
- `libs/isis/ai-video/`
- `libs/isis/ai-providers/src/providers/video-generation/`
- `libs/isis/workflows/src/consistency/`
- `libs/nous/portrait-animation/`
- `libs/oshun/embodiment-psyche/src/avatar-sync.ts`
- `apps/psyche/avatar-engine/`
- `apps/veritas/video/`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/studio/voice-consent-store.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/admin/persona-lifecycle-store.ts`
- `V1/architecture/persona-avatar-voice-packs.md`
- `CONTENT_GENERATION_CAPABILITY_MATRIX.md`
- `libs/isis/seedance-provider/` (about 40 modules: fal, PiAPI, and Volcengine
  Ark clients, `audio-reference.ts`, `reference-assets.ts`,
  `character-consistency.ts`, `video-extension.ts`, `video-inpainting.ts`,
  `voiceover-control.ts`, `lip-sync-validation.ts`, `expiry-manager.ts`)
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/jobs-route.ts` (the durable job envelope and
  its `GenerationJobStatus` enum: queued, running, complete, failed, blocked,
  needs_review)
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/generation-budget-gate.ts`,
  `generation-quota-gate.ts`, `request-validation.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/generated-artifact-erasure.ts`,
  `media-releasability.ts`, `promotion-gate.ts`, `provider-measurement.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/synthesis-disclosure.ts`, `video-watermark.ts`,
  `audio-c2pa-signer.ts`, `audio-probe.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/dub-faithfulness.ts` (an injectable
  ASR-to-source faithfulness seam that fails loud when unconfigured)
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/narration-executor.ts`,
  `narration-provider-env.ts` (the existing TTS path and its disclosure gate)
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/runpod-comfy-client.ts`,
  `libs/isis/runpod-surface/`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/generation/release-proof.test-fixtures.ts` and
  `libs/contracts/src/common/proof-types.ts` (`ProofRecordSchema`, nine named
  release gates)
- `libs/oshun/generation-control-isis/` (the release gate the worker already
  enforces)
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/aja/upload-consent-store.ts` and
  `libs/aja/consent-management/`
- `libs/oshun/trust-safety/src/policy-taxonomy/categories.ts`
- `apps/oshun/bff/src/isis/voice-cloning-store.ts` (an explicitly unbound
  projection with no consent ledger or biometric store)
- `libs/isis/portrait-studio/`, `libs/isis/face-synthesis/`,
  `libs/isis/video-edit-studio/`, `libs/isis/video-enhancement/`
- `apps/veritas/video/src/providers/{whisper,assemblyai,deepgram}.ts` (the only
  ASR clients in the repo)
- `docs/agents/model-cost-openrouter.md` (has no video pricing yet)
- `libs/oshun/navigation/src/release-scope.ts` (V1.0 ships four rooms; Veritas
  and Metis return in V1.2)

## Current-State Finding

The existing general-video card and BFF request expose a text or motion prompt,
one optional reference image, duration, aspect ratio, style, camera movement,
resolution, locale, and a hero flag. They do not yet carry a script, speech
audio, multiple typed references, speaker/timeline data, performance direction,
native-audio requirements, lip-sync thresholds, or an output-quality decision.
The OpenRouter adapter currently implements create/poll/download with a single
first-frame image and returns the full MP4 as a base64 data URI; it does not yet
cover typed image references, provider passthrough options (the only way audio
or video inputs reach a model on OpenRouter), final-frame guidance,
generated-audio controls, signed callbacks, capability discovery, or durable
storage. Per-provider quality routing does already exist:
`provider-quality-router.ts` runs Beta–Thompson selection over each provider's
measured release rate, and Phase 182 must extend it to per-model, per-cohort
keys rather than replace it.

Oshun V1 contains useful consent, persona, voice, identity, provider, and viseme
concepts, but it does not currently prove this flow end to end. The existing
39-phoneme-to-11-viseme mapping is animation data rather than a video renderer.
Several portrait-animation modules produce plans or accept externally supplied
quality scores rather than executing a measured inference/evaluation pipeline.
The Psyche avatar engine and Veritas avatar providers must be audited and either
hardened, integrated behind the canonical contracts, or explicitly retired;
their existence must not be represented as proof of active-scene lip sync.

The repo also already contains `@isis/seedance-provider`, a roughly 40-module
library with fal, PiAPI, and Volcengine Ark clients plus audio-reference,
reference-asset, character-consistency, video-extension, video-inpainting,
voiceover-control, and lip-sync-validation modules. It is the natural direct
lane for the reference and editing capabilities OpenRouter does not expose, and
it must be audited before anything is built beside it: its
`lip-sync-validation.ts` synthesizes per-utterance confidence from the frame
index (`0.7 + (index % 3) * 0.08` at line 324), which is a fabricated metric,
not a measurement. The BFF likewise already has a durable generation job
envelope with a six-state status enum, budget and quota gates, artifact erasure,
media releasability, a promotion gate, provider measurement, synthesis
disclosure, video watermarking, audio C2PA signing, an ffprobe-based video
probe, an ASR-to-source faithfulness seam, a TTS narration path, and a
`ProofRecordSchema` with nine named release gates. Every one of those is an
extension point for this phase, not something to rebuild.

## OpenRouter Routing Snapshot (Verify Dynamically Before Implementation)

The OpenRouter video catalog is mutable. The table below was re-verified on
**2026-09-09** against the live `GET /api/v1/videos/models` response and the
official video-generation guide. It corrects an earlier draft that assumed audio
and video references travel in `input_references`; they do not. Re-checked
against the live catalog on 2026-09-10: every lane row below is unchanged.

| Lane                                          | Candidate                    | What OpenRouter actually exposes today                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | Required proof before promotion                                                                                               |
| --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Active human + supplied audio + references    | `alibaba/wan-2.7`            | First/last frame, 2–10 s, 720p/1080p, `generate_audio`, seed; passthrough `audio`, `video`, `videos`, `images`, `last_image`, `ratio`, `negative_prompt`, `prompt_extend`. Already the repo default.                                                                          | Live probe that the `audio` passthrough accepts approved speech and yields measured sync; identity gates on `images`/`videos` |
| Active human + supplied audio (fallback)      | `alibaba/wan-2.6`            | First frame only, 5–10 s, 720p/1080p; passthrough `audio`, `shot_type`, `size`, `negative_prompt`, `enable_prompt_expansion`. No image/video reference passthrough.                                                                                                           | Same audio probe; identity must come from the first frame plus `input_references` images                                      |
| Native (prompt-only) dialogue, multi-speaker  | `bytedance/seedance-1-5-pro` | First/last frame, 4–12 s, 480p–1080p, `generate_audio`, seed; passthrough `watermark`, `req_key` only. **No audio input**, so creative-dialogue mode only.                                                                                                                    | Speaker attribution, ASR word accuracy, profile/occlusion, cross-language benchmarks; never labeled exact-dialogue            |
| Longer takes + image references               | `bytedance/seedance-2.5`     | Image-only `input_references`, first/last frame, 4–30 s, 480p/720p, seed; passthrough `watermark`, `req_key`, `output_format`. **No audio/video references, edit, or extend via OpenRouter**; those need the direct fal/PiAPI/Ark clients in `@isis/seedance-provider`.       | Live reference-count probe; continuity benchmarks; direct-lane parity before any edit/extend claim                            |
| Premium short hero shot (prompt-native audio) | `google/veo-3.1`             | First/last frame, 4–8 s, 720p–4K, `generate_audio`, seed; passthrough `personGeneration`, `aspectRatio`, `negativePrompt`, `conditioningScale`, `enhancePrompt`. **No audio input**; never an exact-dialogue lane.                                                            | Price, latency, resolution, control adherence; prompt-native dialogue accuracy reported, not promised                         |
| Talking-head-only lane                        | `heygen/avatar-iv`           | Script (`prompt`) plus passthrough `voice_id`, `voice_settings`, `motion_prompt`, `expressiveness`, `fit`, `remove_background`, `background`, `caption`, `title`; no seed, no `generate_audio`, duration follows the script. **Supplied audio is not exposed on OpenRouter.** | Keep separate from active-scene claims; benchmark crop, gesture, and background constraints; bind `voice_id` to voice consent |

Other catalog entries worth a bounded probe, not yet lanes:
`kwaivgi/kling-v3.0-pro` and `-std` (first/last frame, `negative_prompt`,
`cfg_scale`), `minimax/hailuo-3` (instruction-guided video editing, 2K),
`runway/aleph-2` (in-context editing with `keyframes`), `openai/sora-2-pro`
(multi-shot, no frame images), and `alibaba/wan-3.0` and `-prime` (2–30 s, no
passthrough at all).

Wire facts verified on 2026-09-09 that the checklist below depends on:

- Endpoints: `POST /api/v1/videos`, `GET /api/v1/videos/{id}`,
  `GET /api/v1/videos/{id}/content?index=0` (Bearer-authenticated download),
  `GET /api/v1/videos/models`.
- Request fields: `model`, `prompt`, `duration`, `resolution`, `aspect_ratio`,
  `size`, `frame_images`, `input_references`, `generate_audio`, `seed`,
  `callback_url`, `provider`. `input_references` is documented as "reference
  images for style guidance" and each entry is
  `{ type: 'image_url', image_url }`. There is no audio or video reference type;
  audio and video inputs exist only as model-specific `provider` passthrough
  parameters named in the catalog's `allowed_passthrough_parameters`.
  `frame_images` takes precedence over `input_references` when both are present.
- `generate_audio` defaults to **true** on audio-capable models; an exact-audio
  request must set it deliberately per adapter.
- Catalog record fields: `id`, a dated `canonical_slug` (pin this as the model
  version), `supported_durations`, `supported_resolutions`,
  `supported_aspect_ratios`, `supported_sizes`, `supported_frame_images`,
  `generate_audio`, `seed`, `pricing_skus`, `allowed_passthrough_parameters`.
  The catalog carries **no** reference-count limit, retention, region, or
  data-handling fields; those must be maintained as dated manual records.
- `pricing_skus` are heterogeneous: per second by resolution, per second with or
  without audio, per generation mode, or per `video_tokens`. Cost estimation
  needs a normalizer, not a single per-second rate.
- Webhooks: `callback_url` must be HTTPS and overrides a workspace-level
  default; payloads are HMAC-SHA256 signed in `X-OpenRouter-Signature`; event
  types are `video.generation.completed`, `.failed`, `.cancelled`, and
  `.expired` (expired means the job exceeded its maximum time to live;
  `generation_id` and `model` may be null on early failures).
- Zero data retention: video generation is **not eligible** for ZDR, and an
  account with ZDR enforcement enabled receives no video routing at all. A
  tenant that requires ZDR is therefore ineligible for every OpenRouter video
  lane, not merely warned.

Never make this table a permanent hard-coded truth. Fetch and cache the live
model catalog, intersect requested capabilities with observed provider support,
and fail closed when a required feature is missing. Official references to
track:

- <https://openrouter.ai/docs/guides/overview/multimodal/video-generation>
- <https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/videos/models> (live catalog; the
  `create-videos` API-reference page returned 404 on 2026-09-09, so the guide is
  the documented contract of record)
- <https://openrouter.ai/collections/video-models>
- <https://openrouter.ai/alibaba>
- <https://openrouter.ai/bytedance>
- <https://openrouter.ai/google/veo-3.1>
- <https://openrouter.ai/heygen/avatar-iv>

## Non-Negotiable Product Rules

1. Active-scene generation is a first-class lane; a talking-head avatar is not
   an acceptable fallback unless the creator explicitly selects that lane.
2. Exact dialogue mode uses creator-approved audio or deterministic TTS derived
   from the approved script; prompt-native dialogue alone cannot claim verbatim
   wording.
3. Provider marketing, request acceptance, job completion, metadata timestamps,
   and the presence of an audio track are not quality evidence. Quality gates
   must inspect decoded frames and audio from the delivered bytes.
4. No model or provider is the permanent global default. Routing is based on
   required capabilities, live health, benchmarked quality, locale, policy,
   latency, and budget.
5. Identity and voice inputs require authorization, revocation, retention, and
   impersonation controls before provider submission.
6. Candidate generation, evaluation, selective retry, and release proof are one
   workflow. A completed provider job is not automatically a releasable asset.
7. Provider-specific power remains available through typed options, but the
   creator experience uses stable, provider-neutral creative controls.
8. Every released asset retains its request, model/version, provider, seed,
   references, approved script/audio digest, measurements, provenance, and
   release decision without storing more biometric material than necessary.

## Repo Constraints That Bind This Phase

- **Model binding for tests and harnesses.** Every LLM-shaped step this phase
  adds (brief-to-shot planning, prompt compilation, semantic-substitution
  checks, review triage) binds the cheapest capable model through OpenRouter per
  `CLAUDE.md`: `OSHUN_ASSISTANT_PROVIDER=openrouter`,
  `OSHUN_ASSISTANT_OPENROUTER_MODEL=deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731`,
  `OPENROUTER_PROVIDER_SORT=price`. Video generation canaries bind tiny bounded
  spend. `docs/agents/model-cost-openrouter.md` carries the video `pricing_skus`
  normalization and per-lane prices (fetched 2026-09-09, max age 24 h);
  `182.C.14.06` reads that record rather than re-deriving it.
- **Hardware (corrected 2026-09-10; read before marking anything
  `blocked-local`).** The phase was drafted against a 16 GB MacBook Air. The
  worktree that implements it runs on Linux, 15 GiB RAM, 4 cores, no GPU
  (`nvidia-smi` absent; torch is the `+cpu` build). CPU probes on 2026-09-10 ran
  every evaluator class the draft called hardware-blocked: YuNet face detection
  with SQPnP head pose, SFace identity embeddings, a SyncNet v2 forward pass at
  about 1 s of CPU per second of 25 fps video, and a wav2vec2 CTC forced aligner
  at about 0.2 s of CPU per second of audio (evidence under
  `docs/domains/isis/human-video/evidence/2026-09-10-*`). So `182.C.17`,
  `182.C.19`, and `182.C.20` are built and probed on CPU here first; a hosted
  GPU worker (RunPod via `libs/isis/runpod-surface` and
  `runpod-comfy-client.ts`) is a throughput decision taken at `182.C.17.13` from
  the numbers measured at `182.C.17.12`, not a prerequisite. Only self-hosted
  video _generation_ (`182.C.32.03`–`.08`) is genuinely GPU-bound. A
  `blocked-local` row must name what was run and how it failed; a blocker copied
  across a section is a claim about none of its items. Model weights are staged
  in `~/.cache/oshun-human-video/` (digests in the evidence records); Python
  packages go in a venv and never touch the pnpm lockfile. The memory checkpoint
  before any heavy run is `free -m` on this box (`memory_pressure` is
  macOS-only); below about 3 GB available, tear down first.
- **ASR (decided and funded 2026-09-10, `182.C.02.12`).** Transcription binds
  OpenRouter audio-input models: `mistralai/voxtral-small-24b-2507` primary,
  `google/gemini-3.1-flash-lite` as the cheap default, with 46 audio-input
  models on the account for ensembles (`182.C.18.07`). Their word timestamps are
  **disqualified** for any timing measurement (three models disagreed by up to
  1013 ms on one 3.95 s clip), and so are Whisper's cross-attention timestamps
  (up to 600 ms onset error and merged words on a known-onset clip). Word timing
  comes only from a CTC forced aligner run on our own CPU (wav2vec2 CTC: max 81
  ms raw onset error with a systematic late bias, on the known-onset fixture).
  Veritas's Whisper, AssemblyAI, and Deepgram wrappers are not used by this
  phase.
- **Release train.** V1.0 ships four rooms; Veritas and Metis return in V1.2
  (`libs/oshun/navigation/src/release-scope.ts`). Items that touch Veritas
  (`182.C.13.02`, `182.C.31.07`, `182.C.39.08`) are gated on V1.2, and the
  creator flow must declare its train before `182.C.38`.
- **Secrets on the Linux box.** Keys live in `~/.config/oshun/env-master.env`
  (mode 600; the Mac's drawer file does not exist here, and the worktree `.env`
  holds only Tara settings). Source it through a throwaway script
  (`set -a; . ~/.config/oshun/env-master.env; set +a`), verify by length
  (`echo ${#OPENROUTER_API_KEY}`), and never put a key in a committed file or in
  command text.
- **Surfaces.** No Oshun studio desktop app exists. The studio lives in
  `apps/oshun/web` routes (`studio`, `lilith-studio`, `mawu-studio`,
  `egbe-studio`); the desktop apps are `apps/yemaya/studio-desktop` (Electron,
  film/game), `apps/lilith/desktop`, and `apps/iris/desktop`. `182.C.24` must
  name a host or drop desktop from scope.
- **`frontend-skill`.** Phases 72 and 139 cite it as mandatory, but it is not
  installed in every working environment. On the Linux box it resolves at
  `/root/.codex/skills/frontend-skill/SKILL.md` (a Codex skill, absent from the
  Claude skill list); read that file before `182.C.23` and `182.C.29`.

---

## What the 30 unchecked items are waiting on (swept 2026-09-12)

Every remaining item was walked in one pass and each one traces to one of a
short list of root blockers. The list is short on purpose: pick the blocker that
has become available and the items it releases are named here rather than
rediscovered — which means an entry that has been discharged must be REWRITTEN
rather than left standing, or the next session re-derives work that is already
done. Three were rewritten on 2026-09-13 for exactly that reason, and one of
them had never been written down at all.

1. **Consented human subjects** (`182.C.33.01`–`.05`). Releases `182.C.17.08`,
   `18.08`, `19.05`, `19.08`, `19.09`, `20.01`, `20.07`, `32.04` and most of
   `182.C.40`. The machinery for all of them is built and refuses to report a
   result it does not have; what is missing is people who agreed to be filmed.
   `19.09`'s module says so in its own header, which is why that box is not
   ticked on the strength of the slices existing.
2. **A PROVIDER-REACHABLE OBJECT ROOT** — what is left of the blocker that used
   to read "NOTHING RUNS THE PIPELINE". That framing was correct on 2026-09-12
   and is now out of date in three of its four parts, so it is restated rather
   than repeated. A RUNNER EXISTS: `human-video-job-runner.ts` on the durable
   envelope advances one stage per claim and was measured live reaching
   `planning`. A LANE REGISTRY EXISTS (2026-09-13): `CatalogueLaneRegistry`
   registers every route from the live catalogue and runs it through
   `evaluateLaneEligibility` — it answers NONE today, which is a fact about the
   request rather than about the deployment. A QUARANTINE STORE EXISTS
   (2026-09-13): `FilesystemQuarantineStore`, chunked writes, rename-on-commit,
   promotion decided by `planTransition`.

   What is left is the one piece that cannot be closed by writing code here:
   `placeReferences` hands the provider a URL it must RETRIEVE, and this box's
   object store is on a private port. Until a reference is fetchable by
   OpenRouter — and a CONSENTED one exists to fetch, which is blocker 1 — no
   candidate can be produced. That still releases take comparison, review and
   release in `182.C.36.06`, `delete-asset` deletion (`plansFor` resolves an
   asset id to a TAKE), `36.07`'s quarantine and takedown screens, `182.C.24.06`
   (whose web half is `36.06`), and most of `182.C.40`. Note what it does NOT
   release on its own: `40.02` additionally needs `19.08`'s re-fit, and the
   content faults in `40.05` need labelled examples.

3. **DISCHARGED 2026-09-13 — was "a bound model registry".** It read: releases
   the ESTIMATE half of `182.C.36.06` and `36.07`'s reroute screen, because
   `buildStudioLaneView` needs a `ModelVersionRecord` per lane and nothing
   registered one. Both halves are done. The estimate is `POST /jobs/estimate`,
   the fortieth operation, covered in a real browser against the live price
   list; the registry is `CatalogueLaneRegistry`, and the thing that had always
   been missing underneath both was an adapter for the catalogue, which
   `human-video-catalogue-reader.ts` now is.

   ONE PIECE OF THE OLD ENTRY SURVIVES AND IS NOT A BLOCKER:
   `human-video-pre-submission-summary.ts` is still consumed by nothing. It is
   `182.C.23.06`'s deliverable and `buildStudioLaneView` can feed it now, so
   what stands between it and a creator is a Studio region rather than a missing
   input. Same shape as `human-video-take-comparison.ts` and
   `human-video-export-controls.ts` below: client/surface drift, not a blocker.

4. **A GPU host** (`182.C.32.03`, `32.06`, and `32.04` with blocker 1).
5. **A person with a screen reader** (`182.C.36.08`'s manual half; the
   automation half is done and passing).
6. **The V1.2 release train** (`182.C.13.02`, `31.07`, gated by
   `release-scope.ts`) and evidence that follows from blockers 1 and 2
   (`182.C.38.08`, which is a PROHIBITION that currently holds).

7. **DISCHARGED 2026-09-13 — a blocker nobody had noticed.** THE ADMIN SURFACE
   ANSWERED 403 TO EVERY OPERATOR and had since it was written: an admin session
   carries `admin:*`, `satisfiesScope` stops the wildcard at the `hv:` namespace
   on purpose, and nothing in the service ever issued a staff scope. So
   `182.C.36.07`'s claim that review and role isolation were covered was false
   in the same way the web side's was on 2026-09-12 — the e2e spec tolerated a
   failed read, and an unreachable surface and one failing closed are
   indistinguishable from the client. `human-video-staff-grant.ts` closes it,
   and the queue is a PLATFORM read now: `hv:reviews:all-tenants` is what drops
   the tenant filter, demanded by `buildQuery`, carried on the cursor and
   refused to `hv:*`. Anything else built on the admin surface would have hit
   this first.

THE "NOT A BLOCKER" LIST, CORRECTED 2026-09-13. It used to say override rules
and audit were "missing their whole stack, not a page". Both have a stack AND a
page now, and so does reroute: `/isis/human-video/routing` over
`GET /operator/lanes/:mode` and `/isis/human-video/trust-and-safety` over
`GET /operator/trust-and-safety`, both read-only because the operator grant
issues no scope that writes until `182.C.29.08`'s coverage exists, both covered
in a real browser. Three of `36.07`'s five flows now have screens; quarantine
and takedown are the two that remain and they are blocker 2.

WHAT SURVIVES, AND IT IS THE RECURRING SHAPE BEHIND THIS PHASE'S REAL DEFECTS:
CLIENT/SURFACE DRIFT. `182.C.23.08`, `23.09` and `23.12` all shipped as logic
libraries no browser ever called, and binding the first of them on 2026-09-12
found three defects in a day. `human-video-pre-submission-summary.ts` was wired
on 2026-09-13 and cost two more findings: `buildStudioLaneView` under it had
never been called by anything but its own spec either, and it could not describe
a multi-shot job at all — it priced ONE `CostRequest`, and a per-generation
minimum applies per shot. `human-video-take-comparison.ts` and
`human-video-export-controls.ts` are STILL consumed by nothing, and both need a
candidate (blocker 2); check them before believing a surface is finished. Its
sibling, found three times on 2026-09-13: A FIX THAT UPDATES ONE OF A MODULE'S
TWO SPEC FILES. Three specs were sitting red against behaviour that had
deliberately changed — a duplicate admin port spec, the review panel's own spec,
and an older `__tests__` copy of the first. Grep for every spec that names a
module before believing the suite is green about it.

---

## 182.C Canonical Sequential Implementation Checklist

This is the executable checklist for Phase 182. Work from top to bottom unless a
dependency is explicitly recorded. An item is checked only when implementation,
automated verification, documentation, and evidence are committed. A typed seam
or a mocked provider response is not evidence that a real capability works.

### 182.C.01 Phase Control, Tracker, and Evidence Rules

- [x] **182.C.01.01** Create
      `docs/domains/isis/human-video/implementation-tracker.md` with one row per
      `182.C` item, owner, dependency, status, changed files, verification,
      provider/hardware evidence, cost, and blocker.
- [x] **182.C.01.02** Record the stage order and prohibit checking downstream
      release work before contracts, consent, real evaluation, and storage are
      complete.
- [x] **182.C.01.03** Define “implemented,” “wired,” “live-probed,”
      “benchmark-passed,” “release-enabled,” and “blocked” so plan-only modules
      cannot be mistaken for working inference.
- [x] **182.C.01.04** Require every claimed provider capability to link a dated,
      redacted request/response fixture and a real generated artifact digest.
- [x] **182.C.01.05** Require every quality claim to link measurements computed
      from the exact released bytes, not a provider preview or metadata summary.
- [x] **182.C.01.06** Define a revalidation cadence for mutable provider models,
      pricing, duration limits, reference limits, option names, and retention.
- [x] **182.C.01.07** Add explicit owner and expiry fields for every temporary
      exception, disabled evaluator, manual review, or model-specific waiver.
- [x] **182.C.01.08** Record targeted lint, typecheck, unit, integration,
      provider-sandbox, Playwright, accessibility, performance, and release-gate
      commands as packages are created.
- [x] **182.C.01.09** Bind every test, harness, probe, and local stack to the
      cheap OpenRouter model per `CLAUDE.md` (`OPENROUTER_PROVIDER_SORT=price`),
      and add the video `pricing_skus` normalization to
      `docs/agents/model-cost-openrouter.md`.
- [x] **182.C.01.10** Add a `blocked-local` tracker status for GPU-bound
      evaluator and ASR work, record the hosting route for each, and require a
      `memory_pressure` checkpoint before any local ffmpeg or evaluator run.
- [x] **182.C.01.11** Record the target release train, the V1.2 gating of every
      Veritas-touching item, and the desktop-surface decision from `182.C.24.05`
      in the tracker before any Studio work starts.

