# Journey: Trust & safety voice-abuse monitoring

The current Admin implementation monitors voice-abuse evidence; it does not
execute a response cascade. The parent `/trust-safety` workspace renders a
seeded cloned-voice review queue. The dedicated `/trust-safety/voice-abuse`
route renders read-only `@iris/voice` alerts and revocation-cascade progress,
but its loader defaults to empty unless another module binds it. No button
triages an alert, revokes consent, flags an artifact, notifies a rights holder,
or opens an incident.

| Surface                       | Data shown                                                                  | Mutation available                    |
| ----------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- |
| Parent trust-safety workspace | Cloned-voice cases, target, consent status, match score, detector, assignee | None in `ClonedVoiceReviewList`       |
| Dedicated voice-abuse route   | Alert id/kind/profile/severity/status/evidence/time                         | Tab switch only                       |
| Revocation-cascade tab        | Profile, reason, initiation, SLA, total/flagged/breached/latency            | None                                  |
| `@iris/voice` domain store    | Open, triage, resolve, flag-artifact functions                              | Library API, not wired to Admin route |

## Personas

- **Trust & safety reader** — has the trust-safety workspace scope and inspects
  the monitoring tables.
- **Cloned-voice reviewer** — uses the parent workspace's richer seeded case
  facts for manual triage context.
- **Rights operator** — an adjacent role who would own consent action, but has
  no handoff control in this panel.
- **Incident operator** — may independently open the incident cockpit; no
  voice-alert escalation is wired here.

## Pre-conditions

- An admin session exists and has access to `trust-safety`.
- The parent workspace detail snapshot contains any cloned-voice review rows to
  display.
- The dedicated route receives an `AbuseContext` from `bindVoiceAbuseLoader`;
  without a binding it intentionally renders empty arrays and the current Unix
  time.
- `AbuseAlert.severity` is a numeric value from 0 to 1, not an `S1/S2` taxonomy.

## Steps

```mermaid
flowchart LR
    A[Bound AbuseContext] --> B[Voice-abuse page]
    B --> C[Alerts table]
    B --> D[Cascade progress]
    E[AbuseDetectionStore] -. not wired .-> B
    F[Consent ledger] -. no route call .-> D
    G[Incident cockpit] -. no automatic link .-> B
```

### 1. Inspect cloned-voice cases in the parent workspace

- [x] `/trust-safety` loads the moderation snapshot and composes
      `ClonedVoiceReviewList` among the other safety queues.
- [x] Rows show case status, priority, abuse category, consent status,
      voice-match score, suspected target, content/source references, detector
      model/version, assignee, region, and timestamps.
- [x] Cases sort by status, then priority, then voice-match score.
- [ ] The list has no row action, detail link, audio player, acknowledge,
      assignment, or resolution control.
- [ ] Parent offender history is another list in the same snapshot; no
      case-to-history join is rendered by the cloned-voice component.

### 2. Enter the dedicated voice-abuse route

- [x] A missing session redirects to unauthorized with the dedicated return
      path.
- [x] A session lacking the trust-safety workspace scope redirects with
      `forbidden-workspace`.
- [x] An allowed session loads operator view and the bound context in parallel,
      then renders `VoiceAbusePanel` inside `AdminShell`.
- [ ] No production registration path for `bindVoiceAbuseLoader` is identified
      by this source audit.

### 3. Read and sort alerts

- [x] The Alerts tab reports open/triaging count and total count.
- [x] Rows sort by descending numeric severity.
- [x] Each row exposes alert id, evidence summary, alert kind, profile id,
      severity, status, and reported timestamp.
- [x] Severity at or above 0.8 and 0.5 receives progressively stronger row
      highlighting.
- [ ] The `AbuseAlert` shape has no caller id, target identity, detector
      confidence, audio sample, consent-record id, or incident id.
- [ ] There is no alert selection, triage, dismiss, resolve, or evidence-player
      control.

### 4. Read revocation-cascade progress

- [x] The tab lists each profile id, revocation reason, initiation time, and SLA
      seconds.
- [x] `reportCascadeProgress` derives total artifacts, flagged count, mean flag
      latency, and overdue unflagged count.
- [x] Artifact kinds in this contract are `voice-clip`, `transcript`, and
      `derivative-merge`.
- [x] The component test proves an unflagged artifact becomes an SLA breach
      after the window.
- [ ] The UI does not preview scope or call `flagArtifactsForRevocation`.
- [ ] It does not write a consent ledger, remove media, re-render derivatives,
      or select take-down/disclosure treatment.

### 5. Keep the domain store separate

- [x] `AbuseDetectionStore` can open, triage, and resolve alerts in memory and
      records a resolution decision.
- [x] Resolution actions include no-action, monitor, freeze-profile,
      revoke-profile, and cascade-takedown.
- [x] The Iris unit suite validates state transitions, duplicate/range errors,
      artifact flagging, latency, and SLA calculation.
- [ ] No Admin route instantiates this store for the dedicated page, exposes its
      commands over HTTP, or persists its decisions.

