# Task 13.6 independent confirmatory review

Verdict: **BLOCKED**  
Reviewed: 2026-09-14  
Reviewer role: independent confirmatory  
Candidate: `a9ab5220c88c163471e828533acec3fccfddc9aa`  
Implementation source: `38e6e89d82d1424a56ad456656c6e6ed249164a6`  
Evidence snapshot: `f7065e6179b1c29a831a0f3845899beef1161a87`  
Manifest SHA-256:
`d93bda712cd68f9a7f1621770d359acc84c7031421ef5f9a3a29a4c76135b8bb`

## Passing binding checks

- Implementation → evidence snapshot → candidate ancestry is valid.
- The candidate was the exact `origin/main` tip when reviewed.
- General evidence-manifest admission passed.
- All 23 artifact sizes and SHA-256 values reconciled at the evidence snapshot.
- The retained record file SHA-256 was
  `2211d6149b08424d7225a3cd2f4ec186f564618dd40360596e464f7e07dacab2`.
- Its embedded canonical digest recomputed as
  `a07373673741e52e5cbd8771432b14a2a29087cc39368d4f42788115f56be631`.

No expensive or live suite was rerun during review.

## Blocking findings

1. **The eleven-family result is synthetic rather than production-bound.** The
   runner assigns family labels to one ad-hoc PostgreSQL table, one two-point
   Qdrant collection, and one JSON bundle. Source binding checks bytes but does
   not invoke the named conversation, memory, workbench/ledger, schedule,
   watcher, task, audit, or evidence-manifest stores and migrations. Replace
   labels with per-family seed, backup, restore, migrate, and readback through
   the actual implementation or its authoritative persisted layout.
2. **The deployed vector/index recovery boundary is absent.** The operational
   backup inventory has no Qdrant state, production constructs no
   `QdrantVectorBackend`, and the DR runbooks state that search/provenance are
   neither backed up nor currently rebuildable. Bind a deployed vector/index
   runtime, then implement and prove backup/restore or executable reprojection,
   including query, freshness, isolation, deletion, and recovery.
3. **The Qdrant migration and anti-resurrection results are false positives.**
   The late-write result checks only for a PostgreSQL fence and performs no
   vector write. Migration checks collection dimensions/index metadata but not
   migrated payload values. Attempt and reject a real post-replay vector
   insertion, and read/query migrated payload and index configuration from
   Qdrant.
4. **Production task-state deletion is unmapped.** The authoritative data map
   declares BFF task state `identityMapping: 'opaque'` and
   `deletionAction: 'none'`. The drill hides this with a synthetic erase
   delegate and fabricated successful service outcomes. Map and erase actual
   subject-owned task checkpoints and exercise the real journaled deletion
   chain.
5. **Replay is not an unconditional pre-traffic gate.** Server replay is nested
   under Redis plus deletion-signer availability. A production process with a
   configured journal but absent signer can continue without replay, contrary to
   the runbook. Reconcile/replay before app construction or refuse boot, and
   test missing-signer and missing-Redis startup configurations.
6. **Census, integrity, and timing are not domain measurements.** Census values
   are literals, one global elapsed pair is copied into every family, and
   integrity compares backup bytes with the same in-memory bytes. Derive each
   census from restored state, compare source semantic digests to post-migration
   readback (including vector values/query results), and time each actual
   recovery path.

The existing local/synthetic limitations are not enough to cure these defects:
the manifest and report make authoritative production-family and exact integrity
claims that the retained execution does not prove.