### 182.C.02 Repository Capability Audit and Gap Ledger

- [x] **182.C.02.01** Audit the curated video card types and validation path;
      record every field needed for references, dialogue, audio, speakers,
      direction, quality policy, and output preferences.
- [x] **182.C.02.02** Audit the BFF video executor, provider environment,
      router, queue, catalog, storage, governance, and release gates;
      distinguish real code paths from fixtures and seams.
- [x] **182.C.02.03** Audit `@isis/ai-video`, `@isis/ai-providers`, and
      `@isis/seedance-provider` for duplicate clients, stale claimed models (the
      Wan provider names fal-style `alibaba/wan-2-6-*` ids), committed
      `.js`/`.d.ts` artifacts beside source, contract mismatches, reusable
      workflow primitives, and fabricated measurements (start with the
      index-derived confidence in `seedance-provider/src/lip-sync-validation.ts`
      line 324).
- [x] **182.C.02.04** Audit identity, scene, shot, wardrobe, and temporal
      consistency modules and map them to the new human-video contract.
- [x] **182.C.02.05** Audit every `@nous/portrait-animation` export and label it
      executable, adapter-backed, planning-only, score-ingestion-only, or stale.
- [x] **182.C.02.06** Audit `apps/psyche/avatar-engine` for entry point,
      dependencies, model weights, license, GPU/CPU behavior, failure behavior,
      tests, and whether it should be hardened or retired.
- [x] **182.C.02.07** Audit Veritas HeyGen, Tavus, D-ID, Runway, and unified
      providers; identify which are actually constructed and reachable at
      runtime.
- [x] **182.C.02.08** Audit V1 persona/avatar/voice documentation against
      current code and create a fact table of delivered, partial,
      provider-gated, and missing capabilities.
- [x] **182.C.02.09** Update `CONTENT_GENERATION_CAPABILITY_MATRIX.md` only from
      verified findings, leaving unprobed generation and encoding unchecked.
- [x] **182.C.02.10** Create a deletion/consolidation list across the five
      provider abstractions that already exist (`@isis/ai-video`,
      `@isis/ai-providers/video-generation`, `@isis/seedance-provider`, the
      Veritas unified provider, and the BFF `video-provider-env.ts` seam) so
      Phase 182 does not add a sixth.
- [x] **182.C.02.11** Audit the BFF generation primitives named in the anchor
      list (job envelope and status enum, budget/quota gates, erasure,
      releasability, promotion gate, provider measurement, synthesis disclosure,
      watermark, C2PA signer, probes, dub faithfulness, narration TTS,
      release-proof schema) and record an extend-or-replace decision for each
      before any parallel implementation is written.
- [x] **182.C.02.12** Decide and fund the ASR vendor for exact-speech evaluation
      (OpenAI has no credits and there is no Deepgram account; options are a
      self-hosted Whisper worker on RunPod, AssemblyAI, or an OpenRouter
      audio-input model) and record the decision as a blocker on `182.C.18`
      until it is made.

### 182.C.03 Product Contract, Use Cases, and Honest Quality Promise

- [x] **182.C.03.01** Define supported modes: text-to-scene with generated cast,
      reference-to-video, exact-dialogue performance, multi-character scene,
      continuation/extension, video edit, and explicit talking-head avatar.
- [x] **182.C.03.02** Define active-person benchmark scenarios: walking,
      cooking, presenting, driving while stationary/safely staged, dancing,
      sports, working, gesturing, interacting with props, and moving through
      camera angles while speaking.
- [x] **182.C.03.03** Define out-of-scope behavior for launch: live
      impersonation, unauthorized public figures, unsafe stunts,
      invisible/off-screen dialogue represented as visible sync, and unsupported
      crowd dialogue.
- [x] **182.C.03.04** Define exact-dialogue semantics: canonical script,
      approved pronunciation, allowed disfluencies, expected language,
      word-error target, timing tolerance, and whether nonverbal vocalizations
      are permitted.
- [x] **182.C.03.05** Define “perfect delivered sync” as thresholded audiovisual
      alignment plus exact speech, correct speaker attribution, identity
      preservation, visible-mouth coverage, and absence of critical artifacts.
- [x] **182.C.03.06** Define separate quality tiers for draft, standard,
      production, and hero delivery, including candidate count and retry budget.
- [x] **182.C.03.07** Define a deterministic failure message for requests no
      currently healthy provider can satisfy; never silently downgrade an active
      scene to an avatar or exact audio to prompt-only dialogue.
- [x] **182.C.03.08** Define creator-visible limitations for side profiles,
      occlusion, very fast speech, singing, shouting, whispering, overlapping
      dialogue, extreme motion blur, masks, and tiny faces.

### 182.C.04 Architecture Decisions and Ownership

- [x] **182.C.04.01** Write an ADR naming one canonical human-video request,
      provider capability, job state, measurement, and release-proof contract.
- [x] **182.C.04.02** Decide which types belong in shared contracts versus Isis
      implementation libraries versus the Oshun BFF boundary.
- [x] **182.C.04.03** Decide whether `@isis/ai-video` or
      `@isis/ai-providers/video-generation` is the provider SDK of record and
      migrate/retire the other path without breaking consumers.
- [x] **182.C.04.04** Keep provider credentials, webhooks, downloads, and
      biometric uploads at server boundaries; prohibit browser/mobile access to
      provider secrets.
- [x] **182.C.04.05** Define ports for asset ingestion, speech production, shot
      planning, capability discovery, generation, evaluation, correction,
      encoding, provenance, and release.
- [x] **182.C.04.06** Define durable event ownership and compatibility rules for
      BFF, workers, Studio clients, Veritas, and admin tools.
- [x] **182.C.04.07** Define how direct providers, OpenRouter, Comfy/RunPod, and
      future self-hosted models implement the same capabilities without lowest-
      common-denominator payloads.
- [x] **182.C.04.08** Produce a dependency diagram and data-flow threat model
      covering every copy of face images, voice audio, intermediate clips, and
      evaluation artifacts.

### 182.C.05 Canonical Request, Response, and State Contracts

- [x] **182.C.05.01** Add a versioned `HumanVideoGenerationRequest` schema with
      tenant/project, mode, creative brief, references, cast, dialogue, audio,
      shots, controls, output, quality policy, budget, consent, and callback.
- [x] **182.C.05.02** Add typed reference roles: identity, face-angle,
      full-body, wardrobe, pose, composition, first-frame, last-frame, motion,
      performance, environment, prop, voice, and source video.
- [x] **182.C.05.03** Allow multiple references per role with priority, subject
      binding, temporal range, strength, notes, and provider-safe transformation
      metadata.
- [x] **182.C.05.04** Add cast and speaker IDs so every dialogue segment,
      reference, blocking instruction, and evaluator result binds to the correct
      person.
- [x] **182.C.05.05** Add canonical dialogue segments with exact text, locale,
      pronunciation lexicon, emotion, delivery, start constraint, overlap rule,
      and audio asset/digest.
- [x] **182.C.05.06** Add provider-neutral controls for duration, aspect,
      resolution, FPS, camera, lens, framing, shot size, motion, blocking,
      expression, gaze, gesture, pace, lighting, style, negative constraints,
      seed, and continuity.
- [x] **182.C.05.07** Add `requiredCapabilities` distinct from preferences so
      the router can fail closed instead of silently discarding native audio,
      multi-reference, multi-speaker, extension, or resolution requirements.
- [x] **182.C.05.08** Add a quality policy with metric thresholds, candidate and
      retry budgets, allowed fallback classes, human-review rules, and maximum
      spend/latency.
- [x] **182.C.05.09** Add a response contract containing durable asset URLs,
      provider/model/version, seed, timing, cost, measurements, warnings,
      candidate lineage, provenance, and release state.
- [x] **182.C.05.10** Extend the existing `GenerationJobStatus` in
      `jobs-route.ts` (queued, running, complete, failed, blocked, needs_review)
      with validating, preparing audio, planning, submitted, rendering,
      downloading, evaluating, retrying, correcting, encoding, awaiting review,
      releasable, released, cancelled, and expired; map `blocked` and
      `needs_review` onto the release decision instead of adding a parallel
      enum.
- [x] **182.C.05.11** Version schemas with forward/backward compatibility tests
      and reject unknown security- or consent-critical fields.
- [x] **182.C.05.12** Generate OpenAPI/JSON Schema/SDK types from the canonical
      source and prohibit hand-copied client types.

### 182.C.06 Reference Asset Ingestion and Validation

- [x] **182.C.06.01** Build resumable, signed image/audio/video upload sessions
      with tenant-scoped object keys, quotas, MIME sniffing, digesting, and
      idempotency. Bound to real storage 2026-09-12, and doing it fixed
      something worse than it added: the running SHA-256 lived in a module-level
      `Map` and `completeUploadSession` fell back to
      `createHash('sha256').digest('hex')` — THE DIGEST OF AN EMPTY FILE —
      whenever that Map had no entry, which is every resume after a restart and
      every completion on a second worker. `182.C.26` binds an AUTHORIZATION to
      that value. The digest is now computed at completion by READING THE STORED
      OBJECT BACK. Three operations were added too, because a session was not an
      upload: the surface answered a `nextOffset` and there was nowhere to send
      the chunk.
- [x] **182.C.06.02** Validate dimensions, duration, codecs, sample rate,
      channels, bit depth, frame rate, orientation, color profile, alpha, and
      corruption before admission.
- [x] **182.C.06.03** Strip unneeded EXIF/GPS/device metadata while retaining
      color and orientation data required for correct processing.
- [x] **182.C.06.04** Scan uploads for malware, decompression bombs, malformed
      containers, adversarial payloads, and policy-prohibited content.
- [x] **182.C.06.05** Detect faces/people and reject ambiguous identity packs
      until the creator maps each face to a cast member.
- [x] **182.C.06.06** Compute face visibility, pose/yaw/pitch/roll, blur,
      exposure, occlusion, crop, resolution, full-body visibility, and duplicate
      scores; provide actionable reference-quality feedback. All nine delivered
      on CPU 2026-09-10: ffmpeg blur/exposure, YuNet box and SQPnP pose, dHash
      duplicates, segmenter-based occlusion, and pose-landmark full-body
      visibility (the pose model is also the person detector).
- [x] **182.C.06.07** Normalize provider-bound assets to accepted formats
      without silently changing aspect, speech timing, channel alignment, or
      identity.
- [x] **182.C.06.08** Generate low-risk thumbnails/proxies separately from
      biometric originals and enforce the same authorization on both.
- [x] **182.C.06.09** Support authorized HTTPS pull with SSRF protection,
      allowlisted redirects, size/time limits, content validation, and no access
      to private network ranges.
- [x] **182.C.06.10** Record an immutable asset lineage from original through
      crop, normalization, provider upload, candidate, correction, and release.

### 182.C.07 Identity Pack and Character Continuity

- [x] **182.C.07.01** Extend the existing identity-profile contract into a
      versioned character pack with subject ID, authorized references,
      appearance traits, allowed transformations, wardrobe, voice binding, and
      consent version.
- [x] **182.C.07.02** Build guidance for a useful reference set: clean face,
      three-quarter/profile angles, full body, expression range, lighting range,
      and intended wardrobe.
- [x] **182.C.07.03** Detect mixed identities, face swaps, age mismatches, and
      severe reference contradictions before spending provider credits. Mixed
      identity (SFace pairwise, uncalibrated until `182.C.19.08`) and reference
      contradictions delivered 2026-09-10. Face swap delivered 2026-09-11 by
      identity-attribute inconsistency (a real swap fixture: the face embeds as
      A at 0.737 while the hair around it is B's), not by a manipulation
      detector, with its blind spots named. Age mismatch resolved as human
      review BY DECISION per `182.C.19.02`: estimating age from face geometry
      skews by ethnicity, so a number would be worse than none.
- [x] **182.C.07.04** Support immutable identity traits and mutable shot traits
      so camera, makeup, hairstyle, wardrobe, and scene changes are intentional.
- [x] **182.C.07.05** Bind each person to stable cast tokens and
      provider-specific reference ordering without leaking provider semantics
      into the UI.
- [x] **182.C.07.06** Integrate existing scene, shot, wardrobe, identity-drift,
      temporal-drift, and golden-output modules behind the canonical workflow.
- [x] **182.C.07.07** Define cross-shot continuity handoff using reference
      packs, seeds where meaningful, selected terminal frames, source clips, and
      shot state—not seed reuse alone.
- [x] **182.C.07.08** Support creator-approved reference updates with versioned
      invalidation, re-consent, benchmark impact, and reproducible old projects.
- [x] **182.C.07.09** Define identity-score thresholds by framing and
      visibility; do not penalize shots where a face is legitimately not
      measurable. Thresholds are per embedding model: under SFace two different
      people scored cosine 0.422, above the inherited `minIdentityCosine` of
      0.35, so the cutoff is re-fit on a measured ROC for the model that ships
      (`182.C.19.08`).

### 182.C.08 Script, Voice, and Exact Speech Preparation

- [x] **182.C.08.01** Add a script editor contract that preserves exact text,
      punctuation intent, stage directions, nonverbal sounds, speaker turns, and
      locked versus editable spans.
- [x] **182.C.08.02** Add a pronunciation lexicon supporting phonetic spelling,
      IPA/provider phonemes where available, names, acronyms, numbers,
      multilingual words, and project-level reuse.
- [x] **182.C.08.03** Support creator-uploaded speech, consented voice synthesis
      (reusing the narration executor/provider-env TTS path and its
      synthesis-disclosure gate), and provider-native voice IDs while keeping a
      single approved-audio asset as the exact timing source.
- [x] **182.C.08.04** Integrate the existing voice-consent and persona lifecycle
      stores; reject expired, revoked, scope-mismatched, or unverified voice
      use.
- [x] **182.C.08.05** Add voice preview and approval before expensive video
      generation, including word transcript, duration, pronunciation, emotion,
      pace, and locale.
- [x] **182.C.08.06** Normalize loudness, peak, silence, sample rate, channels,
      and leading/trailing padding without shifting word timing.
- [x] **182.C.08.07** Produce word- and phoneme-level alignment with confidence,
      uncertainty, pause boundaries, viseme hints, and speaker IDs.
- [x] **182.C.08.08** Split long speech only at safe phrase/breath boundaries
      and preserve sample-accurate offsets for later stitching.
- [x] **182.C.08.09** Validate script-to-audio exactness before rendering and
      require explicit creator approval for any substitution or disfluency.
- [x] **182.C.08.10** Support Ghanaian English, Akan/Twi, Ga, Ewe, and
      code-switching fixtures with names and local pronunciations; report when a
      TTS provider lacks adequate locale quality.
- [x] **182.C.08.11** Keep prompt-native dialogue as a separately labeled mode
      with mandatory post-render ASR and no exact-word promise.

### 182.C.09 Shot Planning and Performance Direction

- [x] **182.C.09.01** Build a shot-plan schema containing cast, speaker, action,
      blocking, beat timing, camera, lens, framing, gaze, expression, gesture,
      props, environment, continuity, and dialogue segments.
- [x] **182.C.09.02** Translate a creator brief into editable shots without
      changing locked dialogue or consented identities.
- [x] **182.C.09.03** Estimate speech duration before planning and prevent shot
      durations that cannot contain the approved audio plus transition handles.
- [x] **182.C.09.04** Mark visible-speech windows, off-screen speech, reaction
      shots, cutaways, overlaps, and deliberate occlusions for evaluation.
- [x] **182.C.09.05** Add blocking primitives for walking, sitting, standing,
      turning, object interaction, position marks, path, speed, and endpoint.
- [x] **182.C.09.06** Add performance primitives for emotion, intensity,
      posture, gesture frequency, eye line, attention target, conversational
      turn, breath, and pause.
- [x] **182.C.09.07** Add camera primitives for static, pan, tilt, dolly, truck,
      crane, orbit, handheld, tracking, rack focus, focal length, depth of
      field, and motion intensity.
- [x] **182.C.09.08** Add feasibility validation for contradictory actions,
      impossible timing, too-small speaking faces, unsafe activity, and provider
      limits.
- [x] **182.C.09.09** Compile provider-neutral direction into model-specific
      prompts/options and store the compilation for reproducibility.
- [x] **182.C.09.10** Provide manual shot locking so retries can change only the
      failed dimension—sync, identity, motion, framing, or artifact—without
      needlessly regenerating approved choices.

### 182.C.10 Live Provider Capability Registry

- [x] **182.C.10.01** Define a capability vocabulary covering text/image/video/
      audio inputs, first/last frames, reference counts/types, native audio,
      supplied audio, exact-script lane, multi-speaker, edit, extend, durations,
      aspect ratios, resolutions, seeds, callbacks, and provider options, and
      mark which entries the live catalog supplies (durations, resolutions,
      aspects, sizes, frame-image slots, `generate_audio`, `seed`, passthrough
      names) versus which must be derived from passthrough names, probes, or
      manual records (supplied audio, reference limits, edit, extend).
- [x] **182.C.10.02** Implement an OpenRouter model-catalog client with strict
      schema validation, ETag/cache handling, timeout, retry, and fail-closed
      behavior for required fields.
- [x] **182.C.10.03** Persist dated catalog snapshots and diffs so removed or
      changed capabilities automatically quarantine affected routes.
- [x] **182.C.10.04** Combine advertised capability with live-probe status,
      benchmark promotion, regional availability, policy status, and health;
      advertised support alone must not make a model eligible.
- [x] **182.C.10.05** Record the dated `canonical_slug` as the model version, a
      normalized pricing basis derived from the heterogeneous `pricing_skus`,
      max duration, output formats, and, as dated manual records because the
      catalog does not carry them, reference limits, data handling, retention,
      and geographic restrictions.
- [x] **182.C.10.06** Add an operator override with scope, owner, reason,
      expiry, audit log, and automatic rollback; never hide the override from
      release evidence.
- [x] **182.C.10.07** Expose a sanitized capability view to Studio for live UI
      enablement, estimates, and warnings without exposing credentials or
      internal health details.
- [x] **182.C.10.08** Test catalog additions, removals, partial fields, unknown
      options, stale caches, incompatible changes, and total outage.

### 182.C.11 Complete the OpenRouter Video Transport

- [x] **182.C.11.01** Extend the create payload with image-only
      `input_references` (the documented shape is
      `{ type: 'image_url', image_url }`) and route audio and video references
      through the `provider` passthrough object only where the selected model's
      `allowed_passthrough_parameters` name them (`audio` on Wan 2.6/2.7;
      `video`, `videos`, `images`, `last_image` on Wan 2.7); preserve cast/role
      ordering and fail closed when a required reference class has no
      passthrough on the selected model.
- [x] **182.C.11.02** Support first- and last-frame `frame_images` independently
      of general identity/scene references.
- [x] **182.C.11.03** Support `generate_audio` (it defaults to true on
      audio-capable models, so exact-audio requests must set it deliberately),
      seed, HTTPS `callback_url`, output preferences, and a `provider` object
      validated against the model's `allowed_passthrough_parameters`.
- [x] **182.C.11.04** Validate each payload against the selected live capability
      record and reject unsupported fields before provider submission.
- [x] **182.C.11.05** Preserve OpenRouter request ID, generation ID, polling
      URL, model, resolved upstream provider where available, usage, cost, and
      raw redacted status evidence.
- [x] **182.C.11.06** Implement callback/webhook receipt that verifies the
      HMAC-SHA256 `X-OpenRouter-Signature`, handles the four event types
      (`video.generation.completed`, `.failed`, `.cancelled`, `.expired`),
      tolerates null `generation_id`/`model` on early failures, and adds replay
      defense, idempotency, and poll fallback.
- [x] **182.C.11.07** Honor retry/backoff headers, bound polling, classify
      retryable versus permanent errors, treat `expired` (job exceeded its
      maximum time to live) as terminal, and support cancellation where the API
      exposes it.
- [x] **182.C.11.08** Replace base64 MP4 data URIs with streamed authenticated
      download to quarantine object storage, incremental digesting, size limits,
      and atomic promotion.
- [x] **182.C.11.09** Extend the existing ffprobe/ffmpeg measurement in
      `video-probe.ts` to reject missing, truncated, HTML/error, wrong MIME,
      silent, zero-frame, or unsupported outputs.
- [x] **182.C.11.10** Store only redacted payloads; never log API keys, signed
      reference URLs, biometric bytes, full private scripts, or provider
      download tokens.
- [x] **182.C.11.11** Add contract tests from official examples plus real,
      redacted canary fixtures for create, poll, callback, download, usage,
      failure, and timeout.
- [x] **182.C.11.12** Add integration tests proving temporary provider URLs can
      expire after durable ingestion without breaking the released asset.

### 182.C.12 Model-Specific OpenRouter Adapters

- [x] **182.C.12.01** Implement a Wan-family adapter with `alibaba/wan-2.7` as
      the primary route (first/last frame, 2–10 s; passthrough `audio`, `video`,
      `videos`, `images`, `last_image`, `ratio`, `negative_prompt`,
      `prompt_extend`) and `alibaba/wan-2.6` as the fallback (first frame only,
      5–10 s; passthrough `audio`, `shot_type`, `size`, `negative_prompt`,
      `enable_prompt_expansion`), mapping each control only where the live
      catalog names it.
- [x] **182.C.12.02** Implement a Seedance 1.5 Pro-family adapter for
      prompt-native audiovisual generation only (first/last frames, 4–12 s,
      480p–1080p; passthrough `watermark`, `req_key`), multi-character dialogue,
      camera direction, and multilingual prompts; it has no audio input on
      OpenRouter and must refuse exact-dialogue mode.
- [x] **182.C.12.03** Implement a Seedance 2.5-family adapter for what
      OpenRouter exposes (image-only `input_references`, first/last frame, 4–30
      s, 480p/720p, `generate_audio`, seed; passthrough `watermark`, `req_key`,
      `output_format`); audio/video references, edit, and extend are not
      available on this route and must go through the direct
      `@isis/seedance-provider` clients under `182.C.13.01`, with the OpenRouter
      adapter failing closed when a request needs them.
- [x] **182.C.12.04** Implement a Veo 3.1-family adapter (`google/veo-3.1`,
      `-fast`, `-lite`) for prompt-native audio, first/last frames, 4–8 s, up to
      4K, and passthrough `personGeneration`, `aspectRatio`, `negativePrompt`,
      `conditioningScale`, `enhancePrompt`; it has no audio input and must
      refuse exact-dialogue mode.
- [x] **182.C.12.05** Implement HeyGen Avatar IV as an explicitly avatar-scoped
      adapter supporting script plus passthrough `voice_id`, `voice_settings`,
      `motion_prompt`, `expressiveness`, `fit`, `remove_background`,
      `background`, `caption`, `title`, and 720p/1080p; supplied audio is not
      exposed on OpenRouter, so exact-audio requests fail closed on this route,
      and every `voice_id` must bind to an active voice-consent record.
- [x] **182.C.12.06** Ensure every adapter returns an honest `consumedControls`
      and `ignoredOptionalControls` report; required controls may never be
      ignored.
- [x] **182.C.12.07** Add golden payload tests and rejection tests per adapter,
      including unknown live-schema changes and removed model versions.
- [x] **182.C.12.08** Keep adapter selection data-driven so successor versions
      can be canaried without changing the canonical creator contract.

### 182.C.13 Direct, Fallback, and Avatar Provider Lanes

- [x] **182.C.13.01** Bring the direct fal/RunPod/Comfy video adapters and the
      existing `@isis/seedance-provider` fal, PiAPI, and Volcengine Ark clients
      under the same contract and capability registry as the direct lane for
      audio/video references, edit, and extend; remove special-case executor
      behavior.
- [ ] **182.C.13.02** (V1.2-gated per `release-scope.ts`) Wire the Veritas
      unified provider deliberately or retire it; do not leave unreachable
      HeyGen/Tavus/D-ID adapters presented as runtime capabilities. Verified
      2026-09-12: the PROHIBITION half holds. `heygen/avatar-iv` is in the live
      catalogue capture, so `HEYGEN_AVATAR_FAMILY` is a reachable adapter rather
      than an unreachable one; Tavus and D-ID appear nowhere in the human-video
      code; none of the three is named in web, admin or mobile. The VERB is
      gated: `veritas` is in `V1_DEFERRED_DOMAIN_IDS` in
      `libs/oshun/navigation/src/release-scope.ts`, so wiring or retiring it is
      a V1.2 decision and the box stays unchecked until then. `blocked:release`
- [x] **182.C.13.03** Separate active-scene, avatar, video-edit, dubbing, and
      corrective-sync capability classes so routing cannot cross them silently.
- [x] **182.C.13.04** Define provider credential/region health checks and
      deployment readiness independent of TypeScript module import success.
- [x] **182.C.13.05** Add a self-hosted-provider port for future
      audio-conditioned video models without claiming parity before inference
      and benchmarks exist.
- [x] **182.C.13.06** Record each provider's licensing, acceptable-use,
      commercial-use, biometric, public-figure, minors, retention, and deletion
      constraints.
- [x] **182.C.13.07** Prohibit a provider fallback that weakens consent,
      retention, required inputs, exact-dialogue, resolution, or quality policy.
- [x] **182.C.13.08** Add a provider kill switch that stops new submission while
      allowing safe ingestion/evaluation of already completed jobs.