### 6. Keep evaluation evidence separate

- [x] The voice-abuse evaluation contract scores classifier predictions across
      attack type, subject type, consent status, safety category, and
      recommended action.
- [x] It has pass-blocking critical-miss counters for minors, non-consent
      attacks, commercial rights, and sexual-content consent.
- [ ] That offline/release evaluation suite is not the live alert detector,
      queue loader, or operator response workflow.

### 7. Escalate through separate workspaces only

- [x] The Admin app has independent rights, support, incidents, audit, and
      trust-safety surfaces.
- [ ] This panel does not deep-link to those workspaces.
- [ ] No automatic incident declaration, notification job, consent-owner lookup,
      support ticket, or cross-workspace audit correlation is proved.

## Post-conditions

- The operator can inspect the cloned-voice queue and, when a loader is bound,
  the dedicated alert/cascade monitoring snapshot.
- The displayed cascade metrics are derived read-only from the supplied
  `RevocationCascade` values.
- No alert or consent state is changed by the dedicated page.
- No claim is made that the source detector, Iris domain store, consent ledger,
  incident cockpit, notifications, or global audit trail are connected.

## Failure modes

- **Loader never bound** — the dedicated page honestly renders zero alerts and
  cascades.
- **Missing trust-safety scope** — access redirects before the monitoring panel
  renders.
- **Severity taxonomy mismatch** — treating numeric severity as `S1/S2` invents
  a contract.
- **Rich-case/detail conflation** — parent cloned-voice rows and dedicated Iris
  alerts are different shapes without a proved identity join.
- **Read-only control mistaken for response** — tab switches do not triage,
  resolve, or revoke.
- **Cascade metric mistaken for cascade command** — SLA counts are computed from
  input; nothing is written.
- **In-memory domain store mistaken for production wiring** — the tested class
  is not connected to the Admin loader.
- **Evaluation suite mistaken for live detector** — golden-case evaluation does
  not ingest an operational alert.
- **Incident/notification inference** — no automatic route or job is called.

## E2E coverage

- [apps/oshun/admin/src/app/trust-safety/voice-abuse/voice-abuse-panel.test.tsx](../../apps/oshun/admin/src/app/trust-safety/voice-abuse/voice-abuse-panel.test.tsx)
  proves descending alert severity and cascade SLA-breach rendering.
- [libs/iris/voice/src/voice.test.ts](../../libs/iris/voice/src/voice.test.ts)
  proves the separate in-memory alert state machine and cascade calculations.
- [libs/contracts/src/common/safety-voice-abuse-evaluation.spec.ts](../../libs/contracts/src/common/safety-voice-abuse-evaluation.spec.ts)
  covers the separate classifier evaluation contract and critical-miss gates.
- [apps/oshun/admin/e2e/accessibility-key-workspaces.spec.ts](../../apps/oshun/admin/e2e/accessibility-key-workspaces.spec.ts)
  covers the parent trust-safety workspace's general accessibility, not the
  dedicated voice-abuse route.

Coverage is **component/unit level for voice-abuse monitoring and absent for
operator response**. There is no dedicated Playwright journey and no tested
alert → revocation → notification → incident chain.

## Per-view files touched by this journey

- [workspaces/safety/trust-safety.md](../workspaces/safety/trust-safety.md) —
  parent moderation workspace and cloned-voice list.
- [workspaces/safety/trust-safety-voice-abuse.md](../workspaces/safety/trust-safety-voice-abuse.md)
  — dedicated read-only alert and cascade monitor.
- [workspaces/safety/rights.md](../workspaces/safety/rights.md) — adjacent
  consent workspace; no handoff is wired.
- [workspaces/safety/incidents.md](../workspaces/safety/incidents.md) — separate
  incident cockpit.

## Cross-references

- [incident-handling-admin.md](./incident-handling-admin.md) — real incident
  controls, independent of this monitor.
- [persona-release-cycle.md](./persona-release-cycle.md) — persona and voice
  release evidence boundaries.
- `apps/oshun/admin/src/app/trust-safety/page.tsx` — parent composition.
- `apps/oshun/admin/src/app/trust-safety/voice-abuse/page.tsx` — session, scope,
  and loader boundary.
- `apps/oshun/admin/src/app/trust-safety/voice-abuse/VoiceAbusePanel.tsx` —
  read-only monitor.
- `libs/iris/voice/src/integrity/abuse-detection.ts` — separate domain store and
  cascade math.

## Open questions

- [ ] Which production module binds the dedicated voice-abuse loader?
- [ ] Should parent cloned-voice case ids map to Iris alert ids and profile ids?
- [ ] What durable service owns alert triage and resolution decisions?
- [ ] Which endpoint previews and commits artifact revocation idempotently?
- [ ] How are consent-ledger writes, artifact treatment, and rollback modeled?
- [ ] Which workspace owns affected-party notification and delivery receipts?
- [ ] What severity policy should create or link an incident?
- [ ] Which audit correlation id joins alert, consent, artifact, notification,
      and incident evidence?
- [ ] What Playwright fixture can exercise the dedicated route with realistic
      bound data and mutation controls once they exist?