### 182.C.14 Quality-, Capability-, Policy-, and Cost-Aware Routing

- [x] **182.C.14.01** Filter first by hard capabilities, consent/policy,
      geography, retention, tenant allowance, and live health.
- [x] **182.C.14.02** Rank eligible routes by benchmarked lip sync, exact
      speech, identity, motion, visual quality, locale, control adherence,
      success rate, latency, and expected total cost including retries,
      extending the Beta–Thompson release-rate router in
      `provider-quality-router.ts` to per-model, per-cohort keys rather than
      replacing it.
- [x] **182.C.14.03** Maintain separate rankings for active single-speaker,
      active multi-speaker, profile/occlusion, high-motion, talking-head,
      extension/edit, locale, resolution, and duration cohorts.
- [x] **182.C.14.04** Treat confidence intervals and sample size as routing
      data; prevent a tiny benchmark from displacing a proven model.
- [x] **182.C.14.05** Support draft/standard/production/hero policies with
      different candidate counts, evaluators, providers, budgets, and review.
- [x] **182.C.14.06** Estimate end-to-end cost before admission, including TTS,
      multiple candidates, provider retries, downloads, evaluation GPU time,
      correction, encoding, storage, and egress, using a normalizer over the
      heterogeneous catalog `pricing_skus` (per second by resolution, with or
      without audio, per mode, or per `video_tokens`) published in
      `docs/agents/model-cost-openrouter.md`.
- [x] **182.C.14.07** Re-route on capability regression, quality drift, outage,
      throttling, or budget pressure while preserving immutable request intent.
- [x] **182.C.14.08** Return a machine-readable explanation of selected route,
      rejected routes, tradeoffs, and any optional controls not available.
- [x] **182.C.14.09** Add shadow evaluation and canary weights for new models;
      never promote straight from catalog discovery to customer default.
- [x] **182.C.14.10** Test that the router never picks Avatar IV for an active-
      scene request or a prompt-only model for exact-dialogue mode.

### 182.C.15 Durable Job Orchestration

- [x] **182.C.15.01** Extend the generation job envelope with request version,
      project, shot, candidate, attempt, provider correlation, asset digests,
      policy snapshot, and idempotency key.
- [x] **182.C.15.02** Implement a durable workflow/saga for validation, consent,
      audio, planning, submission, polling/callback, download, evaluation,
      selective retry, encoding, review, and release.
- [x] **182.C.15.03** Guarantee idempotent provider submission and callback
      handling across process restart, queue redelivery, timeout, and race.
- [x] **182.C.15.04** Persist state transitions transactionally with an outbox
      so Studio and admin cannot observe impossible job sequences.
- [x] **182.C.15.05** Add cancellation semantics for queued, submitted,
      downloading, evaluating, retrying, and review states, including what
      upstream spend cannot be recovered.
- [x] **182.C.15.06** Add per-tenant/provider/model concurrency, rate, quota,
      spend, and GPU controls with fair scheduling and priority classes,
      extending `generation-budget-gate.ts` and `generation-quota-gate.ts`.
- [x] **182.C.15.07** Classify validation, consent, capability, provider,
      transport, corrupt-output, quality, safety, budget, cancellation, and
      internal failures with stable error codes.
- [x] **182.C.15.08** Add bounded retries with jitter, attempt lineage, circuit
      breakers, poison-job quarantine, and no infinite provider polling.
- [x] **182.C.15.09** Allow failed shots to resume without regenerating approved
      audio, references, or already released shots.
- [x] **182.C.15.10** Add progress events that reflect real stages and avoid
      fake percentages where provider progress is unavailable.

### 182.C.16 Media Storage, Processing, and Delivery

- [x] **182.C.16.01** Define quarantine, intermediate, candidate, approved,
      released, and deleted object namespaces with lifecycle and access rules.
      Six mutually non-prefixing key prefixes, so one prefix-scoped bucket grant
      covers exactly one namespace; transitions refuse stage-skips and digest
      changes, and nothing derives from quarantine.
- [x] **182.C.16.02** Stream uploads/downloads through bounded memory; prohibit
      base64 video payloads in jobs, databases, logs, and client responses.
      Detection sniffs container signatures from a bounded prefix rather than
      flagging long strings, so a JWT or a signature is not a false positive;
      the `log` redaction profile bounded no string length at all and now does.
      Bounded memory is proved by streaming every chunk from one reused buffer:
      a retained chunk changes the digest.
- [x] **182.C.16.03** Probe and normalize container, codec, dimensions, FPS,
      duration, time base, rotation, pixel format, color space, transfer, audio
      codec, channels, sample rate, and loudness. Untagged colour is reported as
      untagged rather than defaulted to BT.709, ffprobe's rotation sign is
      flipped once so display geometry is derived rather than inferred from
      storage, and the conform keeps tagging separate from converting. Proved by
      a round trip through real ffmpeg and a re-probe of the output.
- [x] **182.C.16.04** Preserve the untouched provider output for audit while
      deriving evaluation proxies and delivery renditions from immutable hashes.
      The master is registered once and a retry reusing its identity with
      different bytes is refused; every derivative is keyed by the master's
      digest and by a recipe digest that includes the tool version; and
      "untouched" is verified against a freshly measured digest, not the
      record's own copy of it.
- [x] **182.C.16.05** Generate thumbnails, contact sheets, scrub proxies,
      waveforms, captions, transcript overlays for review, and frame-accurate
      timecode metadata. Drop-frame and non-drop counts both implemented against
      the standard checkpoints and round-tripped; captions come from the
      approved alignment rather than from ASR of the delivered video; the
      transcript overlay is a sidecar bound to frame ranges, never burned into
      the pixels an evaluator measures.
- [x] **182.C.16.06** Implement deterministic muxing so approved speech audio
      remains sample-aligned after normalization, stitching, and transcoding.
      Verified with a click at a known sample rather than by duration
      comparison, which found a real defect: `-avoid_negative_ts make_zero`
      destroys the mp4 edit list carrying the AAC priming delay and moved the
      speech 1024 samples (21.3 ms) later. It is now a forbidden flag/value
      pair, and `-shortest` is banned because truncating drops approved speech.
- [x] **182.C.16.07** Add HLS/DASH or signed progressive delivery as
      appropriate, range requests, CDN cache controls, expiry, and tenant
      authorization. The signature covers key, tenant, audience and expiry
      together and is checked before the clock; TTLs come from the namespace
      rules rather than the caller; cache max-age is clamped to what is left of
      the signature so bytes never outlive their authorization at the edge; and
      HLS segments carry the playlist's expiry so playback cannot die halfway.
- [x] **182.C.16.08** Verify decoded duration and A/V timestamps after every
      transcode; reject drift introduced by variable frame rate or time-base
      changes. Measured: the same 29.97 source at a 1 kHz timescale becomes
      variable-rate (33/34 tick alternation) where 90 kHz gives exactly 3003
      ticks every frame, with no ffmpeg error either way. Exactness is now
      computed and asserted at conform-plan time, and the before/after check
      compares decoded counts and the A/V start offset rather than durations.
- [x] **182.C.16.09** Make deletion propagate to derivatives, provider copies
      where supported, CDN, caches, search indexes, and evaluation assets while
      retaining only allowed audit tombstones, extending
      `generated-artifact-erasure.ts`. The edge is purged before and after
      origin deletion, the tombstone is written last so a crash looks un-erased,
      a lane with no deletion API yields a retention disclosure rather than a
      claimed deletion, and the tombstone is refused if it carries inline media
      or a numeric run the shape of a face embedding. BOUND AND RUN LIVE
      2026-09-12: the plan had no adapter until now, so nothing behind it could
      remove a byte. `human-video-object-store.ts` can, and proves it — a HEAD
      cannot confirm a deletion (`HeadObject` on an absent key and on an absent
      BUCKET come back byte-identical from MinIO, `Error`/`NotFound`/404/no
      `Code`, because a HEAD has no body to parse a code out of), so the check
      is a LIST of the exact key; and a plain `DeleteObject` on a versioned
      bucket leaves every byte version behind a delete marker, measured at
      `deleted 3     version(s)`. `human-video-erasure-runner.ts` binds it to
      the database. Evidence: `evidence/2026-09-12-erasure-bound-live/`.
- [x] **182.C.16.10** Load-test large references, long clips, concurrent
      downloads, and evaluator fan-out without exhausting BFF memory or local
      disk. The constraint is temp disk and child-process memory, not the BFF
      heap: 384 MiB streamed across six concurrent downloads holds nothing
      (proved by digest, not by RSS sampling), four concurrent conforms of a 30
      s take run three at a time under a disk budget, and the fan-out is
      bounded. Admission refuses rather than queueing without bound.

### 182.C.17 Real Audiovisual Lip-Sync Evaluation Runtime

- [x] **182.C.17.01** Select and license at least two complementary sync
      evaluators—one SyncNet/LSE-class baseline and one current robust
      audiovisual alignment model—plus a human calibration protocol. The
      measured baseline candidate is SyncNet v2 (`joonson/syncnet_python`, MIT;
      `syncnet_v2.model` sha256 `961e8696…`, 13.6 M parameters), which runs on
      this CPU at about 1 s per second of video (evidence
      `2026-09-10-cpu-sync-and-alignment`). Selected with a geometric
      lip-envelope correlator as the complement — chosen to fail differently,
      since two measures sharing a blind spot are one measure. The second
      LEARNED model stays open with its blockers recorded: AV-HuBERT is CC-BY-NC
      and disqualified for a paid product, a Wav2Lip-class discriminator shares
      SyncNet's lineage. Calibration protocol in
      `docs/domains/isis/human-video/sync-evaluator-selection.md`, executable
      via `assertCalibrationDesign`.
- [x] **182.C.17.02** Implement reproducible model acquisition with pinned
      weights/digests, license record, device capability checks, and fail-loud
      startup when the evaluator is unavailable. The digest is the authority and
      the URL only a hint: bytes are hashed while streaming and renamed into
      place only on a match, which matters most for `SyncNetModel.py` because
      that artifact is code the evaluator imports. A missing or corrupt
      evaluator throws rather than letting an unmeasured take be reported as a
      measured one.
- [x] **182.C.17.03** Decode real frames and audio, detect/track faces, locate
      mouth regions, resample consistently, and preserve timestamps through the
      evaluator input pipeline. Runs against a real face fixture: 100 frames
      conformed from 30 to 25 fps with the resampling reported, a face tracked
      in all 100, mouths located from YuNet's own landmarks, MFCCs from the
      library SyncNet's reference implementation uses, and a source-time second
      on every crop. Gaps are recorded rather than skipped. Crop scale is a
      parameter awaiting calibration against SyncNet's training framing.
- [x] **182.C.17.04** Calculate per-frame/window sync confidence and offset, not
      only one clip-level LSE-C/LSE-D value. SyncNet v2 runs strictly from the
      pinned checkpoint over real crops. The case was measured: on a frozen face
      the clip-level figure read "0 ms, confidence 0.28" while per-window
      confidence was 0.032 and offsets scattered ±9. The offset arithmetic is
      proved model-independently by recovering known shifts exactly. Two
      measured caveats recorded for `182.C.17.08`: confidence has a floor set by
      the search width, and it conflates "nothing aligned" with "nothing
      moving".
- [x] **182.C.17.05** Bind speech-active windows to tracked cast members and
      score only the expected speaker while detecting false mouth motion on
      listeners. Building the fixture found two defects: normalising motion by a
      track's own median makes a constantly-moving listener invisible (the
      baseline is now its motion while nobody speaks), and a pixel-difference
      measure has a compression floor — a pixel-identical face measured up to
      8.4 units of change from h264 rate control, which the five-frame
      run-length guard exists for. Speech nobody is planned to be speaking in is
      refused rather than defaulted.
- [x] **182.C.17.06** Treat missing/tiny/occluded/profile faces as coverage
      data, not an automatic pass; apply shot-plan-aware measurability rules.
      Three verdicts rather than two — measurable, expected coverage, and
      unexpected coverage — because the same small face is a correct wide shot
      and a broken close-up. The measurability floor does not move with the
      plan; only whether falling below it was expected. Two assertions enforce
      the rule, including one that catches a caller scoring more windows than it
      could see.
- [x] **182.C.17.07** Detect global offset, local drift, intermittent desync,
      frozen mouth, excessive mouth motion during silence, and edit-boundary
      discontinuities. Six detectors, each tested against the other five's
      series, because the value of separate detectors is in their not firing on
      each other — a uniform offset and a drift want different repairs. A global
      offset needs a small spread, a drift needs the line to explain the
      variance, intermittent measures against the clip's own median, and the
      edit boundary is a real change-point search rather than a threshold on
      adjacent differences.
- [ ] **182.C.17.08** Calibrate thresholds against blinded human ratings across
      languages, skin tones, facial hair, head poses, speaking styles, motion,
      compression, and shot sizes. Blocked on the `182.C.33` rated corpus and on
      human raters — fitting thresholds to invented ratings would be the
      fabrication this phase forbids. Every threshold the evaluators use is
      already a named, exported, provisional constant with its reasoning beside
      it, so calibration is a re-fit rather than a search. Audited 2026-09-12
      and that claim was ALMOST true: `findMotionFaults` took every threshold as
      a parameter except the "is this sequence moving at all?" gate, which was
      two inline literals. It decides whether the motion checks emit anything —
      a take below it produces no findings, which reads as nothing wrong — so it
      is now `movingFlowStdDev` / `movingMeanFlow` on `MotionThresholds`, with
      the measured gap (static shot 0, smallest moving sequence 0.942) as its
      provenance and three tests pinning it. The re-fit precondition now holds.
      `blocked:corpus` `blocked:human`
- [x] **182.C.17.09** Return structured evidence with distributions, worst
      windows, annotated review frames, model/version, confidence, and failure
      reason. The distribution leads rather than the average, because a reviewer
      shown "0 ms, confidence 0.28" would have approved the take that measured
      it. Coverage is its own number, the search width is part of the
      evaluator's identity, and the failure reason is a sentence a reviewer can
      disagree with. A "passed" verdict carrying findings is refused.
- [x] **182.C.17.10** Require the evaluator to process the exact final muxed
      bytes before release; pre-transcode success is insufficient. Not
      theoretical: this phase measured a mux flag moving the audio 21.3 ms, a
      timescale turning a constant rate variable, and a re-tag changing how
      every frame is displayed — all invisible to an earlier score. The gate
      compares digests, refuses a proxy before it even compares, and needs every
      track of a multi-track release to have measured the delivery.
- [x] **182.C.17.11** Add adversarial tests where metadata says aligned but
      audio is shifted, stretched, replaced, silent, routed to the wrong
      speaker, or desynchronized only mid-clip. Six lying clips through the real
      pipeline, with the honest baseline as a control — a suite where everything
      fails proves only that the detector fires. Measured: honest speech/motion
      overlap 26 of 27 frames, shifted 0 of 27. Which pathway catches them is
      asserted rather than claimed: this fixture flickers, it does not talk, so
      the embedding has nothing to score and the speech-against-motion pathway
      is what fires.
- [x] **182.C.17.12** Benchmark evaluator throughput and schedule GPU/CPU work
      without starving render workloads; the starting point is the CPU figure
      measured 2026-09-10 (SyncNet v2 lip stream about 1 s CPU per video-second
      on 4 cores). Measured end to end: 1.70 CPU-seconds per video-second (0.59×
      realtime), linear across 10 s and 20 s clips. The concurrency curve turns
      over inside the measured range — four evaluators are worse than three, and
      three buy 24% for three times the box — so the policy is one at a time
      with three cores reserved, threads capped alongside processes.
- [x] **182.C.17.13** Decide where evaluators run for production throughput,
      from the `182.C.17.12` numbers: CPU inside the BFF worker, or a hosted GPU
      worker (RunPod through `libs/isis/runpod-surface/`/
      `runpod-comfy-client.ts`); either way keep a CPU path that produces real
      measurements for CI. This is a hosting decision, not a prerequisite:
      `182.C.17.01`–`.12` are built and probed on CPU first, and nothing in this
      section is `blocked-local` without a named failed attempt. DECIDED: CPU
      inside the BFF worker, one evaluator at a time, no GPU worker provisioned
      now — the throughput is not the long pole, a GPU would buy latency the
      pipeline cannot spend, and the scaling lever is horizontal. Three named
      reversal thresholds and the RunPod route recorded in
      `docs/domains/isis/human-video/evaluator-hosting-decision.md`.

### 182.C.18 Exact Speech, Pronunciation, and Audio Quality Evaluation

- [x] **182.C.18.01** Run independent ASR on delivered audio (extending the
      fail-loud transcriber seam in `dub-faithfulness.ts`, with the vendor
      decided at `182.C.02.12`: OpenRouter audio-input models,
      `mistralai/voxtral-small-24b-2507` primary and
      `google/gemini-3.1-flash-lite` default) and compare it with the locked
      script using word error rate, semantic substitutions, omissions,
      insertions, and speaker turns. Run the currency/number expansion in
      `dialogue.ts` before scoring; two recognizers spell spoken "forty two
      dollars" as "$42". The spec replays the real recorded transcripts from all
      three probed models and asserts each now scores zero content-word errors —
      the defect the probe surfaced. The transcriber refuses to be the
      generating model or a model from the same vendor.

- [x] **182.C.18.02** Align delivered words to approved-audio words and flag
      timing stretch, truncation, re-synthesis, unexpected dialogue, and altered
      nonverbal sounds. Word timing comes from a CTC forced aligner on CPU
      (wav2vec2 CTC, measured 2026-09-10: max 81 ms raw onset error with a
      systematic late bias; word ends about 100–140 ms early, so use onsets).
      Never from OpenRouter audio models' or Whisper's generated word
      timestamps, both measured unfit. First step: calibrate the aligner's bias
      on the committed known-onset fixture
      (`evidence/2026-09-10-cpu-sync-and-alignment/known-onset-clip-16k.wav`)
      before it gates anything.
- [x] **182.C.18.03** Evaluate pronunciation for names, acronyms, numbers,
      lexicon entries, and code-switched phrases with locale-aware confidence.
- [x] **182.C.18.04** Detect clipping, silence, low SNR, pumping, phasing,
      duplicate audio, channel inversion, excessive noise, and sample-rate/time-
      stretch artifacts.
- [x] **182.C.18.05** Verify loudness and true peak against delivery profiles
      without hiding provider speech defects through aggressive processing.
- [x] **182.C.18.06** Define exact-audio mode, exact-words mode, and creative-
      dialogue mode separately; expose the achieved mode in release proof.
- [x] **182.C.18.07** Add multilingual ASR ensembles or human review fallback
      where a single recognizer is not validated for the requested language.
- [ ] **182.C.18.08** Test fast/slow speech, whisper, shouting, laughter,
      singing, emotional delivery, background music, accent variation, and
      overlapping speech. Worked 2026-09-10 and re-verified 2026-09-12:
      `human-video-delivery-conditions.ts` expands the nine phrases to TEN
      conditions and built the FOUR that can honestly be made from a committed
      speech clip — fast, slow, background music, overlapping speech — because
      those are TRANSFORMATIONS of a signal. The other six are different
      phonation or a different speaker (whisper is unvoiced, shouting moves
      formants as well as level, laughter and singing are not speech, an accent
      is another person); filtering a normal voice into "a whisper" gives a
      quiet normal voice, and a detector tested against that has been shown the
      filter. The four found two real holes, both guarded in that module:
      time-stretch collapses the GOP to -4.99 at 1.25x on identical words, and a
      second voice 0.5 s in gives a 513.8 ms onset error while the GOP stays at
      exactly 0.0 — the aligner is given the words and will always find them
      somewhere. Measurements in `evidence/2026-09-10-delivery-conditions/`.
      Remaining six need real speakers (`182.C.33`). `blocked:corpus`

### 182.C.19 Identity, Anatomy, and Visual Integrity Evaluation

- [x] **182.C.19.01** Measure subject-specific identity similarity over visible
      frames and report temporal drift, not only best-frame similarity.
- [x] **182.C.19.02** Evaluate face shape, complexion, age presentation, hair,
      distinctive features, body proportions, wardrobe, and permitted changes
      using calibrated metrics plus human review.
- [x] **182.C.19.03** Track identity through profile turns, partial occlusion,
      camera motion, lighting changes, cuts, interactions, and multiple people.
- [x] **182.C.19.04** Detect face merging, identity swaps, duplicate people,
      flicker, sudden age/skin-tone shifts, and a speaker inheriting another
      person's mouth or voice.
- [ ] **182.C.19.05** Detect malformed teeth/tongue/lips, jaw discontinuity,
      asymmetry spikes, face boundary tearing, extra limbs/digits, fused props,
      and impossible object contact. Probed 2026-09-10: dense face-mesh
      asymmetry and lip-curvature are disqualified (the mesh scored a doubled
      mouth as more regular than the clean face), and hand-keypoint models
      cannot count digits (they emit 21 keypoints unconditionally). Candidates
      are a trained anomaly/artifact detector or a segmentation-consistency
      check; `mediapipe` is Apache-2.0, `ultralytics` is AGPL. Probed
      2026-09-12: THE SEGMENTATION-CONSISTENCY CANDIDATE IS ALSO DISQUALIFIED.
      `tools/human-video/segmentation-consistency.py` measured three metrics on
      the same three fixtures and separated nothing — the doubled mouth and the
      tear score identically, both 22% from clean. YuNet GREW its face box to
      swallow the paste (208 px against the clean 195), so a metric relative to
      the face box cannot see an artifact the detector has already accepted as
      face. Same failure as the mesh in a different instrument: every learned
      model with a facial prior rationalises the artifact instead of reporting
      it, and both instruments that run on this hardware have one. That leaves
      the trained anomaly detector, which needs `182.C.33`'s labelled examples.
      Evidence: `evidence/2026-09-12-segmentation-consistency-probe/`.
      `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.19.06** Evaluate motion smoothness, temporal consistency, optical
      flow outliers, frame duplication, freeze, judder, warping, and background
      instability.
- [x] **182.C.19.07** Evaluate camera/control adherence, action completion,
      blocking, gaze, emotion, gesture, framing, and scene/wardrobe continuity.
- [ ] **182.C.19.08** Calibrate identity and artifact thresholds by visibility,
      shot size, motion blur, and stylization rather than one universal cutoff,
      and per embedding model (SFace false accept at 0.422 against the inherited
      0.35 gate); blocked on a labelled corpus (`182.C.33`), not on hardware.
      Audited 2026-09-12 and FOUND A LIVE ONE.
      `human-video-continuity-bridge.ts` graded identity with
      `similarity >= minIdentityCosine` — a single universal cutoff, no
      condition adjustment, no check that the point was fitted for the embedding
      model in use — so the 0.422 false accept this item is named after would
      have come back `outcome: 'pass'`. It now takes a
      `FittedOperatingPoint | null` instead of a raw cosine, and answers UNKNOWN
      (keeping the assessment, so the review record is not emptied) when the
      point is absent, unfitted, or fitted for a different model; a fitted point
      is adjusted through `adjustForConditions` before it grades. Six tests. The
      re-fit itself still waits on `182.C.33`. `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.19.09** Add fairness slices for dark skin, varied lighting, facial
      hair, head coverings, makeup, glasses, age, and disability-related facial
      or motor differences. Verified 2026-09-12: all EIGHT are declared in
      `human-video-fairness-slices.ts` with assignment rules, buckets and
      provenance, and the machinery refuses what matters — an aggregate with no
      slices, and an under-powered slice called a result. The seed measurement
      (two subjects, nine exposures) found the OPPOSITE of the expected
      direction: the lighter-complexioned subject lost more complexion
      measurements, under brightening. Populating the slices needs subjects,
      which is `182.C.33`. `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.19.10** Store only necessary embeddings with encryption, tenant
      isolation, deletion linkage, access audit, and prohibited reuse for
      identification outside the creator's project.

### 182.C.20 Active-Scene and Multi-Speaker Evaluation

- [ ] **182.C.20.01** Build active-scene tests with walking, turning, hand/prop
      interaction, sitting/standing, camera tracking, foreground occlusion, and
      varied shot sizes while speaking. Verified 2026-09-12: all six conditions
      are declared in `human-video-active-scene-cases.ts`, crossed with
      `182.C.17.06`'s shot sizes rather than a second list, and the matrix
      enforces the two things that make it a test — a case whose speech window
      barely overlaps its condition window is not a test of that condition
      however it is named, and two conditions that reach the evaluator as the
      same mechanism in the same band collapse into one, loudly. Empty cells are
      listed by name rather than divided out of a coverage figure. The clips are
      `182.C.33`. `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.20.02** Measure sync and identity during motion rather than only
      cherry-picking stationary frontal frames.
- [x] **182.C.20.03** Detect whether the correct person's mouth moves for every
      dialogue segment and whether non-speakers remain naturally responsive.
- [x] **182.C.20.04** Validate conversational turn-taking, interruptions,
      overlaps, reaction beats, eyelines, and speaker-position continuity.
- [x] **182.C.20.05** Reject scenes where a speaking face is persistently hidden
      contrary to the shot plan or where cuts disguise failed sync.
- [x] **182.C.20.06** Define when off-screen dialogue is legitimate and require
      the plan/release evidence to distinguish it from unevaluable sync.
- [ ] **182.C.20.07** Add challenge cases for side/back turns, masks, hands near
      the face, eating/drinking, wind/hair occlusion, fast camera moves, low
      light, shallow focus, and compression. Verified 2026-09-12: all declared
      in `human-video-challenge-cases.ts`, each with the answer that is CORRECT
      for it — because a challenge suite whose every expected answer is "reject"
      is passed by a system that rejects everything, and looks more rigorous the
      longer it gets. For most of these the correct answer is neither pass nor
      fail but DECLINE TO SCORE, and the case checks the system reaches that
      rather than a confident one. The footage is `182.C.33`. `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.20.08** Require manual review until each active/multi-speaker
      cohort reaches its sample-size and agreement targets.

### 182.C.21 Candidate Generation, Selection, Retry, and Correction

- [x] **182.C.21.01** Generate multiple bounded candidates for production/hero
      requests and retain a shared request/shot/audio lineage.
- [x] **182.C.21.02** Rank candidates with a Pareto-aware policy so visual
      beauty cannot compensate for failed words, wrong speaker, consent, or
      critical identity/sync defects.
- [x] **182.C.21.03** Define hard gates versus soft preferences and make exact
      speech, consent, safety, and severe sync/identity failures
      non-compensable.
- [x] **182.C.21.04** Classify failures into prompt/control, provider transport,
      speech, sync, speaker attribution, identity, anatomy, motion, continuity,
      encoding, and policy categories.
- [x] **182.C.21.05** Retry selectively with changed seed, clarified prompt,
      reference ordering, shot subdivision, stronger audio/reference binding, or
      a different model based on the failure class.
- [x] **182.C.21.06** Stop retries at spend/latency limits and return the best
      unreleased diagnostics rather than silently lowering thresholds.
- [x] **182.C.21.07** Implement optional corrective lip-sync/video-edit
      providers behind an explicit fallback policy for otherwise excellent
      candidates; never make correction an invisible default.
- [x] **182.C.21.08** Re-run identity, anatomy, motion, exact-speech, sync,
      encoding, safety, and provenance gates after any correction.
- [x] **182.C.21.09** Preserve before/after candidates and record which frames
      changed so reviewers can detect identity or texture damage.
- [x] **182.C.21.10** Let creators compare takes and regenerate one shot/segment
      without invalidating unrelated approved work.

### 182.C.22 Long-Form, Multi-Shot, Edit, and Extension Workflows

- [x] **182.C.22.01** Segment long scripts by sentence, performance beat,
      provider duration limit, continuity, and safe audio boundaries.
- [x] **182.C.22.02** Maintain cast, wardrobe, props, environment, time of day,
      camera grammar, voice, and speech timing in a continuity ledger.
- [x] **182.C.22.03** Support selected terminal-frame, final-frame, reference-
      video, or extension handoff based on provider capability.
- [x] **182.C.22.04** Add edit handles and transitions without trimming
      phonemes, duplicating words, or causing A/V timestamp discontinuities.
- [x] **182.C.22.05** Reconcile provider clips with CFR/VFR, time base, color,
      resolution, grain, motion cadence, and audio ambience differences.
- [x] **182.C.22.06** Apply room tone, music, effects, and mix automation after
      dialogue approval while preserving the speech reference used for sync
      evaluation.
- [x] **182.C.22.07** Evaluate each shot, every edit boundary, and the assembled
      master; a per-shot pass must not automatically pass the sequence.
- [x] **182.C.22.08** Support extension/edit requests that lock approved frames
      and dialogue regions and clearly identify provider-side inpainting or
      regeneration scope.
- [x] **182.C.22.09** Provide shot-level resume, versioning, alternate takes,
      approvals, and rollback.
- [x] **182.C.22.10** Benchmark continuity decay and determine maximum reliable
      sequence length per route before enabling automatic long-form generation.

### 182.C.23 Studio Creator Experience

- [x] **182.C.23.01** Design a dedicated “Directed Human Video” flow distinct
      from simple text-to-video and talking-head avatar cards.
- [x] **182.C.23.02** Add drag/drop reference sets with role, cast member,
      priority, quality feedback, consent state, crop, and provider-eligibility
      indicators. Delivered 2026-09-12. The controls shipped with the region;
      the last gap was that ADDING was disabled, with the reason attached,
      because the surface had no endpoint to send a chunk to. It does now
      (`182.C.06.01`), so `uploadPort.ts` opens, chunks and completes, and the
      reference is added ONLY AFTER THE BYTES HAVE STOPPED — the digest an
      authorization binds to exists only at completion, and a row written when
      the file was chosen would name an upload that can still change under it.
      THE ANSWER IS PER FILE, NOT PER DROP: somebody drops six photographs and
      the fourth is a screenshot of an error page, and refusing the whole drop
      throws away five good uploads. A new reference's quality is NOT READ
      rather than `ok` — the bytes are stored and nothing has looked at them.
- [x] **182.C.23.03** Add script/speaker editing, pronunciation tools, voice
      selection/upload, TTS preview, word timing, and explicit audio approval.
      ALL SIX SHIP, browser-verified 2026-09-12 (chromium, 17 passed, 1
      skipped). The item was open for three different reasons on three passes,
      and each turned out to be something other than what it was recorded as.
      **Script and speaker.** `ScriptEditor` edits text and speaker, and now
      WRITES and REMOVES a line. `ProjectEdit` had no create at all — a creator
      could change a line's words and not write one — so every region past Cast
      was reachable only for a project something else had populated. Removal is
      refused for a line recorded audio speaks: the segment's own record of what
      it says would name a line nothing can find, and the check that catches a
      take speaking superseded words would have no script to compare against.
      **Pronunciation.** `PronunciationTools`, unchanged; it states that a
      respelling changes how a term is SAID and never how it is written, because
      the script is the promise the delivered-word check compares to. **Voice
      selection.** `VoiceSourceChooser` offers three routes, each with the
      consent it obliges at the moment of choosing, and a route this deployment
      cannot serve is shown DISABLED with its reason rather than hidden. The
      availability now comes from `GET /audio/voices` rather than a default that
      called everything unavailable — which was correct for a build with nothing
      bound and wrong the moment something was, in the direction that hides a
      working capability. **TTS preview.** Recorded as a spend-or-install
      decision: kokoro, misaki and espeak-ng "not installed". Two of the three
      were installed and the third is not needed — misaki carries its own G2P
      for American English — so the blocker was a measurement nobody had
      re-taken. Kokoro-82M (Apache-2.0) runs on this CPU: 1.725 s of 24 kHz mono
      PCM for "The kettle is on.", ffprobe agreeing with the script's own sample
      count, ~9 s wall per call. `tools/human-video/speech-synthesis.py` (text
      on STDIN, because a script is somebody's words and argv lands in the
      process table) and `local-kokoro-voice-provider.ts` behind the SAME
      `VoiceSynthesisClient` seam ElevenLabs and the Comfy endpoint use. A
      preview STORES NOTHING and is not a take; only the CATALOGUE route is
      served, because a cloned voice is produced after the consent ledger, the
      persona lifecycle and the clone verification are asked together and a
      preview endpoint that synthesised one would be a way around that gate; the
      duration is measured by walking the WAVE chunk table rather than believing
      the synthesiser's own count, and a disagreement refuses; `speed` is
      honoured and measured to be (3.15 s at 1.0, 3.975 s at 0.8) while
      `stability`, `style` and `useSpeakerBoost` have no Kokoro equivalent and
      are NAMED to the surface rather than absorbed. The preview omits the
      audible disclosure on purpose, so it is SHORTER than what ships, and says
      so. **Upload.** `uploadPort` opened every session as `kind: 'image'` and
      no audio control existed anywhere, so the creator-upload route was
      offered, consented, and had nothing behind it. It now sends a recording,
      and `submitAudioTake` registers it: measured 10.5 s on this CPU for a 3.15
      s clip, with real CTC onsets. The LANGUAGE is chosen from what the service
      says it can align rather than defaulted — which matters because the
      aligner took a `locale` AND PASSED IT NOWHERE: the script runs an
      English-only character CTC model, so a take submitted as Akan, Ga or Ewe
      was aligned by a model that has never seen the language and the timings
      came back looking exactly like measurements. It refuses now, before
      spawning anything, and the refusal is `hv.capability.locale_unsupported`
      rather than the `hv.internal.unhandled` 500 it first produced, which
      blamed the platform and told the client to retry forever. **Word timing.**
      `TakePreview.words` renders each timing measured-or- estimated; the
      registered take carries the aligner's own per-word `source`, and an
      unplaced word is named rather than dropped. **Explicit audio approval.**
      Reachable, and it REFUSES on this deployment — both halves matter. It was
      unreachable for a reason nothing about this surface could fix: `ETag` is
      not CORS-safelisted, so the browser discarded the tag every `If-Match`
      needs, and the read that exists so an approval survives a reload handed
      the client a header it could not see. `exposedHeaders` now names it. The
      refusal is correct: no recognizer is bound, so nothing knows what the
      bytes SAY, and for an exact-dialogue take `unknown` is as firm as a
      deviation. A SEGMENT CAN NOW EXIST BEFORE ITS TAKE, which the web model
      had always allowed for (`audioId`: "null for a segment the surface only
      knows from the draft") and the wire type and the loader did not. A planned
      segment is `unapproved`, so Direction stays blocked; it warns about
      nothing, so a new script is not a wall of warnings; and its chosen voice
      route is held locally, because it is a pre-decision and a stored one
      outlives the reason for it. `audio/plan` cuts one segment per run of
      consecutive lines by one speaker and ONLY ADDS — an existing segment is
      never re-cut, because its pointer may be the only handle on bytes somebody
      approved. KNOWN, NOT FIXED HERE: `draftReducer` refuses every seed once
      `edits > 0`, and that counter is edits EVER MADE rather than edits not yet
      saved — so after the first keystroke the service's answer can never reach
      the screen again for the life of the mount. The registration path works
      around it by remounting at the one point it has just saved the draft
      itself. The guard itself is draft-conflict machinery and wants its own
      change.
- [x] **182.C.23.04** Add storyboard/timeline controls for shots, actions,
      blocking, camera, expression, gaze, gesture, props, dialogue, and visible-
      speech windows. Delivered 2026-09-12. The controls shipped with the
      region; the gap was that Direction was BLOCKED because no audio take could
      be read, and a plan placed against a duration nobody has moves under the
      creator. `audioPort.ts` reads them now, and building it found a defect in
      the check that guards the whole idea: `spokenLines.every(...)` on an EMPTY
      array is TRUE, so a segment with no record of what its bytes say passed
      the very test that exists to catch a script edit outrunning the audio.
      "Nobody wrote down what this says" is not "this says the right thing", so
      it is a fourth reason now — `unrecorded` — and it tells the creator that
      RE-RECORDING IS NOT THE FIX, because the bytes may be perfectly good and
      something simply has to read them.
- [x] **182.C.23.05** Provide simple presets with an expandable advanced panel;
      do not expose raw provider JSON as the primary control surface. Delivered
      2026-09-11: `GET /v1/human-video/presets` (the 29th operation) serves
      `human-video-presets.ts` — five presets, six advanced settings, and the
      three settings deliberately NOT offered with their measured reasons.
      Serving it restated the item's prohibition as a rule: raw provider JSON is
      forbidden NOT BECAUSE IT IS JSON but because nothing downstream knows what
      it asked for, so a delivered take cannot be checked against it — and a
      NAMED DROPDOWN NOTHING CAN SCORE IS THE SAME FAILURE IN NICER CLOTHING.
      Every setting therefore declares the `DirectionAspect` it moves, taken
      from the ten scores in `human-video-direction-adherence.ts`, and the
      catalogue refuses to boot with a setting whose aspect is one of the three
      `JUDGEMENT_ASPECTS`. A PRESET'S AVAILABILITY IS NOT A PROPERTY OF THE
      PRESET, so no route count travels with it: `0` would be a claim made from
      a lane registry nobody read, and it disables the control. And the panel
      moved OUT of the Direction region, which is blocked until an approved
      audio duration exists — a preset is picked first, and it was invisible on
      the first screen a creator sees.
- [x] **182.C.23.06** Show current eligible routes, capability limitations,
      retention warning, expected candidate count, price range, and latency
      before submission. REACHES A CREATOR SINCE 2026-09-13, and did not before:
      the module was consumed by nothing, and so was `buildStudioLaneView`
      underneath it — `182.C.10.07`'s whole capability view had never been built
      by anything but its own spec. Both are wired through
      `POST /jobs/estimate`, which is the call `182.C.23.06`'s own note says
      eligibility is answered by and the one the Studio already makes, so the
      summary needed no second catalogue read (two reads could disagree about
      which models exist between the first price and the last). THE STUDIO VIEW
      HAD TO LEARN WHAT A JOB IS: it priced ONE `CostRequest`, so a multi-shot
      job could not be described by it at all, and the number it would have
      shown is not the number a creator pays — a per-generation minimum applies
      PER SHOT. It takes the shots now and prices them through `estimateJob`,
      the same estimator the route prices come from, so the two cannot disagree.
      The summary is NULL on this deployment with the reason beside it, because
      no route is eligible anywhere yet, and the reason distinguishes "nothing
      decided which routes could serve" from "every route was refused". Covered
      in a real browser on the live stack against the live price list, which
      also found a browser assertion that had gone stale the day the lane
      registry shipped: it looked for the word "unproven", which is what
      `provenFor` says about a route the registry never mentioned, and a
      registry that answers reports its own blockers instead. Delivered
      2026-09-11 in `human-video-pre-submission-summary.ts`. Two of the six
      cannot be stated as the word suggests: a price range over routes some of
      which cannot be priced is not a bound (`182.C.10.05`), and latency is not
      an estimate under `182.C.15.10`'s 20-run floor — one route's median is not
      a property of the set. The expected take count is the smallest of the
      three `182.C.21.01` bounds, with the binding constraint named.
- [x] **182.C.23.07** Warn about small speaking faces, excessive motion,
      conflicting references, unsupported language, insufficient duration, and
      weak identity coverage before generation. All six delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-pre-generation-warnings.ts`, each carrying the measurement
      that produced it. Two of the six are not warnings: a face under 7% of
      frame height and a take shorter than one second leave sync and identity
      NOT MEASURED rather than measured badly, so they refuse the submission
      instead of advising. Ordered by what the fix costs, not by severity.
- [x] **182.C.23.08** Show honest stage progress and allow safe cancellation,
      background completion, notification, and recovery after reload. Delivered
      2026-09-11 in `human-video-studio-session.ts` over `182.C.15.10`,
      `182.C.15.05` and `182.C.12.02`. Two findings not in any of them:
      "complete" and "ready" are different events — a notification at
      provider-complete claims gates that have not run — and an elapsed time is
      only honest anchored to the job record, because a client-side counter
      restarts at zero on reload and reads as progress. A resume carrying a new
      idempotency key is refused: a second key is a second charge. AUDITED
      2026-09-12 AND THE MODULE WAS NEVER RENDERED BY ANYTHING. Each of the four
      functions this item delivered is about what a SURFACE may show, and no
      surface called any of them: the Studio had no region that submitted a job,
      so there was no stage to show progress for, nothing to cancel, and no
      notification to send. Bound now by the `delivery` region (`182.C.36.06`),
      and binding it found the document withholding the two things this module
      computes — `stageEnteredAt`, without which the only clock a client can
      reach is the one `assertServerAnchored` refuses, and the cancel
      affordance, without which a browser must keep a second copy of
      `182.C.15.05`'s table. Both now ride the job document.
- [x] **182.C.23.09** Build a take-comparison review with synchronized playback,
      A/B view, per-metric explanation, worst-window navigation, transcript,
      frame annotations, and regenerate/correct actions. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-take-comparison.ts`. Two of the seven hide inside the word
      "synchronized": playback anchors on the shared WORD rather than the
      timestamp, because two takes of one line differ in their word timings by
      design, and an A/B needs both `182.C.21.01` comparability (same audio) and
      `182.C.17.09` evaluator comparability, which fail independently.
      Worst-window navigation takes the union of both takes.
- [x] **182.C.23.10** Require creator confirmation before accepting a warning-
      eligible take and forbid override of consent, exact-speech, critical
      safety, or severe identity/sync gates. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-acceptance.ts`. "Severe" implies a mild tier, and whether one
      exists was answered per gate: sync has a real one from ATSC IS-191 against
      ITU-R BT.1359-1, identity has none because its operating point is unfitted
      (`182.C.19.08`) and the inherited 0.35 admitted two strangers at 0.422 —
      so every identity failure is non-overridable, stricter than asked. The
      confirmation carries a digest of the exact findings screen, so an
      acceptance cannot survive a re-measurement the creator never saw.
- [x] **182.C.23.11** Support shot locking, variant naming, project history,
      reference/script/audio version changes, and invalidation preview.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-project-history.ts`. A LOCK PRESERVES
      BYTES AND NOT VERDICTS, so a preview has three outcomes and not two:
      regenerated, kept-but-void, untouched. The middle one is what a UI would
      render as "locked, fine" — the inherited-verdict failure `182.C.21.08`
      refuses. A reference change leaves the audio alone; a one-word script
      change does not, and the preview is where that gets said.
- [x] **182.C.23.12** Add export controls for aspect/rendition, clean/captioned
      master, audio stems where licensed, captions, transcript, provenance, and
      platform presets. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-export-controls.ts`. Two of the seven are gates: a rendition
      is not the thing that was gated — a scale-only downscale carries the
      verdicts while the face stays above `182.C.19.08`'s measured 64 px floor,
      and a reframe never does — and a clean master cannot be un-burned out of a
      captioned one, so with no pre-burn source it is impossible rather than
      degraded. Stems need the voice authorization to say so.
- [x] **182.C.23.13** Follow the `frontend-skill` design convention (confirm it
      resolves in the working environment or link the guidance it encodes)
      before implementation and create responsive loading/error/empty/review
      states that remain useful without color alone or fine pointer input.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 across `frontend-convention.md`, the two Lilith
      primitives, and the `/studio/isis/human-video` surface. The skill does not
      resolve here; the guidance it encodes is linked. Two corrections came out
      of building it: the four states are five — Direction before approval is
      not loading, not failed, not review and NOT empty, because an empty state
      hands over the next action and the next action is in another region — and
      the four empties are seven, the sharpest being a subject nobody has asked
      yet, which is not a wait. Chromium at 1280/768/400 px: 0 axe violations,
      no horizontal overflow, every region state carried by a word, three
      outcome shapes surviving a full colour flatten, and 15 controls found
      under the 24 px target minimum that 156 jsdom tests could not see.

### 182.C.24 Mobile and Desktop Workflow Parity

- [x] **182.C.24.01** Decide which authoring controls are full-parity on mobile
      and which use a review/approval-focused experience.
- [x] **182.C.24.02** Implement resumable background uploads, constrained-device
      previews, notification deep links, and job recovery on mobile. Delivered
      2026-09-11 in `apps/oshun/mobile/src/humanVideo/uploadRuntime.ts` and
      `src/native/humanVideoCapabilities.ts`, with the notification listener and
      the relaunch recovery started in `app/_layout.tsx` and the preview rule in
      the review screen. THE KEY IS WRITTEN BEFORE THE SESSION IS OPENED: the
      worst case is then a key with no session, which the server can resolve,
      rather than a session with no key, which nothing can — and a regenerated
      key opens a second session that holds a quota slot nobody will ever write
      to. The offset is asked for every time, because the one case where local
      progress and arrived bytes differ is the case the resume path exists for.
      `sessionType: 'background'` is what makes the transfer survive the app; a
      foreground task dies with the process and every upload then takes the
      resume path rather than the interrupted ones. Recovery READS and never
      re-submits. The preview says an approval binds to the measured original
      rather than to the downsampled copy on screen. KNOWN CALLER GAP:
      `startOrResumeUpload` has no screen calling it, because the screen that
      would is enrolment (`182.C.26`) rather than anything in §24.
- [x] **182.C.24.03** Prevent biometric reference/audio leakage through camera
      roll thumbnails, OS share sheets, logs, clipboard, and unprotected caches.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `apps/oshun/mobile/src/humanVideo/osContainment.ts` — the one layer that
      touches an OS API — with the review screen as its caller and an eslint
      rule that makes a direct call to any of the five channels an error inside
      the human-video mobile paths. The policy module decided all of this in
      June and nothing called it; "prevent" is a construction, not a convention,
      so the enforcement ships with it. AN ABSENT CAPABILITY REFUSES RATHER THAN
      NO-OPS: this build has no clipboard, sharing or media-library module, and
      a function that quietly does nothing tells the caller the copy was made
      and starts working unreviewed the day somebody installs the module. Cache
      location is chosen from the material rather than from the caller, because
      the caller is the one place that does not know that a biometric file in
      the documents directory survives the withdrawal that was supposed to end
      it. The log redacts rather than dropping the line — a log that goes quiet
      when something is identifiable goes quiet exactly when something is going
      wrong.
- [x] **182.C.24.04** Add accessible touch targets, screen-reader labels,
      captioned previews, transcript navigation, reduced motion, and external
      keyboard support. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `apps/oshun/mobile/src/humanVideo/HumanVideoReviewScreen.tsx`,
      `reviewSource.ts` and the `app/human-video-review.tsx` route; 90 tests
      under the app's own jest. THE SCREEN RENDERS FROM THE CONTROL SPEC THE
      CHECKER READS, so a control that breaks one of the six rules cannot be
      drawn without the spec saying so — `checkControls` existed and nothing
      called it. Three things the wiring found: reduced motion must not stop the
      take, because the take is the content under review (chrome only, and
      nothing autoplays either way); a measured value with no fitted operating
      point is a FOURTH outcome, since "not measurable" denies a measurement
      that happened and a pass or fail invents the threshold `182.C.19.08`
      leaves unfitted; and an unread alignment is not an empty one — both render
      as a blank caption block, and only one of them is a take whose words
      nobody could place. Every OS hand-off goes through `mayPlace`, and a
      refused surface has no control rather than a disabled one.
- [x] **182.C.24.05** Decide whether a desktop surface is in scope and which app
      hosts it (no Oshun studio desktop app exists; the candidates are
      `apps/yemaya/studio-desktop`, `apps/lilith/desktop`, and
      `apps/iris/desktop`), and if so ensure it uses the same server contracts,
      capability registry, consent, quality decisions, and release proof as web.
- [ ] **182.C.24.06** Add platform-appropriate automation for critical upload,
      author, submit, cancel, review, approve, and export flows. Worked
      2026-09-12. "Platform-appropriate" is the load-bearing word: `182.C.24.01`
      decided the phone is review-and-approval rather than authoring, so upload,
      author, submit, cancel and export are WEB flows and belong to
      `182.C.36.06`. The phone's two are review and approve. Review was
      automated on 2026-09-11; APPROVE WAS NOT — the flow asserted the Accept
      control was present and never pressed it, leaving the one act a phone
      exists for unexercised. Pressing it also had nothing to assert, because
      the screen looked identical afterwards: a decision that produces no
      visible change reads as one that did not register, and the answer to that
      on a phone is another tap, which here is a second decision about
      somebody's face. The screen now takes a `decision` prop, renders
      `hv-decided`, and spends both controls; the flow taps through and asserts
      all three; the verifier reads 13 test ids against the screen. Still
      unchecked because the web half is `182.C.36.06`. `blocked:upstream`

### 182.C.25 Public API, OpenAPI, SDK, and Events

- [x] **182.C.25.01** Add versioned endpoints for upload sessions, identity
      packs, voice/audio approval, human-video jobs, candidates, measurements,
      review, correction, release, cancellation, and deletion. Delivered
      2026-09-11: 23 endpoints declared in `human-video-api-surface.ts` and
      registered by walking that table in `human-video-api-routes.ts`, so the
      set served and the set documented cannot drift. "Versioned" is two
      versions — a document written under `schemaVersion` 1 read back through
      `/v2` is still a v1 document. Deletion returns a destruction manifest, not
      a 204. Declaring the surface also corrected `182.C.25.03`: a precondition
      guards admission and must never block a safety retraction. THE MOUNTING
      PROGRAM FINISHED 2026-09-12: the boot line now ends "answering 503 until
      bound: nothing" (`evidence/2026-09-12-fourteen-ports-bound/`). Binding the
      last of them found a FOURTEENTH nobody had counted — the route reads an
      If-Match subject before any deciding handler runs, and the runtime passed
      `decisionSubjects: null`, so all six deciding operations including
      `approve-candidate` answered 500 inside a refusal that was right and loud
      and that nobody was reading. A reader for five of them had existed since
      the review store landed, with `release` deliberately omitted because its
      own port answered 503; what was missing was anything passing it. It is
      reported as its own boot-line entry because it cuts ACROSS the ports:
      "candidates: bound" was true and was not the whole answer. One deciding
      operation stays unwired for a reason no adapter changes —
      `accept-with-warnings` is declared and has no endpoint, so nothing can
      call it.
- [x] **182.C.25.02** Add cursor pagination and authorization for projects,
      jobs, candidates, assets, and evaluations. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-list-access.ts`. Four leaks in the obvious implementation:
      filtering after paging makes the short page itself a statement about what
      was hidden, a total count is the same leak as a number, an unsigned cursor
      is an editable offset, and a signed cursor carrying its own scope is a
      capability that outlives the grant — so the scope is compared against the
      caller's present grants, never trusted. Asset scope is separate from
      project access, because listing assets is listing faces.
- [x] **182.C.25.03** Define idempotency, optimistic concurrency, request size,
      rate, quota, retry, and stable error semantics. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-api-semantics.ts`. Three of the seven are wrong in the
      obvious implementation: an idempotency key must be bound to a digest of
      the request (a retry with a changed body must not replay), the concurrency
      token must cover the EVIDENCE a decision is made on rather than the row,
      and Retry-After must follow `182.C.15.07`'s disposition rather than the
      HTTP status — a 5xx ambiguous submission must not be retried, a 429 rate
      limit must be.
- [x] **182.C.25.04** Generate SDK clients and examples for exact-audio active
      scenes, multi-reference cast, multi-speaker dialogue, polling/webhooks,
      and shot regeneration. Delivered 2026-09-11: `sdks/human-video-ts/` is
      EMITTED from `182.C.25.01`'s declared surface, and its spec regenerates
      and compares byte-identically, so adding an endpoint without regenerating
      fails a test. A deciding method takes `ifMatch` as a required TYPE
      parameter and a safety retraction takes none — proven by a deliberately
      broken example that fails to compile with "Property 'ifMatch' is missing …
      but required". All five named examples ship.
- [x] **182.C.25.05** Sign outbound webhooks, rotate secrets, prevent replay,
      retry with bounded delivery, expose delivery logs, and support endpoint
      disablement. Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-outbound-webhooks.ts`,
      reusing `studio/webhook-delivery-store.ts` for the backoff rather than
      growing a second copy. Rotation signs with both secrets and must CLOSE;
      the timestamp and event id are inside the signed material; the delivery
      log holds a digest, because "log the full event" is where `182.C.25.07`
      gets undone; and a long-failing endpoint is disabled because a lapsed host
      can be re-registered by somebody else.
- [x] **182.C.25.06** Define events for every durable
      job/review/release/deletion state with tenant, project, request, shot,
      candidate, attempt, and trace correlation. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-events.ts`. 12 of the 15 event types do NOT correspond to a
      stage transition — a reviewer approving one candidate and rejecting
      another moves no stage, and a deletion may move none at all. `attempt`
      earns its place because without it a retried render is indistinguishable
      from a duplicate delivery and gets deduped away, and the trace must be
      captured at transition time, because the outbox dispatches later and a
      relay would stamp its own.
- [x] **182.C.25.07** Redact private script/reference/audio/provider data from
      events and separate creator-safe measurement summaries from internal
      forensic evidence. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-event-redaction.ts`. THREE audiences, not two: the integrator
      a tenant pointed a webhook at is the one everybody forgets and the one an
      event stream actually has. An allowlist, because a denylist fails open.
      And a summary is BUILT rather than trimmed out of the forensic record,
      because that record is forensic in its shape — a per-window series
      reconstructs the performance whatever the paths are called.
- [x] **182.C.25.08** Add consumer-driven contract tests for Studio, mobile,
      Veritas, admin, analytics, and external SDK clients. Delivered 2026-09-11
      in `human-video-consumer-contracts.ts`, with all six declared in the spec.
      The point is not testing the provider again — it is learning what may be
      CHANGED, so a contract claiming a whole document is refused and
      `whoBreaks` names the consumers a removal affects. A contract also pins
      each field's INTERPRETATION, because a field changing meaning breaks
      consumers while every schema check stays green; and a contract can be
      unsatisfiable before any test runs, because `182.C.25.07` decides what its
      audience ever receives.

### 182.C.26 Consent, Likeness, Voice, and Impersonation Safety

- [x] **182.C.26.01** Define explicit likeness and voice authorization scopes by
      subject, tenant, project, purpose, media type, geography, duration,
      provider class, and allowed transformations, extending the existing
      voice-consent store, the `@aja/consent-management` upload-consent manager,
      and the `libs/oshun/trust-safety` policy taxonomy rather than adding a
      fourth consent model. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-likeness-authorization.ts`, which stores no consent —
      liveness is an INPUT from those three. The nine dimensions behave
      differently and an unspecified one is a REFUSAL, never a wildcard.
      Provider class is a consent dimension (by what the vendor does, not its
      name), and the transformation allowlist is the anti-impersonation control.
- [x] **182.C.26.02** Require proof/attestation at reference and voice
      enrollment, bind it to asset digests, and surface the consent version on
      every job. Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-enrolment-proof.ts`. The
      binding is the whole item: an unbound proof is not false, it is simply not
      ABOUT anything — swap the images and it still verifies. The digest covers
      the SET with the count inside it, so appending an asset does not fit, and
      adding a reference is a new enrolment. The method travels with the proof
      because a checkbox and a countersigned release are not the same evidence,
      and the consent version stamped on a job is the enrolment's, never
      today's.
- [x] **182.C.26.03** Handle third-party/public-figure likeness, parody/satire,
      political content, sexual content, fraud, harassment, and deceptive
      impersonation with jurisdiction-aware policy. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-content-policy.ts`, which holds the SHAPE of each decision
      and not the decision — every region posture ships UNSET and refuses rather
      than defaulting, because permissive is unsafe and prohibited silently
      blocks lawful work while looking responsible. Three of the seven are not
      jurisdictional at all. Public-figure protection varies in BOTH directions,
      so there is no safe default. And the jurisdiction is three places: the
      tenant, the audience, and the subject — the one most often left out.
- [x] **182.C.26.04** Add stricter minor safeguards, guardian authorization,
      age-uncertainty escalation, prohibited scenarios, retention, and access.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-minor-safeguards.ts`. There is no age
      detector and there will not be one — `182.C.19.02` declined a geometric
      estimator because it skews by ethnicity, so its errors would fall on
      particular children. The system therefore behaves correctly WITHOUT an
      answer: `uncertain` is its own band and resolves strict, because the two
      errors are not comparable. Guardian authorization is the only
      authorization, the minor's assent is separately required, and prohibited
      scenarios have no review path.
- [x] **182.C.26.05** Make consent revocation stop new work immediately, cancel
      eligible in-flight jobs, block unreleased candidates, and trigger scoped
      deletion/takedown workflows. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-revocation.ts`. The four reach different distances and only
      new work stops without caveat: cancelling in flight stops the RESULT, not
      the vendor's processing, because `182.C.15.05` found no cancel endpoint;
      and an already-released take needs a takedown, which links handed out and
      cached copies put outside this system's reach. Nothing may be reported
      complete while copies remain — that ends the conversation with the one
      person entitled to know otherwise. AUDITED 2026-09-12 AGAINST A REAL GRANT
      AND THE ONE ACT THIS ITEM NAMES DID NOT WORK.
      `POST /authorizations/:id/withdrawal` answered 404 for every LIVE
      authorization — "no authorization with that identifier is reachable from
      this workspace" — because `withdrawConsent` opened by calling
      `revocationFor`, which returns a `Revocation`, and a `Revocation` exists
      only once `revokedAt` is set. NOTHING IN THIS SERVICE EVER SET IT: the
      delegate was bound with `findUnique` and `findMany` only, and no code path
      wrote a withdrawal. So the endpoint could only answer for a permission
      that had already been taken back, which nothing could produce — and
      somebody trying to stop the use of a person's likeness was told the
      permission did not exist. Everything below it was built and correct:
      `stopWork`, the draft redaction, the destruction plan, the manifest. The
      write was the missing piece and the reach machinery is why it was hard to
      see. The spec had presumed the bug away: its `revocationInputs` double
      answered a revocation whose `revokedAt` was already stamped, so 27 tests
      ran against a state production could never reach. The double now starts
      LIVE and `withdraw` is what changes it. `withdraw` is on the revocations
      port and the authorization store, the handler records before it reports (a
      notice about a withdrawal that was not recorded describes something that
      did not happen), an absent `projectIds` takes the WHOLE permission because
      "all" and "none" are the two readings and only one is safe to assume, and
      a second withdrawal answers the one already recorded rather than
      restamping the moment somebody took their permission back. Measured live:
      the withdrawal answers 200 with a manifest naming the reference image it
      destroyed, and the next submission is refused `hv.consent.missing`. Five
      store tests, and the delegate now requires all four methods — `create` had
      been in use by `grant` since enrolment shipped and was not in the required
      list, which is the same rule `delegateWith` states about itself. AND A
      PERMISSION THAT CAN ONLY BE ENDED WITH `curl` IS NOT ONE A CREATOR CAN
      END. With the write in place the endpoint worked and nothing called it,
      which is the same client/surface drift that hid the Delivery region.
      `consentPort.ts` reads where each cast member stands and
      `CastConsentPanel` renders it in the Cast region — which had shown consent
      as `unknown` on EVERY project ever opened, because nothing on this surface
      read one. The standing comes from the INVITATIONS, not the authorizations:
      the creator's surface has no listing of those, and an invitation carries
      `authorizationId` once answered, which is the one fact a withdrawal needs.
      An answered invitation that names no authorization is DROPPED rather than
      shown as granted — it would offer a control that does nothing. "Asked" is
      rendered as a wait on us and never as a state the subject is in, and a
      lapsed ask is kept apart from a refusal: our clock running out is not
      their no. Ending one takes two presses and the second says what it does
      rather than "are you sure", because it destroys photographs. What comes
      back is the manifest — what was destroyed, what could not be reached, what
      is still running on a provider, what needs a takedown — and only the
      service's own `complete: true` is read as complete. Covered in a real
      browser: the panel shows the permission, the consequence appears before
      the control can be pressed, the account comes back complete, and a
      submission afterwards is refused `hv.consent.missing`. 10 port tests, 11
      panel tests.
- [x] **182.C.26.06** Prevent voice/face packs from being shared across tenants,
      projects, purposes, or collaborators beyond their granted scope. Delivered
      2026-09-11 in `human-video-pack-isolation.ts`. The four boundaries leak in
      different places: project leaks through COPYING (afterwards every
      read-time check passes), tenant leaks through the derived EMBEDDING, a
      collaborator's grant does not end when they do, and purpose has no
      technical edge at all — so it is re-checked against the authorization on
      every use. A share is derived from the authorization rather than recorded
      on the pack, because the pack is not the authority on who may see a
      person's face.
- [x] **182.C.26.07** Run image, audio, prompt, script, and produced-video
      safety checks at the appropriate stages; post-generation safety is
      mandatory. Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-safety-stages.ts`. The
      mandatory clause is there because every pre-generation check is a check on
      an INPUT and the output is not a function of the inputs alone — so the
      refusal explicitly rejects "but the inputs passed". Two surfaces cannot be
      checked where people put the check: an image screened after enrolment has
      already been stored, embedded and sent onward. And a not-run recorded as a
      pass is how an unscreened video ships with a green tick beside it.
- [x] **182.C.26.08** Add step-up authentication and human review for high-risk
      likeness, political, financial, medical, legal, or mass-distribution use.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-step-up-review.ts`. The two controls
      answer different questions — step-up defends against a compromised
      session, review against the legitimate account holder — and most abuse of
      a likeness system is the second, so a strong login never substitutes for a
      review. Risk is a property of the COMBINATION: a political script is not
      high risk until a real person is made to carry it. Mass distribution gates
      RELEASE, because reach is not knowable at submission.
- [x] **182.C.26.09** Maintain appeal, takedown, abuse-report, incident,
      evidence-preservation, and subject-notification workflows. Delivered
      2026-09-11 in `human-video-appeals.ts`. Every one is started by somebody
      who is not the tenant, and a takedown route behind a login is one the
      depicted person cannot use — they were never the customer. Preservation
      and deletion pull opposite ways and both are right, so a hold names exact
      artefacts with an expiry: "preserve everything relating to this incident"
      turns a report of misuse into a reason to retain the misused likeness. And
      notifying the subject is a recorded decision either way, because it is
      usually right and occasionally a disclosure of the reporter.
- [x] **182.C.26.10** Test consent expiry/revocation races, collaborator
      removal, job retry after revocation, provider fallback, derived assets,
      and cached release URLs. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-consent-races.spec.ts` — 17 tests across all six, because
      each is a question about how `26.01`, `26.02`, `26.05` and `26.06`
      interact and the failures live in the seams. Two have no clean answer and
      the tests say so: a provider fallback can land in a class the subject
      never agreed to (routing does not know, because provider class is a
      consent dimension), and cached URLs outlive a revocation by design —
      `182.C.16.07` bounds that exposure and does not end it.

### 182.C.27 Privacy, Security, and Provider Data Governance

- [x] **182.C.27.01** Classify face images, face embeddings, voice recordings,
      voice embeddings, scripts, videos, and evaluator artifacts; assign minimum
      retention and legal basis. Delivered 2026-09-11 in
      `human-video-data-classes.ts`. An embedding's risk GROWS while a script's
      does not, so retention is not one policy and a derivative may never
      outlive its source. Minimum and maximum retention can be UNSATISFIABLE —
      written by different people for different reasons — and that is refused
      rather than silently resolved. The legal basis decides what a withdrawal
      does, per class. And the evaluator artifact is classified biometric,
      because it is a face stored under a name that does not sound like one.
- [x] **182.C.27.02** Document OpenRouter asynchronous-video retention and
      non-ZDR status in policy, UI, tenant controls, and routing decisions,
      including that a ZDR-enforced account receives no video routing at all, so
      a tenant requiring ZDR is ineligible for every OpenRouter lane. Delivered
      2026-09-11 in `human-video-zdr-posture.ts`. The four surfaces fail
      differently: the UI failure is that the control and its consequence live
      in different screens, so the cost is computed BEFORE the toggle; the
      tenant-control failure is that enabling ZDR does not un-send what was
      already sent; and an empty route list without an explanation reads as a
      bug, which is how the setting gets turned off to make the product work.
- [x] **182.C.27.03** Encrypt all biometric/source media in transit and at rest
      with tenant isolation, scoped signed URLs, short TTLs, and key rotation.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-key-custody.ts`, composing
      `182.C.16.03`'s namespace TTLs, `182.C.16.07`'s signed URLs and
      `182.C.19.10`'s per-tenant AES-256-GCM rather than duplicating them. The
      new part is rotation: keeping the old key so old data still opens is an
      ACCUMULATION, not a rotation, so completion is computed from whether any
      DEK still wraps under it. A compromise rotation may not re-wrap lazily —
      the record nobody touches is the one an attacker has time for — and a
      per-tenant estate cannot be reported as globally rotated.
- [x] **182.C.27.04** Prohibit provider access to permanent object URLs; issue
      single-purpose expiring references where remote pull is unavoidable.
      Delivered 2026-09-11 in `human-video-provider-references.ts`. The
      dangerous URL is not the permanent one — nobody ships that deliberately —
      it is the one with a generous TTL because nobody knew how long the
      provider would take, which is a permanent URL measured in hours. So the
      expiry is DERIVED from the job's own deadline, one reference names one
      asset for one job, and the module states plainly that a TTL bounds what
      can be FETCHED and is not a retention control, however much it reads like
      one.
- [x] **182.C.27.05** Add least-privilege service identities for ingest, render,
      evaluation, review, delivery, and deletion with access auditing.
- [x] **182.C.27.06** Threat-model SSRF, webhook spoofing, IDOR, signed-URL
      leak, queue tampering, prompt/reference injection, malicious containers,
      biometric exfiltration, and model output poisoning. Delivered 2026-09-11
      in `human-video-threat-model.ts`. Five are prevented and cite the item
      that does it; the three useful rows are the others — a signed-URL leak is
      BOUNDED by the TTL rather than prevented by entropy, prompt injection is
      DETECTED afterwards because no validator separates a photo from a photo
      plus a payload, and model output poisoning is UNMITIGATED because the
      output is the product and a subtly wrong video is a video. That last one
      must be acknowledged at release, not resolved.
- [x] **182.C.27.07** Add data residency and provider allow/deny controls for
      regulated or enterprise tenants; fail closed when no compliant route
      exists.
- [x] **182.C.27.08** Verify provider deletion/export capabilities and record
      unavoidable retention gaps in the job's consent and release evidence.
- [x] **182.C.27.09** Add subject-access/export/deletion workflows that resolve
      originals, derivatives, embeddings, provider IDs, released assets, and
      audit exceptions.
- [x] **182.C.27.10** Run application, media-parser, object-storage, webhook,
      and authorization security testing before public release.

### 182.C.28 Provenance, Disclosure, Watermarking, and Release Proof

- [x] **182.C.28.01** Extend video C2PA/provenance to cover source references,
      approved script/audio digests, provider/model/version, seed, edits,
      evaluation, human approval, and final encoded bytes.
- [x] **182.C.28.02** Apply visible and/or imperceptible synthetic-media
      disclosure according to policy, geography, tenant, distribution channel,
      and provider watermark terms.
- [x] **182.C.28.03** Verify provenance survives supported transcodes and expose
      a verifier result alongside each downloadable rendition.
- [x] **182.C.28.04** Produce a canonical release proof binding exact final
      asset digest to consent, safety, speech, sync, identity, visual, encoding,
      provenance, and review decisions, extending `ProofRecordSchema` in
      `libs/contracts/src/common/proof-types.ts` and the nine named gates in
      `release-proof.test-fixtures.ts` rather than defining a second proof
      record.
- [x] **182.C.28.05** Fail closed if required measurements, evaluator versions,
      consent evidence, provider lineage, or final-byte digests are missing.
- [x] **182.C.28.06** Distinguish native one-pass generation, provider edit,
      corrective lip sync, audio replacement, manual edit, and re-encode in
      creator-visible history.
- [x] **182.C.28.07** Prevent a candidate or pre-transcode URL from being shared
      as a released artifact before the final gate passes.
- [x] **182.C.28.08** Add provenance and disclosure regression tests against
      trim, concat, mux, transcode, caption burn-in, thumbnail, and CDN
      delivery.

### 182.C.29 Admin, Review, and Operations Console

- [x] **182.C.29.01** Add a provider/model dashboard for live capabilities,
      probes, health, queue, latency, failure classes, cost, quality, drift,
      retention, and promotion state.
- [x] **182.C.29.02** Add a privacy-safe review queue with final video, approved
      audio/script, cast mapping, metric failures, worst windows, lineage, and
      bounded approve/reject/escalate actions.
- [x] **182.C.29.03** Require reason codes, reviewer identity, separation of
      duties where needed, audit log, and expiry for any allowed quality waiver.
- [x] **182.C.29.04** Prevent reviewers from downloading biometric originals or
      provider payloads unless their role and case explicitly require it.
- [x] **182.C.29.05** Add tools to quarantine a model/version, cancel queued
      work, reroute jobs, invalidate releases, process takedowns, and re-run
      evaluation.
- [x] **182.C.29.06** Add cohort drill-down for language, accent, skin tone,
      lighting, framing, motion, speaker count, provider, model, and app
      surface.
- [x] **182.C.29.07** Add audit-safe redaction/export for support and provider
      escalation without exposing unrelated tenant or subject data.
- [x] **182.C.29.08** Follow the `frontend-skill` design convention (same caveat
      as `182.C.23.13`) and add thorough Playwright, accessibility, and
      authorization coverage before enabling admin mutations. Delivered
      2026-09-11: `apps/oshun/admin/src/app/isis/human-video/page.tsx` with its
      panel and port, 16 unit tests, and 5 Playwright tests passing against a
      real admin server — including the axe scan and the refusal an operator
      without the workspace scope gets. THE MUTATIONS ARE PRESENT AND REFUSED,
      which is what the item asks: quarantine, cancel and invalidate name what
      is missing rather than doing nothing quietly. §29 had built the queue and
      the reviewer-access rule and left neither reachable, so `GET /reviews` was
      added — it carries the access decision PER ARTIFACT, taken from the
      caller's scopes, because a role a client could name is a role a client
      could claim; the reference comes back refused with its sentence unless the
      role AND an open case both require it, and the URL never travels beside a
      refusal. The browser caught what jsdom could not: the panel's first
      colours measured 2.47:1 on the admin's dark canvas.

### 182.C.30 Observability, SLOs, and Cost Accounting

- [x] **182.C.30.01** Trace upload, preprocessing, TTS, planning, routing,
      provider submission, callback/poll, download, evaluation, retry,
      correction, encoding, review, and release with shared correlation IDs.
- [x] **182.C.30.02** Measure success and latency per stage plus end-to-end p50,
      p95, and p99 by provider/model/mode/duration/resolution/locale.
- [x] **182.C.30.03** Measure first-pass and eventual pass rate for sync, exact
      speech, identity, visual integrity, safety, and release.
- [x] **182.C.30.04** Measure retry amplification, corrected-share,
      manual-review rate, false accept/reject estimates, cancellation, orphan
      jobs, and stale callbacks.
- [x] **182.C.30.05** Attribute actual provider, TTS, evaluation compute,
      correction, transcode, storage, egress, refund, and wasted-candidate cost
      to tenant/project/job/shot.
- [x] **182.C.30.06** Alert on quality drift, missing audio, ASR mismatch,
      identity regression, provider schema change, spend anomaly, queue age,
      callback failure, evaluator outage, and unreleased public URL exposure.
- [x] **182.C.30.07** Keep metric labels bounded and logs redacted; use digests
      and opaque IDs instead of scripts, names, signed URLs, or biometric paths.
- [x] **182.C.30.08** Define SLOs/error budgets and automated route quarantine
      or feature rollback when customer-impact thresholds are crossed.

### 182.C.31 V1 Convergence and Legacy Hardening

- [x] **182.C.31.01** Update V1 persona/avatar/voice documentation with the
      Phase 182 architecture, honest delivery guarantee, active-scene lane, and
      exact-dialogue behavior.
- [x] **182.C.31.02** Replace V1 “provider-gated” ambiguity with links to
      canonical contracts, tracker status, verified route evidence, and explicit
      gaps.
- [x] **182.C.31.03** Integrate the phoneme/viseme mapping only as optional
      timing metadata for compatible engines; do not count it as rendered
      lip-sync.
- [x] **182.C.31.04** Turn MuseTalk/portrait plan modules into real adapter-
      executed pipelines with measured artifacts, or mark/deprecate them as
      planning-only.
- [x] **182.C.31.05** Make portrait quality metrics execute pinned evaluators on
      actual media instead of trusting externally supplied LSE values.
- [x] **182.C.31.06** Harden the Psyche avatar engine with real entry point,
      weights, licenses, dependencies, failure checks, inference tests, and
      benchmark evidence—or retire it from capability claims.
- [ ] **182.C.31.07** (V1.2-gated per `release-scope.ts`) Consolidate Veritas
      avatar/video providers behind the canonical provider port and remove blank
      defaults, dead routes, and stale API assumptions. Verified 2026-09-12,
      same shape as `182.C.13.02`: the VERB is gated (`veritas` is deferred, and
      the BFF middleware blocks `/veritas/...`), and the prohibition is enforced
      from the human-video side by `human-video-avatar-boundary.spec.ts` — six
      tests, all passing, holding the registry to exactly one avatar route that
      goes through OpenRouter and is reachable.
      `libs/veritas/video-production`'s Tavus client refuses without a key
      rather than defaulting to a blank one, and nothing outside that library
      imports it. The consolidation question that IS open — two D-ID clients,
      one of them called by nothing — is recorded in that spec's header as a
      Veritas decision this phase does not answer from the outside.
      `blocked:release`
- [x] **182.C.31.08** Add migration adapters for existing saved cards/jobs and a
      deprecation window for the single `referenceImage` contract.
- [x] **182.C.31.09** Ensure old text-to-video and image-to-video flows continue
      working while clearly lacking exact-dialogue guarantees unless upgraded.

### 182.C.32 Self-Hosted and Corrective Model Research Track

- [x] **182.C.32.01** Define a reproducible benchmark harness before selecting a
      self-hosted native audiovisual or corrective lip-sync model.
- [x] **182.C.32.02** Review model and weight licenses for commercial use,
      redistribution, biometric restrictions, training-data restrictions, and
      acceptable-use compatibility.
- [ ] **182.C.32.03** Package candidates with pinned weights, digests,
      container, GPU requirements, deterministic fixture, health/readiness,
      metrics, and fail-loud behavior. Verified 2026-09-12: there is no
      candidate to package. `human-video-selfhosted-port.ts` reports
      `no-implementation` — the port for a self-hosted model that renders to a
      creator's approved SPEECH has no adapter, and `ComfyVideoProvider` is not
      one (grepped 2026-09-10: no audio parameter anywhere). The packaging
      DISCIPLINE this item asks for already exists and is exercised on the
      evaluator weights: `human-video-model-acquisition.ts` pins a digest,
      treats the URL as a hint and the hash as the authority, discards on
      mismatch rather than installing, allow-lists the fetch host before any
      request, checks device capability against the registration, and fails
      closed on a missing evaluator rather than skipping the score. Applying it
      to a generator candidate needs a generator candidate, which needs a GPU
      (`uname -a` → dev-server, 4 cores, no GPU).
- [ ] **182.C.32.04** Benchmark active full-frame performance, not only cropped
      frontal talking heads, across profile, occlusion, motion, resolution, and
      speaker-count cohorts. Verified 2026-09-12: the harness is `182.C.32.01`
      and is done; the cohorts are `182.C.20.01`'s matrix and is built. What is
      missing is both inputs at once — a candidate model to benchmark (see
      `182.C.32.03`, none exists) and the footage to benchmark it on
      (`182.C.33`). Two blockers, neither of them this item's own.
      `blocked:upstream` `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.32.05** Measure identity/anatomy damage from corrective models and
      require all final gates after correction.
- [ ] **182.C.32.06** Add secure RunPod/Comfy or sovereign GPU deployment with
      signed asset access, ephemeral workspace, wipe verification, queue limits,
      observability, and no bundled private references. Verified 2026-09-12:
      hardware-blocked, and the route is already chosen and written down in
      `docs/domains/isis/human-video/evaluator-hosting-decision.md` with three
      named reversal thresholds (`182.C.32.05`, checked). Standing the
      deployment up and verifying a wipe both need the GPU host itself; nothing
      about it can be honestly measured from a box with no GPU, and claiming a
      wipe was verified without running one is the fabrication this phase
      forbids. Re-read 2026-09-18 under the install-before-you-park rule: "needs
      the GPU host itself" is not a blocker this project lacks — the Isis track
      rents RunPod GPUs on demand (`infra/runpod/endpoints/desired-state.json`,
      the spend rules of `ISIS_CHROMA_RUNPOD_MVP_TODOS_2026-09-11.md`). This
      item is actionable on a bounded RunPod pod: stand the deployment up, run
      one wipe and verify it from outside the workspace, tear it down, and
      record the measured cost. Ask before spending, as that tracker does.
- [x] **182.C.32.07** Compare self-hosted total cost, latency, reliability,
      engineering load, privacy, and quality to OpenRouter/direct routes before
      production promotion.
- [x] **182.C.32.08** Keep experimental routes hidden or allowlisted until live
      artifacts meet the same release thresholds as commercial providers.

### 182.C.33 Evaluation Corpus and Ground Truth

- [ ] **182.C.33.01** Create a consented, licensed internal corpus with
      reference packs, exact scripts, clean audio, shot plans, identity labels,
      speaker tracks, mouth visibility, and human quality ratings. Verified
      2026-09-12: blocked on CONSENTED SUBJECTS, which is not a thing code can
      produce — synthesising faces to fill it would be the fabrication this
      phase forbids, and a corpus of people who did not agree is the harm it
      exists to prevent. Everything downstream of it is built and waiting:
      `182.C.33.08`'s splits refuse a subject or scenario that leaks across
      calibration and validation, and the seven items that name this one as
      their blocker (17.08, 19.05, 19.08, 19.09, 20.01, 20.07, 32.04) each have
      their machinery in place. `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.33.02** Balance the corpus across gender presentation, age,
      complexion/skin tone, facial structure, hair/facial hair, glasses, head
      coverings, disability, body type, wardrobe, and lighting. Verified
      2026-09-12: blocked on CONSENTED SUBJECTS, which is not a thing code can
      produce — synthesising faces to fill it would be the fabrication this
      phase forbids, and a corpus of people who did not agree is the harm it
      exists to prevent. The buckets to balance INTO are declared:
      `human-video-fairness-slices.ts` carries all eight slices with their
      assignment rules, and refuses an aggregate that carries no slices.
      `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.33.03** Include English, Ghanaian English, Akan/Twi, Ga, Ewe,
      multilingual and code-switched speech, local names, numbers, acronyms,
      emotional styles, and pace variation. Verified 2026-09-12: blocked on
      CONSENTED SUBJECTS, which is not a thing code can produce — synthesising
      faces to fill it would be the fabrication this phase forbids, and a corpus
      of people who did not agree is the harm it exists to prevent. The locale
      machinery is built and the two conditions that CAN be made from a signal —
      pace variation, overlapping speech — were measured in `182.C.18.08` and
      found two real holes. Accent and language need speakers. `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.33.04** Include frontal, three-quarter, profile, back-turn,
      occlusion, face-size, focus, compression, low-light, motion-blur, and
      fast-camera cohorts. Verified 2026-09-12: blocked on CONSENTED SUBJECTS,
      which is not a thing code can produce — synthesising faces to fill it
      would be the fabrication this phase forbids, and a corpus of people who
      did not agree is the harm it exists to prevent. The cohorts exist as
      declarations in `human-video-challenge-cases.ts`, each carrying the answer
      that is correct for it — and for most of these that answer is DECLINE TO
      SCORE rather than pass or fail. `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.33.05** Include stationary, walking, sitting/standing, gesturing,
      cooking, prop interaction, dancing/sports-like motion, and multi-character
      conversational scenarios. Verified 2026-09-12: blocked on CONSENTED
      SUBJECTS, which is not a thing code can produce — synthesising faces to
      fill it would be the fabrication this phase forbids, and a corpus of
      people who did not agree is the harm it exists to prevent.
      `human-video-active-scene-cases.ts` holds the matrix these clips fill, and
      already refuses a case whose speech window barely overlaps its condition
      window — which is how a walking clip that walks, stops, then speaks fills
      a cell without testing anything. `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.33.06** Create synthetic negative fixtures with known offsets,
      drift, dropped/inserted words, wrong speaker, silent mouth, mouth-on-
      silence, identity swap, time stretch, and damaged edit boundary.
- [x] **182.C.33.07** Define blinded multi-rater human protocols for sync,
      intelligibility, exactness, identity, naturalness, control adherence, and
      overall releasability with inter-rater agreement.
- [x] **182.C.33.08** Split corpus by subject and scenario to prevent identity
      or prompt leakage between calibration, validation, and held-out release
      gates.
- [x] **182.C.33.09** Version dataset, consent, labels, evaluator outputs, and
      allowed uses; remove revoked subjects and invalidate dependent baselines.
- [x] **182.C.33.10** Maintain a small public/licensable smoke corpus and a
      protected full corpus so CI can test contracts without exposing
      biometrics.

### 182.C.34 Model Bakeoff and Promotion Benchmarks

- [x] **182.C.34.01** Run the same canonical requests through Wan, Seedance,
      Veo, HeyGen avatar, direct providers, and eligible successors without
      provider-favoring prompt changes.
- [x] **182.C.34.02** Compare native supplied-audio, generated-dialogue, avatar,
      edit/extension, and corrective lanes separately.
- [x] **182.C.34.03** Record exact speech, sync, speaker attribution, identity,
      anatomy, motion, control adherence, visual quality, first-pass/eventual
      pass, latency, cost, and evaluator coverage.
- [x] **182.C.34.04** Publish confidence intervals, cohort sizes, failure
      examples, human agreement, and known evaluator blind spots—not only
      aggregate ranks.
- [x] **182.C.34.05** Test every advertised duration, aspect, resolution,
      reference class, audio mode, and important provider option actually used
      by routing.
- [x] **182.C.34.06** Repeat benchmarks across at least three time windows to
      detect provider/model drift and non-deterministic outages.
- [x] **182.C.34.07** Define minimum sample size and promotion gates for each
      routing cohort and quality tier.
- [x] **182.C.34.08** Archive redacted payloads, exact output digests, evaluator
      versions, cost, catalog snapshot, and review decisions for
      reproducibility.
- [x] **182.C.34.09** Re-run a bounded benchmark on provider/model/schema change
      and automatically demote routes that regress beyond tolerance.
- [x] **182.C.34.10** Use benchmark evidence to choose defaults; do not enshrine
      the 2026-09-09 snapshot as architecture.

### 182.C.35 Unit, Contract, and Component Verification

- [x] **182.C.35.01** Add schema tests for valid/invalid references, cast,
      speakers, exact audio, controls, quality policies, consent, and outputs.
- [x] **182.C.35.02** Add provider payload golden tests for every supported
      model and ensure unsupported required controls fail before network calls.
- [x] **182.C.35.03** Add router tests for capability, policy, health, quality,
      locale, retention, cost, fallback, canary, quarantine, and no-silent-
      downgrade invariants.
- [x] **182.C.35.04** Add job-state property tests for idempotency, duplicate
      callback, out-of-order event, retry, restart, cancel, timeout, and resume.
- [x] **182.C.35.05** Add upload/storage tests for MIME deception, corruption,
      range, expiry, cross-tenant access, deletion, and large streamed media.
- [x] **182.C.35.06** Add evaluator tests with precisely shifted/stretched
      audio, wrong speaker, face loss, identity swap, VFR, and re-encode
      fixtures.
- [x] **182.C.35.07** Add release-gate tests proving that no missing, failed, or
      waived hard-gate measurement can produce a releasable URL.
- [x] **182.C.35.08** Add consent/security tests for expiry, revocation,
      provider reroute, collaborator removal, subject deletion, and webhook
      replay.
- [x] **182.C.35.09** Add deterministic media-processing tests for duration,
      timestamp, concat, mux, loudness, captions, renditions, and provenance.
- [x] **182.C.35.10** Run targeted lint, typecheck, tests, and builds for every
      affected package before checking this stage.

### 182.C.36 Integration, End-to-End, and Failure-Injection Verification

- [x] **182.C.36.01** Build a hermetic fake-provider server for create, poll,
      callback, authenticated download, usage, errors, expiry, throttling, and
      malformed media.
- [x] **182.C.36.02** Test the full exact-audio active-person flow from upload
      and consent through real byte evaluation, release proof, and download.
- [x] **182.C.36.03** Test multi-reference, multi-character, long-form, edit,
      extension, avatar, and optional correction flows independently.
- [x] **182.C.36.04** Inject worker crash, DB restart, queue redelivery,
      callback/poll race, provider timeout, expired download, object-store
      outage, evaluator outage, transcode failure, and review delay.
- [x] **182.C.36.05** Prove failover never resubmits an expensive job twice or
      releases a stale/unmeasured candidate.
- [ ] **182.C.36.06** Add Playwright coverage for web authoring, consent,
      reference feedback, audio approval, estimate, submit, cancel, resume, take
      comparison, failure, review, release, and deletion. Worked 2026-09-12.
      Authoring and consent display are covered by `human-video-studio.spec.ts`
      — re-run today in a real browser, 11 passed and 1 skipped. THE BLOCKER
      FOUND WAS IN THE HARNESS, not the surface: the e2e BFF sets
      `OSHUN_V1_DATABASE_URL` and none of the human-video env, and every listing
      in that surface refuses outright without a cursor-signing secret, so jobs,
      candidates, the review queue and project listing all answered 503 and no
      spec could have driven them whatever it asserted. The config now passes a
      cursor secret and a staging root; the CPU tool paths are deliberately left
      out, so identity packs and audio takes stay unbound under test and say so
      at boot rather than resolving a machine-specific path to nothing. The
      remaining flows need fixture seeding through the now-bound stores. Worked
      again 2026-09-12 and THE SECOND BLOCKER WAS NOT THE HARNESS: no code in
      this service has ever issued an `hv:` scope. `buildAuthSession` mints
      `['domain:*']` for every customer, `satisfiesScope` keeps `domain:*` out
      of the `hv:` namespace on purpose, and grepping every issuance site found
      nothing else — so all thirty-two endpoints answered 403 to every signed-in
      creator, and the surface was UNREACHABLE rather than gated. The two are
      indistinguishable from the client, which is why a spec that drove them
      would have asserted the fail-closed behaviour and called it coverage.
      `human-video-entitlement-grant.ts` makes the entitlement decision the
      `182.C.25.02` comment left open: the capability rides a paid plan, the
      grant is re-read per request rather than minted into a token (a lapsed
      plan must lose reach over reference images and their embeddings at once,
      not at token expiry), it is enumerated scopes rather than `hv:*` because
      `decodeCursor` re-authorizes against the exact minting scope and a
      wildcard-only caller cannot page any list past its first screenful, and
      `hv:review:write` and the two reviewer roles are refused at runtime rather
      than merely omitted. `assertGrantCoversSurface` fails the boot when the
      surface declares a scope nobody can hold. Eleven module tests, six over a
      real Fastify instance; the remaining flows still need fixture seeding. AND
      THE GRANT WAS NOT ENOUGH: run against a real BFF, all five listings still
      answered 401 `missing_tenant_claim`, because the customer token carries no
      `tid` either — a second gate in front of the first. The tenant is now
      resolved at this surface's own boundary and a consumer's is THEIR OWN
      rather than the shared `'house'` the rest of the repo falls back to,
      because every `Caller` here is built with `projectIds: null` and one
      shared consumer tenant would list every creator's projects to every other
      creator, with `hv:assets:read` reaching the faces behind them. With both
      closed, the surface answered a browser for the first time in this phase,
      and the first run found a third defect it had been hiding: `presetPort`,
      `uploadPort` and `audioPort` each passed an ABSOLUTE url to an `api`
      client that prepends its own base, so the preset region's `error` was a
      doubled host rather than the scope it was attributed to on 2026-09-11 —
      three of the four ports had it and the only one that did not is the only
      one whose region ever worked. `portUrls.spec.ts` reads the four sources
      and fails on an absolute path, because each port's own spec mocks `api`
      and asserts the result rather than the path. COVERED IN A REAL BROWSER (16
      chromium tests, all green): authoring (create, open, edit, autosave at a
      service version), resume across a reload, consent display, the free-plan
      refusal naming the PLAN rather than a scope, cross-creator isolation, and
      every region stating what it is doing. NOT COVERED and why: reference
      feedback past the empty state, audio approval, estimate, submit, cancel,
      take comparison, review, release and deletion all hang off a CAST MEMBER,
      a cast member is somebody who has authorized their likeness, and the
      screen that records that is enrolment (`182.C.26`) — the known caller gap
      `182.C.24.02` already names. Submit additionally needs identity packs,
      which need the face detector this deployment deliberately leaves unbound.
      The box stays unchecked for those nine. RE-MEASURED LATER THE SAME DAY,
      after `182.C.23.03` shipped. Three of the nine moved. AUDIO APPROVAL is
      covered: a recording is uploaded, registered as a take with measured CTC
      timings, and the approval is offered and refuses with its reason — and
      reaching it required exposing `ETag`, which is not CORS-safelisted, so the
      tag every `If-Match` needs was being discarded by the browser and no
      decision on this surface was reachable from the web app at all. RESUME and
      FAILURE were already covered. AND EVERY PORT NOW BINDS ON THIS BOX:
      `opencv-python-headless` was the one missing package (the YuNet weights
      were already staged, sha256 matching the one `face-geometry.py`
      documents), so with the face detector, the probe, the aligner, the
      synthesiser and a filesystem object root set, the boot line reads
      "answering 503 until bound: NOTHING" for the first time in this phase. The
      numpy upgrade it pulled was checked against the committed alignment ground
      truth, which still passes. SO WHAT REMAINS IS NOT ADAPTERS, IT IS TWO
      MISSING SCREENS. `submit-job` refuses without a likeness AUTHORIZATION,
      and nothing in the API creates one — `withdraw-consent` exists and no
      create does, because an authorization is the subject's act and belongs to
      enrolment (`182.C.26`). And reference feedback stops at the upload: the
      Studio has no control that DECLARES an identity pack, so `quality` stays
      `not-read` on every reference and the face-mapping and eligibility
      controls that already exist are fed by nothing. estimate, submit, cancel,
      take comparison, review, release and deletion all sit behind the first of
      those. REFERENCE FEEDBACK IS NOW COVERED, and closing it found TWO DEFECTS
      BEHIND THE MISSING CONTROL rather than only the control. `packPort.ts` and
      the pack block in `ReferenceSet` declare the set, which is what the
      per-reference quality, the face picker and the eligibility line were
      always meant to be fed by. FIRST, THE QUESTION A PACK ASKS WAS
      UNANSWERABLE: a mapping names a `faceId`, an id that exists only inside
      one detection run, and the run was computed and discarded — so the
      permitted answers were gone, and re-detecting to recover them is not the
      same run, which is the whole finding of the 2026-09-10 probe (two models,
      2 and 6 faces, one photograph). The detections are kept with the pack now
      and the document offers the candidates for the reference that is waiting,
      only that one, because a settled reference has no question and listing
      every face in every photograph hands out more about the people in the
      background than the decision needs. SECOND, "A LATER CALL AGAINST THIS ID"
      — which the create handler's own comment has promised since it was written
      — DID NOT EXIST, so the only way to supply a mapping was to declare the
      pack again: a new detector run with different ids, and a new pack id,
      which an authorization binds its digests to. Fixing the creator's slip
      would have cost the subject's consent.
      `POST /identity-packs/:packId/mappings` is the thirty-third endpoint,
      deciding, re-evaluated against the STORED run, a replacement per reference
      rather than an append (two mappings for one reference is
      `mapping_conflicts`, so appending refuses the act of correcting), and a
      version-conditional write because `If-Match` is checked before the handler
      runs and two callers holding the same fresh tag both clear it. On the web
      side the verdict is an EDIT rather than a reseed: it arrives in answer to
      `reference/map-face`, so edits are always pending when it lands, and
      `draftReducer` refuses a seed then — correctly, a refresh does not get to
      take the creator's work — so it has its own reducer action that applies it
      without counting as an edit. COVERED IN A REAL BROWSER, two chromium tests
      on the live stack with the detector bound: a faceless image is refused
      with the service's own sentence and the row stays `not-read` rather than
      being cleared by a failed declaration; and the committed multi-face
      evidence image from that same probe produces the real question, the picker
      offers the faces that answer it, each choice says WHERE the face is, and
      the answer clears the pack with the service's verdict rather than this
      browser's optimism. The first run of it also found a disclosure: the
      detector's refusal carried `execFile`'s `Command failed: <full argv>` into
      the error envelope, so the interpreter path, the script path, the weights
      path and THE STAGING PATH OF THE UPLOADED REFERENCE rendered in the Cast
      region; the status or signal plus stderr says everything diagnosable
      without any of them. WHAT IS LEFT IS ONE SCREEN, NOT TWO: estimate,
      submit, cancel, take comparison, review, release and deletion all sit
      behind a likeness authorization, which is the subject's act and belongs to
      enrolment. WORKED AGAIN 2026-09-12, AND THE NINE THAT WERE LEFT WERE NOT
      WAITING ON A SCREEN NOBODY HAD DESIGNED — THEY WERE WAITING ON THE REGION
      THE OTHER SIX POINT AT, WHICH WAS NEVER ON THE PAGE. `182.C.23.08` shipped
      `human-video-studio-session.ts` on 2026-09-11 — the stage, whether a bar
      may be drawn, what pressing cancel would actually do — and NOTHING ON THIS
      SURFACE EVER CALLED IT. Same for `182.C.23.09`'s take comparison and
      `182.C.23.12`'s export controls: three modules, each delivered and tested,
      each consumed by no browser. So the Studio had six regions and not one of
      them submitted anything, and `takes` could only ever be empty — not
      because no provider is bound, but because no job had ever been created
      from a browser at all. Every endpoint behind it has answered since
      `182.C.25.01`. SUBMIT, HONEST STAGE PROGRESS AND CANCEL ARE NOW COVERED IN
      A REAL BROWSER. A seventh region, `delivery`, sits between the plan and
      the takes; `jobPort.ts` calls `submit-job`, `get-job`, `list-jobs` and
      `cancel-job`. It is a FORM and not a button because a submission is
      checked against the nine dimensions of the authorization the subject
      granted and the handler is explicit that an unstated dimension is a
      refusal rather than a wildcard — so every chooser opens on "not stated",
      each says why it is being asked, and the submit control names the missing
      answers instead of spending a round trip to be told. 2 chromium tests on
      the live stack, 38 module tests, and six more over the job handlers. The
      22 browser tests the three earlier human-video specs already had were
      re-run with the seventh region on the page and stayed green, axe included.
      AND BINDING IT FOUND THE JOB DOCUMENT WITHHOLDING BOTH THINGS THE SHIPPED
      MODULE COMPUTES. `jobDocument` dropped `stageEnteredAt`, which the stored
      record has carried all along — so the only clock a client could reach was
      the one `assertServerAnchored` exists to refuse: a counter started when
      the tab first saw the job, which restarts at zero on every reload and
      reads as progress for a render that has been going an hour. And it sent no
      cancel affordance, so a surface had to re-derive `182.C.15.05`'s stage
      table in the browser — the drift `cancelAffordanceFor` warns about in its
      own comment, and wrong in the direction that costs money. Both ride the
      document now, beside `progressSource`, `barIsDeterminate`, `isTerminal`
      and `notifiable`. No `elapsedMs`: a field that changes on every read of an
      unchanged job makes two identical versions serialize differently. THE
      BROWSER FOUND A THIRD THAT NO UNIT TEST COULD. Everything passed up to the
      last assertion, where the cancelled job rendered as "Stopped from : " with
      both halves empty. ONE RESOURCE WAS ANSWERING IN TWO VOCABULARIES: the
      cancel response composes `cancelledFromStage` and `explanation`, and the
      job document embedded the raw `CancellationDecision`, which spells the
      same two facts `fromStage` and `detail`. A client written against the
      response lost both the moment it re-read the job — which is exactly where
      a browser lands after a reload, and a reload is the NORMAL case in a flow
      that waits on a provider for minutes. Both now go through one
      `cancelledView` mapper, so the sentence a creator reads after a reload is
      the same sentence they were shown when they pressed the button. WHAT IS
      LEFT, AND WHY IT IS NOT A SCREEN THIS TIME: take comparison, review and
      release. No provider is bound in this deployment, so a submitted job rests
      at `validating` and produces no candidate — and a comparison of nothing is
      not a test of a comparison, nor is releasing nothing a test of a release.
      Estimate is its own gap and a real one: there is no estimate operation
      among the thirty-nine, `human-video-cost-estimate.ts` is implemented and
      reachable from no endpoint, and `182.C.23.06`'s own note says eligibility
      "is answered against the routes just before you submit" — which is the
      call that does not exist. TAKES IS FED NOW, AND FEEDING IT FOUND THE WEB
      UNABLE TO SAY WHAT THE PHONE CAN. `notRead.takes` had been true on every
      project since the region was written — nothing on this surface ever read a
      job's candidates — so Takes could only ever report itself PARTIAL: "the
      candidates of this project's jobs were not read here". `readJobTakes`
      reads the listing and then each candidate's MEASUREMENTS, because the
      listing says only whether something looked, and a region drawn from
      `evaluated: true` alone would be a review of nothing. A job that has
      produced nothing now says "nothing has been generated yet", which is a
      sentence about the work rather than about the screen. And
      `measurement.measured` is `null` and never `[]` for a candidate nobody
      evaluated, so a document flagged evaluated with null rows is called NOT
      evaluated rather than rendered as a clean review. THE FOURTH OUTCOME:
      Lilith's `MeasuredOutcome` had three and `MeasuredFinding.passed` on the
      wire is `boolean | null` — the null being `182.C.19.08`'s unfitted
      identity operating point, a number with no verdict. Both three-outcome
      answers are wrong for it: "not measurable" denies a measurement that
      happened and a pass or fail invents the threshold. The phone settled this
      on 2026-09-11 and the design system never followed, so anything the web
      rendered for an unfitted gate had to be one of the two lies.
      `measured-no-verdict` is now a fourth outcome with its own shape and the
      phone's wording verbatim, pinned by a test, because two spellings of one
      verdict is how a creator and a reviewer end up disagreeing about a take
      neither of them mis-read. DELETION IS COVERED FOR THE PATH THIS DEPLOYMENT
      CAN REACH, which is the withdrawal: ending a permission destroys the
      references it covered, and `human-video-delivery.spec.ts` drives it in a
      browser and reads the manifest that comes back. `delete-asset` is NOT
      covered and cannot be here — `plansFor` resolves an asset id to a TAKE, so
      it needs a candidate, and no provider is bound. Measured 2026-09-12 rather
      than assumed. WORKED AGAIN LATER THE SAME DAY, AND THE ESTIMATE GAP IS
      CLOSED. `human-video-cost-estimate.ts` had priced a job since
      `182.C.14.06` and was reachable from NO ENDPOINT, so the region that asks
      a creator for nine permission answers then offered a control that spends
      money with no number beside it. `POST /jobs/estimate` is the fortieth
      operation. It prices the plan against the routes `LANE_ADAPTERS` would
      actually send to — the same table `LaneRenderRequestBuilder` selects
      through — rather than the whole catalogue, because a price for a model
      this service would never choose is a number a creator budgets against and
      never pays. AND IT ASKS FOR NO AUTHORIZATION DIMENSIONS: an estimate is
      not a use of anybody's likeness (it reads a public price list and
      multiplies; no row is read and nothing is written), so requiring a purpose
      and a geography before showing a price would make somebody declare what a
      face is for in order to read a rate card, and would put the estimate after
      the decisions it exists to inform. THREE THINGS IT WILL NOT DO. It states
      a FLOOR and says so: the number of passes per released candidate comes
      from a measured release rate and nothing here has released anything, so
      the generation leg is reported unknown and the derivable half — one pass
      over every shot — is stated beside it rather than folded into a total. It
      refuses to price a route it cannot: both Seedance families price per
      `video_tokens`, whose tokenizer is the vendor's, and they come back null
      with that sentence rather than a guess. And NO ROUTE IS SAID TO BE
      AVAILABLE — eligibility needs a probe against the dated slug, a benchmark
      promotion, a region record, terms and health, and no lane is registered on
      any deployment, so every route carries `proven: false` with the reason
      next to its own figure. The first implementation of `CatalogueReader` came
      with it: the port every routing decision goes through had no adapter
      anywhere, and `human-video-catalogue-reader.ts` is the live OpenRouter
      video catalogue behind it, with the date and the content hash of the bytes
      travelling beside the prices. A catalogue that cannot be read answers a
      TRANSPORT code rather than `store_unavailable`, because an operator
      reading the second goes looking for a setting that does not exist.
      `estimateJob` generalises the estimator to a whole job and fixes an
      arithmetic trap on the way: a per-generation minimum applies PER SHOT
      (four one-second shots on `runway/aleph-2` pay the $0.56 floor four times,
      where summed durations pay it once) while per-job legs such as encoding
      are counted ONCE, and a single unpriceable shot makes the whole leg
      unknown and names that shot rather than totalling the rest into a smaller
      number that looks complete. The surface grew a checked `changesNothing`: a
      POST that writes nothing is exempt from the idempotency rule, and an
      endpoint declaring itself safe while also deciding or deduplicating now
      fails the boot check. Measured live against the real catalogue (29
      models): exact dialogue, 6s + 4s at 1080p, `alibaba/wan-2.7` $1.00 and
      `wan-2.6` $1.50; text-to-scene 5s 720p, `google/veo-3.1-lite` $0.15
      cheapest of seven routes with both Seedance lanes unpriceable. COVERED IN
      A REAL BROWSER (1 chromium test on the live stack, which reads the live
      price list): nothing is shown before the press, the control is refused
      without a mode, a real figure and both caveats render, and the submit
      control beside it is still refused — which is the point of asking first.
      57 module tests behind it: 22 over the handler, 9 over the catalogue
      reader, 6 more over the estimator, 11 over the web port and 9 over the
      region. AMENDED LATER THE SAME DAY: `proven` shipped as a CONSTANT — the
      one field in that response that was not derived — because no lane registry
      existed to ask. One does now, so the field reports what
      `evaluateLaneEligibility` decided with the engine's own blockers as the
      reason, and a test asserts a route CAN come back proven so the field
      cannot quietly become a constant again. The answer is still no on every
      route; the difference is that it is now a decision. WHAT IS LEFT OF THIS
      ITEM IS STILL take comparison, review and release: they need a candidate,
      and no provider is bound.
- [ ] **182.C.36.07** Add Playwright admin coverage for quarantine, review,
      override rules, reroute, takedown, audit, and role isolation. Verified
      2026-09-12: TWO of the seven are covered by
      `apps/oshun/admin/e2e/human-video-review-queue.spec.ts` (five tests) —
      review, and role isolation through the scoped admin session. The other
      five have no admin surface to drive:
      `apps/oshun/admin/src/app/isis/     human-video/` is one page, the review
      queue panel, and quarantine, override rules, reroute, takedown and audit
      are each a screen that does not exist. A spec that tapped through them
      would pass by finding nothing. SWEPT AGAIN 2026-09-12 AND "A SCREEN THAT
      DOES NOT EXIST" UNDERSTATES IT: none of the five has a bound source behind
      it either. `human-video-operator-override.ts` is pure logic with no store
      and is bound nowhere in the runtime; `human-video-appeals.ts` has no store
      interface at all; quarantine rows come from a failed download and
      takedowns from a released take, so both wait on a provider; and reroute
      waits on the model registry that `buildStudioLaneView` needs. Building the
      pages first would put five screens over nothing, which is the same mistake
      in the other direction. UPDATED 2026-09-13: TWO OF THE FIVE HAVE MOVED,
      and one of them was unblocked by exactly what this note predicted. REROUTE
      no longer "waits on the model registry that `buildStudioLaneView` needs" —
      `CatalogueLaneRegistry` is that registry and it ships. OVERRIDE RULES no
      longer have "no store": `human-video-override-store.ts` and the
      `human_video_operator_override` table are the stack that was missing, and
      the lane registry now applies REAL overrides instead of the literal empty
      list it shipped with, so an operator's judgment reaches a routing decision
      with the un-overridden decision kept beside it. There is still NO SCREEN
      for either, and a spec that tapped through one would still pass by finding
      nothing — so the box stays unchecked, and what these two are waiting for
      has changed from "no stack" to "no page". Quarantine and takedown still
      wait on a provider (their rows come from a failed download and a released
      take). AUDIT NOW HAS ITS STACK TOO (2026-09-13):
      `human-video-case-store.ts` with `human_video_case` and
      `human_video_legal_hold` behind it. The case table has NO TENANT COLUMN on
      purpose — a takedown is started by the depicted person or a member of the
      public who never had an account, and scoping the row to a tenant would
      make `assertOpenToUnauthenticated`'s refusal unenforceable because there
      would be no row to write. Acknowledgement and resolution are separate
      columns because they are separate promises, and `isOverdue` is asked
      rather than re-derived. A hold is refused unless it names its artefacts
      and expires, and it is LIFTED rather than deleted, because a hold taken
      off early is as interesting as one that ran out. So THREE of the five have
      moved from "no stack" to "no page": override rules, reroute and audit.
      Quarantine and takedown still wait on a provider, and nothing here wires a
      hold into the erasure path — `planDeletionUnderHolds` is still consumed by
      nothing, and adding a hold check to a destructive path is its own change
      rather than a side effect of giving holds somewhere to live. AMENDED LATER
      THE SAME DAY: NONE OF THE THREE STACKS COULD BIND. The generated Prisma
      client under `libs/oshun/persistence/src/generated` is CHECKED IN and was
      not regenerated for either migration, so `delegateWith` found no delegate
      for `humanVideoOperatorOverride`, `humanVideoCase` or
      `humanVideoLegalHold`, all three stores resolved to null, and the boot
      line listed them unbound — which is indistinguishable from a deployment
      that left the port out on purpose, because that is exactly what the
      `bound`/`unbound` list is for. So the lane registry went on applying the
      literal empty override list it was said to have stopped applying.
      Regenerated, and `generated-client-drift.spec.ts` now asserts that every
      model in the committed schema has a delegate in the committed client,
      proved by reverting the client rather than asserted: it names the three.
      AND THE TWO FLOWS THIS ITEM CALLED COVERED WERE NOT. Measured by injection
      2026-09-13: an admin session carries `admin:*` and `admin:workspace:isis`,
      `satisfiesScope` stops the wildcard at the `hv:` namespace on purpose, and
      NOTHING IN THIS SERVICE EVER ISSUED A STAFF SCOPE — the entitlement
      grant's own comment says the staff scopes are "held by reviewers and
      trust-and-safety through the admin authentication path", and that path did
      not exist. `GET /reviews` answered 403 to every operator who has ever
      opened the review queue, and the spec passed throughout because it
      TOLERATED `data-queue-state="failed"` and asserted the refusal rendered
      nicely. Same confusion as the web side found on 2026-09-12, in the other
      direction: unreachable and correctly-failing-closed are indistinguishable
      from the client, so a spec written for the second passes on the first.
      Role isolation was the same illusion — everything was refused, which looks
      like isolation. `human-video-staff-grant.ts` is the missing half:
      `admin:*`/`admin:studio`/`admin:workspace:isis` carry the queue read and
      the platform reach; each elevated role needs its OWN named claim and is
      never covered by a wildcard, because `182.C.29.04` makes the role half of
      what unlocks a member of the public's photograph; and NO decision scope is
      issued at all, so `182.C.29.08`'s "coverage before mutations" now lives in
      the grant instead of a comment on a page. THE REACH IS A SCOPE AND NOT AN
      INFERENCE: a reviewer's queue is every tenant's waiting takes, so
      `hv:reviews:all-tenants` is demanded by `buildQuery` before it will drop
      the tenant filter, re-authorized when a cursor minted under it comes back,
      and refused to `hv:*`. Binding it found two more: the queue looked each
      row's speakers up under the CALLER's tenant, which on a platform read
      finds no job and drops every row as depicting nobody — an empty queue, the
      one answer this queue may never give by accident — and the keyset position
      was a bare candidate id whose tiebreak re-composed a key from the caller's
      tenant, which belongs to none of the rows. 26 tests: 10 over the grant, 5
      over a real Fastify instance, 7 over the reach and the cursor, 3 in the
      store, 3 in the handler, plus the two the admin's stale duplicate port
      spec lost (it had been red since the role parameters were removed). AND IT
      IS VERIFIED IN A REAL BROWSER, which this worktree was not supposed to
      manage: the admin e2e needs the BFF and this worktree has no workspace
      link farm, so `server.ts` cannot boot. What CAN is the human-video surface
      on its own — `createHumanVideoRuntime` over the local Postgres behind
      `registerHumanVideoApiRoutes`, 14 ports bound, with only the surrounding
      app faked (`/v1/admin/session/me`). Against it: an Isis operator reads the
      queue 200, a support-workspace operator is refused 403, a creator holding
      `hv:candidates:read` sees zero rows and so does one holding `hv:*`, and
      one seeded take in ANOTHER tenant renders with `data-queue-state="ok"`,
      its row id, `Tenant tenant-harness-customer` and the gate that failed. 8
      chromium tests green, axe included. The single red on the first pass was a
      cold `next dev` compile of `/unauthorized` exceeding a 10 s expect timeout
      — it passes alone and passes warm, the dev-server artifact CLAUDE.md warns
      about rather than a defect. Closing it found a THIRD stale spec left red
      by an earlier fix: `HumanVideoReviewQueuePanel.spec.tsx` omitted the
      queue's `reviewerRole` entirely and `undefined` is not `null`, so the
      panel rendered "Read as , which is the role the SERVICE applied" — a
      sentence claiming the service decided and naming nobody. It coalesces now,
      with three tests over the three branches. WORKED AGAIN 2026-09-13 AND THE
      FIRST OF THE FIVE FLOWS HAS A PAGE: override rules and reroute, which are
      one screen because they are two questions about one decision and two
      screens would show two versions of it. `GET /operator/lanes/:mode` is the
      forty-first operation — every route in today's catalogue that serves a
      named mode, its eligibility decision, and every override applied to or
      refused for it. A `get-` and not a `list-`, because the rows are bounded
      by what the vendor publishes rather than by anything a tenant wrote, and
      paginating a fixed vocabulary tells a client it grows with use. THE MODE
      IS A PATH SEGMENT and the SDK drift guard is why: the generator emits a
      query string only for an endpoint with a declared `lists` target, so a
      mode in the query produced a generated method with no way to pass one — a
      client generated from the surface that could not call it, which is the
      exact drift the generator exists to prevent. Its scope `hv:lanes:read` is
      staff-only: reading who authorised an exception and why is the one thing
      the Studio capability view deliberately withholds from a creator, and
      `human-video-operator-lane-view.ts` is the mirror image of that file —
      structural, no spread of a registration anywhere, but the owner, the
      reason, the expiry and the real health all cross. BOTH DECISIONS TRAVEL
      AND THE PAGE RENDERS BOTH: a lane that is ineligible on its own terms and
      shipping under an exception is the row that matters most and is invisible
      on a screen with one verdict. A REFUSED OVERRIDE IS SHOWN TOO, because its
      author is the person who needs to know it did not apply. The write half is
      absent and says so — the operator grant issues no scope that writes, so
      `182.C.29.08`'s sequencing is enforced rather than commented. 17 module
      tests (9 over the handler, 8 over the admin port) and 10 chromium tests on
      the live stack, axe included, against a database holding three real
      overrides: two lifting `policy_not_approved` and `region_unrecorded` on
      `wan:alibaba/wan-2.7` so it ships under them, and one scoped to another
      tenant so it comes back `wrong_tenant` — neither of those two tests
      skipped. AND THE AUDIT FLOW HAS A PAGE TOO, the third of the five.
      `GET /operator/trust-and-safety` is the forty-second operation and answers
      TWO lists in one read, because they are the two halves of one obligation
      and they pull against each other: a case is somebody asking for something
      to stop, and a hold is the reason part of it has not. A queue of
      unacknowledged reports reads as neglect until you know a hold is why one
      is unfinished; a list of holds reads as diligence until you know somebody
      has waited four days for a reply. UNPAGINATED AND CAPPED AT 200, and past
      the cap it REFUSES rather than truncating — the first two hundred of four
      hundred, with no way to know, reads as a backlog of two hundred, which is
      the number somebody acts on. Nothing about the report itself crosses:
      whether a subject is named rather than who, whether there is a contact
      rather than what it is, and never the statement, because a triage list
      read at a glance by whoever is on shift is the wrong place for the text of
      somebody's complaint about their own likeness. 7 handler tests, 7 over the
      admin port and 9 chromium tests on the live stack, against a database
      holding a real four-day-old unacknowledged takedown and two live holds,
      one lapsing within the day. WHAT IS STILL MISSING FOR THIS BOX: quarantine
      and takedown wait on a provider, and none of the three human-video admin
      routes is in the workspace nav — all are reached by URL, as the shipped
      review page already was. AND THE HOLD IS WIRED INTO THE ERASURE PATH,
      which the note above listed as deliberately not done. `destroy` reads the
      live holds before it destroys anything and `planDeletionUnderHolds`
      decides: what a hold NAMES is kept and everything else still goes, because
      an incident about one video must not become a reason to keep a person's
      whole reference pack. Four things it took. `plansFor` answers entries
      carrying each take's ASSET ID — a hold is placed by somebody reading a
      review queue, where a take is an id, and the plan identified its master
      only by digest and object key, so a withdrawal could not have honoured a
      hold on one of its own takes; both spellings are compared, because the one
      worked example in this repo names a key. The uploaded bytes are enumerated
      BEFORE the erasure (`sourceLocators`) and skipped inside it (a `preserve`
      list), because a held key reported afterwards as `gone: false` is
      indistinguishable from a delete that failed, which the handler raises on.
      A suspended destruction is NOT ledgered: the ledger replays, so a stored
      partial manifest would report the suspension as the final outcome forever
      and the held take would never be destroyed. And the manifest carries what
      was preserved, with the same never-overclaim CHECK `unreachable` has —
      proved against a throwaway database, where the row claiming completeness
      beside a preserved artefact is refused by the table. `assertHoldsRelevant`
      is deliberately NOT called and the reason is written down: it refuses a
      caller whose holds name nothing being deleted, and this path passes every
      live hold, so one unrelated incident would make that guard block the
      erasure it exists to protect. 14 new tests over four files in the app and
      two in the library; the human-video suite is green at 291 files / 6063
      tests. None of this checks the box: the five flows still have no screen.
- [ ] **182.C.36.08** Add accessibility automation and manual screen-reader,
      keyboard, zoom, contrast, reduced-motion, captions, and transcript checks.
      Verified 2026-09-12: the AUTOMATION half is done and passing. axe runs on
      the web authoring surface and on the admin review queue; keyboard reach
      through every region and phone-width reflow are Playwright assertions
      (both in today's 11-passed run); reduced motion, captions and transcript
      are `apps/oshun/mobile/src/humanVideo/reviewAccessibility.ts` with its own
      specs, and its position is the load-bearing one — reduced motion governs
      CHROME and never the take, because suppressing playback would remove the
      take from a review of the take, and captions come from the alignment the
      gates were computed against rather than a second ASR pass that would put
      different words on the screen from the ones anybody checked. The MANUAL
      half needs a person with a screen reader, and that is what remains. Board
      tag 2026-09-18: the automation half is done and passing; what is left is a
      person with a screen reader, which no agent can stand in for.
      `blocked:human`
- [x] **182.C.36.09** Add mobile automation for the supported critical paths and
      explicitly document any non-automatable device/media limitation. Delivered
      2026-09-11: `apps/oshun/mobile/e2e/flows/shell/human-video-review.yaml`
      covers the path this platform has — `182.C.24.01` made the phone
      review-and-approval — and
      `scripts/human-video/verify-mobile-review-automation.mjs` keeps the flow's
      test ids and the screen in step on a machine with no device, because a
      flow that asserts a renamed id passes by finding nothing (proved by
      renaming a control: it fails, and passes again when restored). The six
      limitations are written down in `mobile-parity.md` rather than left
      implicit — and two of them are the same fact twice: A DEVICE TEST CAN
      PROVE THE SURFACE OFFERS THE TAKE HONESTLY AND CANNOT PROVE THE TAKE IS
      ANY GOOD, which is why §40's evidence is not a Maestro run.
- [x] **182.C.36.10** Run real provider canaries with tiny bounded spend and
      redacted evidence before declaring any production route available.

### 182.C.37 Performance, Capacity, Reliability, and FinOps

- [x] **182.C.37.01** Load-test upload, callback, poll, download, proxy
      creation, evaluator queue, review playback, and delivery separately and
      end to end.
- [x] **182.C.37.02** Establish capacity models for duration, resolution,
      candidate count, evaluator GPU memory/time, transcode CPU, storage, and
      network egress.
- [x] **182.C.37.03** Add backpressure from object store/evaluator/transcoder to
      provider admission so completed outputs do not expire before ingestion.
- [x] **182.C.37.04** Verify bounded memory and disk use under large concurrent
      videos and clean abandoned temporary files after crash/restart.
- [x] **182.C.37.05** Add spend reservations, per-job ceilings, daily/monthly
      budgets, anomaly detection, credits/refunds, and creator-visible final
      cost.
- [x] **182.C.37.06** Model cost per releasable second rather than cost per
      provider attempt, including failed candidates and evaluation/correction.
- [x] **182.C.37.07** Define provider/evaluator/storage/queue SLO dependencies,
      degraded modes, recovery objectives, and incident runbooks.
- [x] **182.C.37.08** Run soak tests long enough to cover slow provider jobs,
      webhook retries, signed-URL expiry, queue aging, and lifecycle cleanup.

### 182.C.38 Rollout, Feature Flags, and Incident Readiness

- [x] **182.C.38.01** Ship behind tenant, region, mode, provider, model,
      quality-tier, and app-surface feature flags with a global kill switch.
- [x] **182.C.38.02** Roll out internal dogfood → consented design partners →
      allowlisted beta → capped production → broader release with explicit
      gates.
- [x] **182.C.38.03** Keep active-scene exact-dialogue, multi-speaker,
      long-form, avatar, and corrective lanes independently promotable and
      reversible.
- [x] **182.C.38.04** Define canary abort thresholds for consent/safety
      incidents, bad-sync false accepts, identity drift, provider failures,
      latency, and cost.
- [x] **182.C.38.05** Practice provider quarantine, leaked-URL response,
      unauthorized-likeness takedown, revocation, model regression, and mass
      release invalidation.
- [x] **182.C.38.06** Add rollback that preserves job/audit truth and prevents
      old clients from resubmitting unsupported contracts.
- [x] **182.C.38.07** Obtain Trust & Safety, privacy, security, legal/licensing,
      accessibility, SRE, product, and release-engineering sign-off.
- [ ] **182.C.38.08** Update the capability matrix and public product copy only
      after the promoted route has real production-like evidence. Verified
      2026-09-12: this is a PROHIBITION and it currently holds — there is no
      promoted route with production-like evidence (`182.C.40.01`), and nothing
      claims one. `capability-audit.md` is a gap ledger whose verdicts were
      reached by reading source, `limitations.md` says "where nothing was
      measured, the entry says so instead of estimating", and the preset
      catalogue deliberately carries NO availability field at all — its note
      explains that how many routes can serve a preset is a question about one
      request at one moment, and that "0 routes" would be a claim rather than a
      missing value. The box is checked when there IS evidence and the copy is
      updated, so it follows `182.C.40.01` rather than blocking on its own.
      Board tag 2026-09-18: follows `182.C.40.01`, as the note above says.
      `blocked:upstream`

### 182.C.39 Documentation and Operator Guidance

- [x] **182.C.39.01** Document creator workflows for reference preparation,
      consent, script locking, pronunciation, audio approval, scene direction,
      take review, correction, export, and deletion.
- [x] **182.C.39.02** Document honest limitations and troubleshooting for
      profile, occlusion, fast speech, singing, overlapping dialogue, tiny
      faces, rapid movement, weak references, unsupported languages, and model
      drift.
- [x] **182.C.39.03** Publish API guides and complete examples without real
      credentials, private biometric assets, or misleading mocked success
      claims.
- [x] **182.C.39.04** Document provider onboarding, live probing, benchmark,
      promotion, quarantine, cost, retention, and deletion procedures.
- [x] **182.C.39.05** Document evaluator acquisition, calibration, thresholds,
      failure interpretation, fairness slices, upgrades, and rollback.
- [x] **182.C.39.06** Document review and escalation rules, non-overridable
      gates, subject requests, takedowns, and incident response.
- [x] **182.C.39.07** Document media/storage lifecycle, final-byte evaluation,
      C2PA verification, watermark/disclosure, and release-proof inspection.
- [x] **182.C.39.08** Create a concise V1 migration guide for existing avatar,
      voice, and image-to-video callers, and for Veritas callers when V1.2
      restores that surface.

### 182.C.40 Final Evidence and Definition of Done

- [ ] **182.C.40.01** Demonstrate at least one production-configured
      active-scene route using multiple authorized references and exact supplied
      audio, with the person moving and speaking outside a talking-head setup.
      As of 2026-09-09 only the Wan 2.7/2.6 `audio` passthrough can satisfy this
      on OpenRouter; if that live probe fails, the item is satisfied by the
      direct lane from `182.C.13.01` and the evidence must name which route.
      Worked 2026-09-12: THE PIPELINE NOW EXISTS AND IS PROVEN HERMETICALLY.
      `human-video-render-request-builder.ts` turns a submitted job into a
      provider payload, `human-video-provider-transport.ts` is the exchange, and
      `human-video-render-worker.ts` submits, polls, downloads, probes and files
      a candidate; `human-video-render-end-to-end.spec.ts` runs the whole leg
      through the real stores with only the four replaceable boundaries stubbed.
      What blocks a REAL run is neither code nor money (~$4.35 of the approved
      canary budget is untouched): a CONSENTED REFERENCE (`182.C.33.01`) and an
      object store the provider can fetch from — `placeReferences` hands the
      provider a URL it must retrieve, and the local MinIO is on a private port
      so a presigned URL to it is unreachable from OpenRouter. A render with no
      references is not a likeness render and cannot demonstrate this item.
      Evidence: `evidence/2026-09-12-jobs-adapter-live/`.
  - _(Dependency stated 2026-09-19: depends on
    `phase-182-human-video:182.C.33.01`.)_
  - _(Parked 2026-09-19: its own text says a real run needs a consented
    reference (182.C.33.01, which needs a corpus of consenting people that no
    agent can obtain) and an object store the provider can fetch from; it was on
    offer as ready. The hermetic pipeline it describes is built. Unpark when
    182.C.33.01 is met.)_ `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.40.02** Demonstrate identity continuity across multiple shots and
      at least one profile/occlusion/high-motion challenge without lowering
      gates. Verified 2026-09-12: blocked TWICE OVER, and the second is sharper
      than "needs renders". Since today `human-video-continuity-bridge.ts`
      refuses to grade identity against an operating point nobody fitted, so
      even with footage in hand this item cannot pass until `182.C.19.08`'s
      re-fit happens — which is `182.C.33`. "Without lowering gates" is exactly
      what that refusal protects: the alternative was grading against the
      inherited 0.35, which admitted two strangers at 0.422. Board tag
      2026-09-18: waits on the re-fit of `182.C.19.08`, which waits on the
      consented corpus of `182.C.33`. `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.40.03** Demonstrate multi-speaker attribution or explicitly keep
      it feature-flagged if its benchmark gate is not met. Worked 2026-09-12:
      NEITHER ALTERNATIVE WAS TRUE. `WAN_FAMILY` refuses only `video-edit` and
      `talking-head-avatar`, so `multi-character-scene` was servable, and
      nothing has benchmarked which face says which line — servable with an
      unmet gate is the worst of the two states.
      `human-video-multi-speaker-gate.ts` now holds the mode back, and the flag
      READS `cohortVerdict` rather than being a boolean somebody sets, because
      "keep it flagged until the benchmark passes" implemented as a constant is
      a constant somebody flips on a one-character diff nobody can tell from the
      one that was earned. `not-promoted` and `blocked` stay apart in what a
      creator is told: one is a schedule, the other is a bug report. Found
      alongside it that `submit-job` read `mode` as any non-empty string while
      the contract has a closed seven-value enum, so an unknown mode was
      accepted with a 202 and failed at render time; it now reads a member. The
      box stays unchecked until somebody decides this counts as the flagged
      alternative. Decided 2026-09-18 under the owner's delegation: a mode held
      back by `human-video-multi-speaker-gate.ts` reading `cohortVerdict` IS the
      "explicitly keep it feature-flagged" alternative this item offers — the
      flag is earned by a benchmark, not set by hand, which is stricter than
      what was asked. What is left for an agent: verify with both passes that no
      route serves `multi-character-scene` while the verdict is `not-promoted`
      (submit-job, the preset catalogue, the Studio and the mobile review
      screen), and that the creator-facing message tells `not-promoted` from
      `blocked`; then this box can be checked on that evidence.
- [ ] **182.C.40.04** Demonstrate creator-approved script/audio, delivered-word
      validation, real frame/audio sync evaluation, identity/artifact
      evaluation, final-byte recheck, and a cryptographically bound release
      proof. Verified 2026-09-12: the chain is built up to the release and stops
      there. Approval binds to the speech digest, the aligner and sync
      evaluators run on CPU, and the render leg files a candidate — but the
      RELEASE PROOF needs `deps.proofs`, and `releases` is one of the two ports
      still answering 503. `release()` already refuses without it in the right
      words: publishing without checking the sixteen gates would be a release
      that passed nothing, and a proof set silent about a gate reads as a
      release that passed it. WORKED AGAIN LATER THE SAME DAY: the release port
      is BOUND and the refusal is now about the pipeline rather than the
      deployment (`evidence/2026-09-12-fourteen-ports-bound/`). The proof set is
      DERIVED from what a candidate stores, so a gate is present exactly when
      the thing it attests to is stored, and `human_video_release`'s CHECK
      requires all sixteen — a row cannot exist for a take that passed fifteen.
      Driven live against a measured take, the refusal names TEN: nine gates
      nothing in this pipeline produces (no C2PA manifest, watermark report,
      disclosure record, output-shape or encoding measurement, policy or rights
      decision, quality aggregate, or signed provider attribution is recorded
      against a candidate anywhere — `UNPRODUCED_GATES` names each with the item
      that closes it), plus identity-preservation, which was measured at 0.71
      and is absent because `passed` is null: a number exists and nothing fits a
      verdict to it, which is where `182.C.19.08` left the operating point. So
      this item now needs those nine producers and a real render, and the list
      is a work queue rather than a missing adapter. WORKED AGAIN LATER THE SAME
      DAY: TWO OF THE TEN ARE NOW PRODUCED, and what was missing turned out not
      to be a measurement. `output-shape-valid` and `encoding-conformance` have
      had every number they need since `182.C.16.03` — `probeMediaFacts` reads
      the display matrix, the geometry, both frame rates, the pixel format, the
      colour tags and the audio layout out of real ffprobe — and NOTHING KEPT
      THE ANSWER AGAINST THE TAKE IT WAS ABOUT, so at release time there was
      nothing to check. A candidate now carries `shape`: the measured facts
      whole, plus the four numbers the shot DIRECTED, snapshotted at render time
      for the same reason the lineage snapshots the audio digest — reading the
      job's controls at release would grade a take against instructions that may
      have been re-directed since. The facts are stored and the VERDICT is not,
      so both gates are derived at release and a profile edited next month
      re-decides every take rather than only the ones rendered after it.
      `output-shape-valid` compares length, displayed aspect, resolution and
      frame rate, each answered separately because "the output is wrong" sends
      nobody anywhere and "it came back 24fps for a 30fps request" sends them to
      the lane's frame-rate mapping; the resolution tier is read off the SHORT
      edge, because 1080p portrait is 1080x1920 and reading the tier as a height
      would fail every portrait take. `encoding-conformance` asks a DIFFERENT
      question, because a candidate holds the provider's untouched master and
      holding that to `DEFAULT_DELIVERY_PROFILE` directly would fail almost
      every take for tagging the conform step exists to fix: it asks whether
      `planConform` can reach the house profile from these bytes, which is what
      a release actually needs since the delivered file is derived from this
      master. Three states each, and the third is the one a written verdict
      would have lost — nothing measured it (ABSENT, never-attempted), the
      measurement disagrees with what was directed (ABSENT, measured-failed), or
      it agrees (PRESENT). A number nobody could read is not a pass either.
      `FfprobeTakeProbe` is the producer, and it measures LOUDNESS too, because
      the house profile names a target and `planConform` refuses to invent a
      gain from a file nobody decoded — found by running the gate against a real
      file rather than by reading the profile. It reads a LOCAL path and says
      so: a bucket-backed deployment gets null from `resolveTakeProbe` and a
      boot line naming which setting is missing, rather than a prober that would
      have to invent the numbers. 26 tests, 7 of them against files real ffmpeg
      wrote and real ffprobe read. WHAT IS STILL TRUE: the render leg that would
      CALL this prober is not bound, so a candidate's shape is null on this
      deployment and both gates read as absent-never-attempted; and for a take
      whose shape IS measured the refusal names eight rather than ten — the
      seven with no producer, plus identity-preservation's unfitted operating
      point. AND A THIRD GATE GOT A PRODUCER THE SAME DAY: `provider-lineage`.
      Its entry said "the lane and model are stored and NOT SIGNED; an unkeyed
      digest cannot establish who issued it" — and a candidate's `laneId` is a
      row anybody with write access can edit, so a release that read it would
      attribute a take to whatever the database last said. What this can
      HONESTLY attest is stated in the module and in the field names: OpenRouter
      signs nothing, so this is Oshun asserting under its own Ed25519 key that
      these exact bytes came back from this lane, on this dated model version,
      through this provider slug, on this date. A manifest implying the vendor
      had signed would be the fabrication `182.C.28.05` is about. The digest is
      INSIDE the signed statement, so a signature lifted from another take fails
      against this one, and the gate is DERIVED BY CHECKING rather than by
      reading: algorithm, then digest, then signature, in that order, because a
      verifier that checks the signature first and the digest afterwards has
      already said yes to somebody else's take. Three outcomes again — nothing
      signed one (absent), a signature this deployment holds no key to check
      (absent, and the reason names the deployment rather than the take), or a
      checked verdict. It shares `OSHUN_C2PA_SIGNING_KEY` with the audio
      manifest signer deliberately: a deployment with two provenance keys has
      two answers to "who issued this" and a verifier holding one reads the
      other's output as a forgery. `RenderRequest` gained `modelVersion` and
      `providerSlug` to carry it, the dated `canonical_slug` rather than the
      alias, because an alias names a model and only the dated slug names the
      version that made the bytes. 17 tests, including a lane edited on the row
      after signing and a valid signature lifted onto other bytes — both
      refused. `UNPRODUCED_GATES` is now SIX: C2PA manifest, watermark coverage,
      disclosure record, quality aggregate, policy decision, rights decision.
- [ ] **182.C.40.05** Demonstrate automatic rejection and selective
      retry/reroute on intentionally bad sync, wrong words, wrong speaker,
      identity swap, malformed output, provider outage, and evaluator outage.
      Verified 2026-09-12: SPLITS CLEANLY IN TWO. The transport faults —
      provider outage, malformed output, and the rejection that follows — are
      already demonstrable hermetically and are demonstrated:
      `human-video-provider-double.ts` scripts `throttled`, `html-error-page`,
      `partial-download`, `completed-without-output` and `create-refused`, and
      `human-video-render-end-to-end.spec.ts` drives two of them through the
      real stores to show nothing is filed and nothing is left in the object
      store. The CONTENT faults — bad sync, wrong words, wrong speaker, identity
      swap — need a take that is actually wrong in those ways, which is a render
      plus `182.C.33`'s labelled examples. Board tag 2026-09-18: the
      transport-fault half is demonstrated; the content-fault half needs takes
      that are wrong in known ways, which is the labelled corpus of `182.C.33`.
      `blocked:corpus`
- [x] **182.C.40.06** Demonstrate consent expiry/revocation, tenant isolation,
      provider retention disclosure, subject deletion, takedown, and no public
      candidate URL before release. Verified 2026-09-12: FOUR OF THE SIX ARE
      DEMONSTRATED, two are not. Consent REVOCATION was driven live against
      Postgres today — a whole withdrawal answered 403 `hv.consent.missing` and
      a partial one answered 403 `hv.consent.scope_exceeded` while the sibling
      project still rendered (`evidence/2026-09-12-jobs-adapter-live/`). Tenant
      isolation is in the row key and was exercised in the same run. Provider
      retention disclosure is `human-video-zdr-posture.ts`. No public candidate
      URL holds by namespace: `released` is the only namespace the CDN can read,
      and a candidate URL is deliberately short-lived because one that outlives
      the review window is an unreleased take loose on the internet. SUBJECT
      DELETION and TAKEDOWN were the two that were not. CLOSED LATER THE SAME
      DAY in three passes, all live against Postgres and a versioned MinIO
      bucket (`evidence/2026-09-12-erasure-bound-live/`). The `erasure` port is
      bound, so thirteen of the fourteen ports are and only `releases`
      answers 503. `DELETE /assets/:id` destroyed one take's master and the
      proxy no table records, left the sibling take's objects and the job's
      quarantine alone, and left no surviving VERSION — the failure a plain
      delete hides, measured at `deleted 3 version(s)` on a key an ordinary
      delete had already "removed". The withdrawal covered every take, the job's
      orphaned attempt, and the uploaded reference photograph and approved
      audio, which live in a second store with its own key scheme; a subject
      deletion that leaves the source photographs is not one. Expiry and tenant
      isolation were driven live too: a lapsed permission answers 403
      `hv.consent.expired` with the window in the detail, and one tenant asking
      for another's job by its real id gets the same answer as for an id that
      does not exist. The sixth, no public candidate URL, is a namespace rule
      rather than a capture — `canRead(ns, 'delivery')` is true only for
      `released`, pinned over all six namespaces, and nothing on this deployment
      mints a delivery URL at all. TWO THINGS ARE NAMED RATHER THAN CLAIMED:
      `complete: true` is unreachable on any lane in this build because
      `provider-side` retains, which is the retention disclosure being honest
      rather than a gap; and face embeddings are not destroyed because nothing
      writes one, which a drift-guard test asserts with a control so the day
      something does, it fails and says what to do. A NEGATIVE CONTROL FOUND THE
      ONLY REAL DEFECT: a withdrawal narrower than the whole permission
      correctly kept the references and reported `complete: true` with "every
      copy of this likeness known to the system has been destroyed", because a
      location nothing was going to destroy had been left out of the reach
      entirely. `takedownReach` now takes a `retained` list that reports it as
      still there with its own reason.
- [ ] **182.C.40.07** Meet documented quality targets with statistically
      adequate held-out results across active motion, locales, skin
      tones/lighting, profiles/occlusions, shot sizes, and supported speaker
      counts. Verified 2026-09-12: "statistically adequate" is already defined
      rather than left to judgement — `samplesForZeroFailureClaim` derives the
      count a zero-failure claim needs at 95% confidence, and `cohortVerdict`
      keeps `not-promoted` (too few samples) apart from `blocked` (measured and
      failed), so an under-powered cohort cannot be reported as a weaker pass.
      The held-out split refuses a subject or scenario that leaks. Everything is
      in place except the clips: `182.C.33`. Board tag 2026-09-18: everything is
      in place except the clips of `182.C.33`. `blocked:corpus`
- [ ] **182.C.40.08** Meet documented latency, reliability, cost-per-releasable-
      second, accessibility, security, privacy, and provenance gates. Verified
      2026-09-12: cost-per-releasable-second RETURNS NULL BY DESIGN today, and
      the reason is the item's own point.
      `human-video-releasable-second-cost.ts` names four terms: the attempt
      price is measured and is 2.5x what the catalog predicts ($0.25/s billed
      against $0.10 predicted on wan-2.7), candidates-per-shot is configured at
      four so a releasable second starts at 4x before any retry, evaluation is
      measured in CPU-seconds and refuses to be priced until somebody names a
      rate rather than treating CPU as costless, and THE RELEASE RATE — the
      divisor — is not measured because nothing has been released. A model whose
      divisor is unknown does not produce a range, it produces nothing, and the
      module returns null rather than a plausible figure. Latency and
      reliability need runs. Accessibility's automated half passes today
      (`182.C.36.08`). Gated on `182.C.40.01` and `182.C.40.04`. Board tag
      2026-09-18: cost per releasable second has no divisor until something is
      released, which is `182.C.40.01` and `182.C.40.04`. `blocked:upstream`
- [x] **182.C.40.09** Run and archive all applicable targeted lint, typecheck,
      unit, integration, contract, build, Playwright/mobile, accessibility,
      performance, provider-canary, evaluator, and release-gate evidence. Run
      2026-09-12 and archived at `evidence/2026-09-12-release-evidence-run/`.
      Twelve categories: 0 lint errors over all 504 files, 0 typecheck errors
      with all 504 in ONE program and a control that reported, 5442 + 215 + 128
      unit tests, 40 contract tests plus two guards, a passing build, 11 + 5
      Playwright with 0 axe violations, 46 performance, 50 release-gate, and the
      canary archived from 2026-09-11. RUNNING IT AS ONE PROGRAM FOUND THREE
      REAL LINT ERRORS THAT PER-FILE RUNS HAD MISSED — a per-item lint only ever
      saw the file that item touched — including `let within = 0` where ZERO IS
      A REAL POSITION INSIDE A WORD, so a default surviving a missed branch
      would have read as "at the very start of it" rather than as a bug.
- [x] **182.C.40.10** Verify documentation, OpenAPI/SDKs, operator runbooks,
      capability matrix, dashboards, alerts, flags, rollback, and incident
      drills match deployed behavior. Verified 2026-09-12 against a RUNNING
      SERVER, archived at `evidence/2026-09-12-live-surface-capture/`. TWO
      DOCUMENTS OPENED WITH A CLAIM THAT WAS NO LONGER TRUE: `api-guide.md` said
      "Nothing here is mounted" and `creator-workflow.md` said "None of this is
      reachable today" — both true when written, both false since the surface
      was mounted on 2026-09-11, and a reader of either would have concluded the
      feature does not run. Both now say what runs, and the API guide carries
      FOUR RESPONSES CAPTURED FROM A LIVE SERVER where it previously carried
      none. The SDK matches the surface by a byte-identical drift guard, and all
      seven hand-written clients now match it too. The boot line's three "(no …
      table)" notes are the finding worth keeping: the tables exist and the
      ports are unbound, because the committed Prisma client predates the models
      and the runtime treats a stale client as no database on purpose.
- [x] **182.C.40.11** Leave unsupported modes visibly disabled or fail-loud; do
      not close the phase with a plan-only adapter, mocked generation, supplied
      metric, or provider marketing claim represented as shipped capability.
      Audited 2026-09-12 in
      `docs/domains/isis/human-video/evidence/2026-09-12-fabrication-audit/`. NO
      PORT IS BOUND TO SOMETHING THAT DOES NOT DO THE WORK: a deployment with no
      database binds exactly one thing — the preset catalogue, which has no
      store to be missing — and refuses eleven, and three ports bind only as
      ALL-OR-NOTHING groups because the half-bound states are the dangerous
      ones. The provider double has no importer outside its own spec, and the
      only two `Math.random` calls are annotated backoff jitter. No handler
      accepts a metric from a request body. And the three severity-H findings
      from `capability-audit.md` — the fabricated phoneme track, the fabricated
      VMAF, the unrunnable avatar engine — are closed: fails loud, deleted, and
      retired from capability claims with a drift-guarded status document. One
      soft spot is NAMED RATHER THAN FIXED: `confidence ?? 0` is the worst
      default for a confidence, and the contract cannot express "not reported";
      it is unexercised today and making it expressible is a contract decision.
- [ ] **182.C.40.12** Check this final item only after all prior non-deferred
      items are complete, approved exceptions have owners/expiry, and
      `origin/main` contains the implementation and its evidence. Verified
      2026-09-12 as the last step of a sequential pass over all 32 unchecked
      items. Every one was opened against its source and either fixed or given a
      measured reason; none became checkable, and the reasons now reduce to
      four: `182.C.33`'s CONSENTED CORPUS (17.08, 18.08 in part, 19.05, 19.08,
      19.09, 20.01, 20.07, 33.01-05, 40.02, 40.05 in part, 40.07), a GPU HOST
      (32.03, 32.04, 32.06), the V1.2 RELEASE TRAIN (13.02, 31.07), and the two
      unbound ports plus a reachable object store (40.01, 40.04, 40.06, 40.08).
      The three that are neither: 23.03 waits on a TTS spend-or-install
      decision, 36.08 on a person with a screen reader, and 40.03 on whether its
      new benchmark flag counts as the flagged alternative. `origin/main`
      contains everything through this pass. Board tag 2026-09-18: the closing
      gate of the phase; it follows every item above. `blocked:upstream`

---

## Delivery Milestones

### Milestone A — Honest Foundation

Complete `182.C.01`–`182.C.10`: audited reality, one canonical contract,
authorized reference/audio ingestion, editable shot plans, and a live capability
registry. No customer generation claim is enabled at this milestone.

### Milestone B — First Exact-Audio Active-Scene Vertical Slice

Complete the relevant parts of `182.C.11`–`182.C.21` for one promoted model:
multiple references, approved audio, active performance, durable storage, actual
sync/speech/identity/artifact evaluation, bounded retry, and fail-closed
release. On OpenRouter only the Wan 2.7/2.6 `audio` passthrough can carry
approved audio today, so the candidates for this slice are Wan 2.7 via
OpenRouter and Seedance via the direct `@isis/seedance-provider` clients; the
milestone records which one passed. This is the first milestone that may support
an allowlisted internal demo.

### Milestone C — Creator-Ready Product

Complete `182.C.22`–`182.C.30`: multi-shot continuity, Studio/API flows,
consent/security/provenance, admin review, and production observability. Enable
only benchmark-passing modes and cohorts.

### Milestone D — SOTA Routing and Production Release

Complete `182.C.31`–`182.C.40`: converge V1/legacy systems, evaluate self-hosted
options, build a representative corpus, run the model bakeoff, finish deep
automation and load/security verification, canary safely, and publish evidence.

## Critical Path

1. Canonical contracts and consent must precede provider submission.
2. Durable object storage must replace base64 outputs before production-scale
   clips or real evaluation.
3. Real decoded-frame/audio evaluators must exist before the product can claim
   measured lip sync.
4. Exact speech, correct speaker, identity, anatomy, and safety gates must join
   sync in one non-compensable release decision.
5. One active-scene vertical slice must pass held-out tests before building a
   broad provider menu.
6. Studio and API release paths must consume the same release proof.
7. Multi-speaker and long-form modes remain separately gated until their own
   cohorts pass.
8. Model defaults are promoted from recurring evidence and are reversible.
9. **A RUNNER MUST EXIST BEFORE ANY OF 5 CAN BE DEMONSTRATED, AND ONE DOES NOT**
   (traced 2026-09-12). A submitted job is written at `validating` and the only
   writer of a job row reachable from the running service is the cancel handler,
   so the single thing that can happen to a render request today is that
   somebody stops it. Every module the pipeline needs is written and specced —
   `human-video-render-worker.ts`, `human-video-workflow.ts`'s stage executor,
   `human-video-saga.ts`, `human-video-provider-double.ts` — and nothing calls
   any of them outside a test. WHICH RUNNER IS AN OPEN DECISION AND IT IS NOT A
   WIRING DETAIL. `human-video-workflow.ts` says of itself that its queue is
   in-process and non-durable and is "not a replacement for the durable job
   envelope in `jobs-route.ts`", so the two candidates disagree about
   durability. And the stages between `validating` and `planning` are validation
   and audio preparation: a runner that jumped a job forward to produce a
   candidate would be recording that both had happened. The defensible reading —
   that `submit-job` already performs every check the `validating` stage names,
   so a job that survived submission has been validated — is a decision to take
   deliberately, not to assume while wiring. RESOLVED: the durable envelope is
   the runner (user decision 2026-09-12). `human-video-job-runner.ts` advances
   ONE stage per claim, the envelope persists the claim first so a crash loses
   at most one transition, and `submit-job` hands the recorded job over through
   a PORT rather than importing the queue. `validating` → `planning` is taken as
   a record of what the submission already did, and audio preparation is skipped
   because a named take is already the approved bytes the render is measured
   against. It stops at `planning` and throws with the binding that is missing,
   which the envelope files as `needs_review` — resolving there would mark a
   generation job complete for a render that never started. Measured live:
   submit, operator tick, `validating` → `planning`. What remained before
   `submitted` was a registered lane with a model record, an object root a
   provider can fetch a reference from, and a quarantine store. **THE FIRST OF
   THE THREE IS DONE (2026-09-12).** No registry existed anywhere because the
   one input every `LaneRegistration` needs — the catalogue — had no adapter
   until `human-video-catalogue-reader.ts` shipped the same day.
   `CatalogueLaneRegistry` assembles every route from today's catalogue and
   hands it to `evaluateLaneEligibility`; it does NOT decide eligibility itself,
   which is `182.C.10.04`'s whole rule — advertised support alone must not make
   a model eligible. Measured live against the real catalogue: 2 routes
   registered for exact dialogue, 7 for text-to-scene, 1 for the avatar lane,
   and NONE eligible — each blocked on `policy_not_approved` and
   `region_unrecorded`, with the exact-dialogue pair additionally denied
   `accepts-supplied-audio` as `unprobed`. So the runner's refusal has moved
   from "no lane registry is bound on this deployment" to "a registry answered,
   and it answered none", which is a fact about the REQUEST rather than about
   the deployment. Every unknown is a parameter with an honest empty default —
   no probes, no promotion, no region record, `unreviewed` policy — and the one
   that cannot say "unknown", health, answers zero consecutive failures with
   `lastSuccessAt: null`, because `healthy` in that engine means "not currently
   failing" and a lane nobody has called is not currently failing. The serving
   region is `unstated` unless configured, which matches no dated record, so a
   guessed region cannot serve a likeness into a jurisdiction nobody wrote down.
   **AND THE SECOND OF THE THREE IS DONE.** `QuarantineStore` had been declared
   since the download path was written and had no implementation anywhere —
   three specs held doubles and nothing else. `human-video-quarantine-store.ts`
   is a real one over a local object root: the writer appends each chunk and
   retains none, which is `182.C.16.02`'s bounded memory; the commit is a
   RENAME, so a half-written take is never observable under the name a reader
   uses; and the promotion asks `planTransition` rather than renaming what it
   was handed, so a stage skip, a digest change, a destination under another job
   or another tenant, and a leaf the lifecycle rules did not compute are all
   refused in the namespace module's own words. It is filesystem-only and says
   so: promoting in S3 is a copy-then-delete whose partial failure leaves the
   same bytes under two namespaces, and a bucket- backed deployment gets null
   with that sentence rather than an adapter pretending the two are the same. 17
   tests against a real directory. SO WHAT REMAINS BEFORE `submitted` IS ONE
   THING: an object root a provider can fetch a reference from. `182.C.40.01`
   records it as the real blocker — `placeReferences` hands the provider a URL
   it must retrieve and the local store is on a private port — and it is the
   only one of the three that cannot be closed by writing code on this box.

## Success Standard

Phase 182 is complete when a creator can authorize a person and voice, provide
multiple images and/or reference media, lock the exact words and pronunciation,
direct a genuinely active performance, submit it through an eligible model,
review candidates, and download only a final asset that has passed real
audiovisual sync, exact-speech, speaker, identity, anatomy, motion, safety,
encoding, provenance, and consent gates. The same flow must survive provider
failure, job restart, cancellation, revocation, model drift, and final
transcoding without misrepresenting partial or unmeasured capability as SOTA.
